FIFTH SECTION

DECISION

Application no. 20647/21 Karel KARAS against the Czech Republic

The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting on 6 April 2023 as a Committee composed of:

Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström , President , Lado Chanturia, Mykola Gnatovskyy , judges , and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 20647/21) against the Czech Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 10 April 2021 by a Czech national, Mr Karel Karas (“the applicant”), who was born in 1968 and lives in Příbram and who was represented by Mr J. Bouček, a lawyer practising in Prague;

the decision to give notice of the complaint concerning the applicant’s right to respect for family life to the Czech Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Mr P. Konůpka, of the Ministry of Justice, and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible;

the parties’ observations;

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1. The application mainly concerns the applicant’s right to respect for his family life following significant restrictions on his visiting rights in respect of his daughter in order to prevent confrontational situations which had been found to be detrimental to the child’s health and mental development (Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention).

2 . The applicant is the father of A., who was born in 2014. In May 2016, within divorce proceedings, he and his ex-wife agreed on shared custody of A.

3 . Because of the parents’ acrimonious relationship and the applicant’s inappropriate behaviour, the following interim measures were issued pending a hearing on the merits. In April 2017 the Příbram District Court awarded custody of A. to the mother and gave the applicant the right to see his daughter twice a week. In February 2018 the court deprived the applicant of his visiting rights, finding his attitude detrimental to the child’s healthy development. The court referred mainly to the applicant’s manipulative behaviour and false accusations against the mother, which had led to several police interventions and unnecessary hospitalisations of A. It also noted that after the applicant had repeatedly returned A. to her mother late, he had refused to return her at all, which had led to the making of a court order for her to be returned. In July 2018 the applicant was allowed to see A. once a week under the supervision of a social worker but, because his disrespectful behaviour towards social workers compromised the successful supervision of contact, he was again deprived of his visiting rights in February 2019.

4. In the meantime, the applicant was convicted of stalking of the mother; according to an expert report drawn up for the purposes of the criminal proceedings, he suffered from a severe form of paranoid personality disorder.

5 . During the proceedings on the merits, the court heard the parents and considered several expert reports. The experts confirmed that, despite his personality disorder, the applicant loved his daughter and she also had positive feelings towards him which were, however, associated with unpleasant emotional experiences. According to the last expert report drawn up in May 2019 by an expert commissioned at the applicant’s request, who was also heard by the court, A.’s relationship with the applicant was ambivalent but she liked him and wished to continue meeting him; she had developed defence mechanisms of regression and somatisation as a reaction to emotionally demanding situations. According to the expert, the applicant was completely uncritical of himself and suffered from a paranoid personality disorder, which substantially affected his parenting abilities and made him unable to ensure A.’s full development. Since the applicant kept exposing A. to situations of stress and conflict, the expert reported that contact with him was not beneficial to A. and recommended that contact between them should be either ended or reduced to supervised contact taking place at long intervals such as once or twice a year, since more frequent contact would increase the risks to A.’s healthy development. The expert added that a change to visiting rights could be considered in the future provided that the applicant underwent therapy and took a critical look at his own behaviour.

Finding that the above-mentioned expert report was clear and supported by the file and that its author had convincingly explained her conclusions, the court rejected the applicant’s request for a second expert report; it also refused to supplement the evidence with additional written evidence, statements and various recordings made by the applicant, which were considered inappropriate and irrelevant given that the applicant’s allegations had already been disproved by other concrete evidence.

6. A.’s guardian ad litem reported that the social environment at the child’s mother’s home was found to be harmonious, and recommended that the applicant have supervised contact with A. limited to three times a year.

7. By a judgment of 19 December 2019, relying mainly on the above ‑ mentioned expert report, the court gave custody of A. to her mother. It found that the applicant had a negative influence on A. and that contact with him was not in her best interests, and therefore it limited the applicant’s visiting rights to one hour three times per year, under the supervision of a social worker.

8. On 16 June 2020 the appellate court upheld the judgment as to the scope of the applicant’s visiting rights, emphasising that according to the expert report, it was necessary for A.’s successful mental development to prevent the confrontational situations that were being repeatedly caused by the applicant.

9. The applicant lodged a constitutional appeal, relying on Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention, and on 13 October 2020 the Constitutional Court dismissed it as manifestly ill-founded (II. US 2574/20). It considered that the applicant was merely expressing his strong disagreement with decisions of the courts which had been duly reasoned and it explained why there had been no need for further evidence. It also endorsed the conclusion that under the given circumstances it was necessary to take steps to provide A. with a stable environment.

10 . It appears from the Government’s submissions that such supervised contact has been taking place successfully and also that in October 2021 the applicant’s parental responsibility was restricted because of his adverse influence on A.’s development.

THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT

11. Relying on Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention, the applicant complained that evidence submitted by him had not been admitted by the domestic courts and that his family life had been significantly disrupted by the decisions taken on the merits since he had been prevented from seeing his daughter and participating in her upbringing.

12. The Court, being the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case, considers that all the complaints raised by the applicant fall to be examined under Article 8 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis , Macready v. the Czech Republic , nos. 4824/06 and 15512/08, § 41, 22 April 2010). It will examine the case in the light of its well-established case-law and consider whether, in the light of the case as a whole, the reasons adduced to justify the limitation of the applicant’s visiting rights were relevant and sufficient and whether the domestic authorities struck a fair balance between the interests of the child and those of the parents, bearing in mind that particular importance should be attached to the best interests of the child (see, for example, Sommerfeld v. Germany [GC], no. 31871/96, § 64, ECHR 2003 ‑ VIII (extracts), and Z.J. v. Lithuania , no. 60092/12, § 96, 29 April 2014). What is decisive is whether the national authorities have taken all necessary steps to facilitate contact as can reasonably be demanded in the particular circumstances of the present case.

13. The Court accepts that the scope of the applicant’s visiting rights as determined in the contested proceedings on the merits appears very limited. It agrees, however, with the Government’s argument that the applicant had previously been given sufficient opportunity to develop his relationship with his daughter and demonstrate his parenting skills, since the contested decisions restricting his access to A. were taken only after other arrangements, from shared custody through relatively frequent unsupervised contact and then supervised contact, had failed (see paragraphs 2 and 3 above).

14. It follows from the file that the domestic courts, which are better placed than the Court to weigh the different interests at stake, proceeded carefully with the case and placed the child’s best interests first, as is required by Article 8 as well as by domestic law and international instruments. Without neglecting the child’s positive feelings towards the applicant, as submitted by him, the courts referred to the applicant’s long-term inappropriate behaviour, his aggressive attitude towards social workers, his attempts at manipulating A. and his non-compliance with interim measures. They largely relied on the expert report of May 2019 (see paragraph 5 above), according to which the applicant had repeatedly placed A. in situations of conflict capable of leading to trauma and his influence was harmful to A.’s healthy development.

15. The Court also observes that it has not been disputed by the applicant that he is able to meet with his daughter as provided by the contested decisions (see paragraph 10 above), which allows their family ties to be maintained.

16. The Court reiterates in this connection that a parent cannot be entitled to have measures taken that would harm the child’s health and development (see, for example, Pedovič v. the Czech Republic , no. 27145/03, § 109, 18 July 2006, and Drenk v. the Czech Republic , no. 1071/12, § 84, 4 September 2014). There is nothing to indicate that the findings reached by the domestic courts, which had the benefit of directly hearing all the persons concerned, were unreasonable and thus fell outside their wide margin of appreciation. Nor can the Court agree with the applicant’s submissions that the courts showed bias against him because they viewed him as a troublemaker.

17. The Court further notes that the decisions at issue were reached following adversarial proceedings in which the applicant was able to put forward all his arguments and submit all his evidence, and the refusal to admit his evidence was duly reasoned (see paragraph 5 in fine above). It is to be noted in particular that it is generally for the domestic authorities to decide whether expert reports are needed (see Strand Lobben and Others v. Norway [GC], no. 37283/13, § 223, 10 September 2019) and that, in the present case, the court adequately explained why there had been no need for the second expert report requested by the applicant. The Court is therefore satisfied that the applicant was involved in the decision-making process to a degree sufficient to protect his interests.

18. The Court concludes from the above that the decision-making process was fair and that the reasons advanced by the domestic courts were relevant and sufficient. It further considers that the courts struck a fair balance between the interests at stake and cannot be reproached for having neglected their duties under Article 8 of the Convention.

19. Consequently, the present application must be declared inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 4 May 2023.

Martina Keller Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström Deputy Registrar President