CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE RAVARANI

1. I am in agreement with the conclusion reached by the majority of judges that, in the circumstances of the case, there has been no violation of Article 10. I should like, however, to make clear that I reached that conclusion only because of the specificity of the known facts and, moreover, lacunae in the presentation of other facts which might have been relevant for the assessment of the alleged violation. Based on the available information, it appears to me that the case was not about (i) the applicant’s allegedly impaired right to express his opinions, but rather (ii) his non-compliance with a legal and proportionate police order, based on the risk of degeneration of the peaceful conduct of the gathering into which he had introduced himself.

2. As a matter of fact, the applicant and Mr B. were not actually prevented from expressing their opinion at any point during the demonstration. It is true, as stated in paragraph 9 of the judgment, that the police invited them to remove the provocative banner, but they refused to do so; moreover, they were able to remain in the middle of the pro-Putin gathering and to display their banner during the entire meeting, until its very end. So, there actually was no concrete impediment to expressing their opinion.

3. It is true that at some point the police invited them to remove their banner. I am in agreement with the majority that there was a genuine risk to the peaceful conduct of the event and it appears quite astonishing that only two participants in the demonstration showed discontent with the provocative banner being displayed in their midst. The police did not, to my mind, take an unreasonable or excessive step in inviting the applicant and Mr B. to remove their banner; on the contrary, such action showed sound risk ‑ assessment. It is futile to speculate on how the police would have reacted had they stepped out of the demonstration and displayed their banner outside the pro-Putin crowd in a quite visible way, using their right to counter ‑ demonstrate. Had there had been an intervention by the police in such a situation, there would certainly have been an issue under that right. In this context, I feel obliged to distance myself from the statement contained in paragraph 36 of the judgment according to which “the applicant’s banner distorted and undermined the message that other participants and the overall demonstration wanted to convey, which was in support of Mr Putin”, as it is highly ambiguous and could be understood as restricting the right to counter ‑ demonstrate, which is protected by Article 10 of the Convention (see the references to the Court’s case-law in that field in paragraph 33 of the judgment).

4. It is also true that once the gathering was over, the police stepped in and took the applicant to the police station in order to record the administrative offence of non-compliance with a legal order. It appears to me that, as a matter of fact, the applicant had indeed failed to abide by such an order. This did not in itself impair his freedom of expression, as it does not appear from the facts that the given order was aimed at preventing him from expressing his opinions, but rather at avoiding uproar and violence, as the applicant actually continued to display his banner and did not step out of the gathering; had he done so and the police had nevertheless recorded an administrative offence, an issue under Article 10 would certainly have arisen.

5. The fact of taking the applicant to the police station could have given rise to a violation of Convention guarantees if it had been shown that it was triggered by the content of his banner rather than by the refusal to abide by an invitation that quite legitimately tried to minimise a risk of physical violence, not least directed against the applicant and Mr. B. themselves. There could also have been a Convention issue if the applicant had been taken by force to the police station and been obliged to remain in the premises longer than necessary to draw up the offence record. However, the facts surrounding this episode are unknown or at the least unexplained (see paragraph 11 of the judgment) and the applicant has not lodged a complaint under Article 5 of the Convention.

JOINT CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGES ELÓSEGUI AND ZÜND

1. In the present case of Manannikov v. Russia we have voted with the majority because we agree with the finding that there has been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The reason for our concurring opinion is to emphasise one of the elements which ought to be taken into consideration as a limitation on the right to freedom of expression, namely the rights of expression of other citizens.

2. We agree with the reasoning in the judgment to the effect that there is a double reason for finding no violation, namely the legitimate aims of protecting the rights of others and preventing a disturbance of public order. Our caveat is that in the current circumstances, different parts of the population demonstrate on an increasingly frequent basis in public spaces because they hold different opinions about social matters, such as, for instance, the policies imposed by States with regard to pandemic-related public-health measures. We are living in tense societies all around Europe, for very different causes and reasons.

3. In our view, what it is important under Article 10 is that those citizens who have requested official permission to demonstrate in one or another direction should be able to do so, without being hampered by other citizens who think differently. In the present case, the fact that the applicant (Mr Manannikov) introduced himself into the middle of an authorised demonstration distorted the message that the other participants wished to express. In fact, by displaying a banner stating that “Putin is better than Hitler” he changed the overall image of the demonstration, which was intended to express support for Mr Putin.

4. In our view, this behaviour of course increased the risk of conflict, but, moreover, it also failed to respect the rights of others to freedom of expression. The applicant is free to think in another way, but he is not entitled to impede others from expressing their views in the way that he did. The case ‑ law of the Court has insisted on the idea that the exercise of one individual’s freedom may be limited if it impedes the rights of others. For instance, in the case of Steel and Others v. the United Kingdom (23 September 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 ‑ VII), the first applicant, together with approximately sixty others, took part in a protest against a grouse shoot on Wheeldale Moor, Yorkshire (ibid., § 7). She was arrested for a “breach of the peace”. Moreover, “according to the police she was intentionally impeding the progress of a member of the shoot by walking in front of him as he lifted his shotgun to take aim, thus preventing him from firing” (ibid., § 8). She was further charged with using “threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress” (ibid., § 10). The Court found that the measures taken against her had not given rise to a violation of Article 10.

5. We would like to emphasise that the Court has consistently underlined “the importance of the right to counter-demonstration, which could be held at the same time and venue [as] a demonstration (see, for example, Öllinger v. Austria , no. 76900/01, § 44, ECHR 2006 ‑ IX; and Fáber v. Hungary , no. 40721/08, §§ 42-44, 24 July 2012)”; see paragraph 33 of the present judgment. However this right to counter-demonstration is not absolute and it has to respect the rights of others (see Plattform “Ärzte für das Leben” v. Austria , 21 June 1988, § 32, Series A no. 139; Fáber , cited above, § 38; and Berkman v. Russia , no. 46712/15, § 47, 1 December 2020; see also paragraph 34 of the present judgment). This was not so in the present case, as outlined in paragraph 3 above.