CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE SEIBERT-FOHR JOINED BY JUDGE ZÃœND

1. I agree with the majority’s finding of a violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention for the reasons given in paragraph 47 of the judgment. Whereas a requirement of loyalty to a State for members of the legislative branch constitutes a legitimate aim justifying restrictions on electoral rights (see Tănase v. Moldova [GC], no. 7/08, § 166, ECHR 2010), the Government have failed to explain (see paragraph 34 of the judgment) why it was necessary to introduce this restriction for dual nationals thirteen years after the adoption of the Constitution, by which time the Russian political system had already been shaped (see paragraph 47 of the judgment and Tănase , cited above, § 172).

2. I am less persuaded by the majority’s critique that the ban was formulated in absolute terms for any multiple nationalities without providing for exceptions for particular circumstances (see paragraphs 48-49 of the judgment). While the Court asks for an individualisation of restrictions on Convention rights protected under Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention, the same rationale does not automatically also apply to the right to equal suffrage. The Court has recognised that the degree of individualisation required under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 is different from that under Articles 8 to 11 (see Ādamsons v. Latvia , no. 3669/03, § 111, 24 June 2008). This applies also to the passive rights protected under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.

3. In the context of election law there is a need for general rules regarding the right to stand for elections. The enactment of generally applicable norms is a correlate to the principle of general elections. Therefore, States are not required to make an individualised assessment of the particular circumstances of each candidate (see Scoppola v. Italy (no. 3) [GC], no. 126/05, § 102, 22 May 2012), recognising, in the context of the right to vote, generally applicable laws which are based on a balance between the competing interests). Moreover, as a matter of non-discrimination, a restriction on the right to stand for elections depending on the national origin of a dual national, in the absence of objective grounds for justification, would be equally questionable (for non-discrimination in elections, see also the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 12 September 2006 in Eman and Sevinger , C-300/04, EU:C:2006:545, paragraph 61).

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE LOBOV

1. I voted against the finding of a violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in the present case.

2. To explain my position, a brief reminder of the key principles arising from the Court’s established case-law would be in order (emphasis added):

“There are numerous ways of organising and running electoral systems and a wealth of differences, inter alia, in historical development, cultural diversity and political thought within Europe which it is for each Contracting State to mould into [its] own democratic vision.” (see Hirst v. the United Kingdom (no. 2) [GC], no. 74025/01, § 61, ECHR 2005-IX)

“[T]he Contracting States enjoy considerable latitude in establishing constitutional rules on the status of members of parliament, including criteria governing eligibility to stand for election. ” (see Ždanoka v. Latvia [GC], no. 58278/00, § 106, ECHR 2006 ‑ IV)

“Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 ... do[es] not prevent, in principle, Contracting States from introducing general policy schemes by way of legislative measures whereby a certain category or group of individuals is treated differently from others, provided that the interference with the rights of the statutory category or group as a whole can be justified under the Convention.” (ibid., § 112)

“[T]he competent authorities cannot take account of every individual case in regulating the exercise of voting rights, but must lay down a general rule .” (see Sitaropoulos and Giakoumopoulos v. Greece [GC], no. 42202/07, § 79, ECHR 2012)

3. Hidden behind a perfunctory reference in paragraph 36 of the judgment, these cogent fundamentals established by generations of Strasbourg judges sitting in the Grand Chamber should have compelled the Chamber to display greater caution in applying the Tănase approach, which was tied to radically different factual, historical, cultural and political circumstances (see Tănase v. Moldova ([GC], no. 7/08, §§ 11-18, 26 and 173, ECHR 2010).

4. Bearing in mind the above principles, the Chamber should also have shown greater “process-based” deference towards the Russian Constitutional Court, which gave a detailed and meaningful assessment of the impugned legislation in the light of both the Constitution and the European Court’s case-law.

5. A closer attention to the wide margin of appreciation, which is only incidentally mentioned in the text (see paragraph 48), would likewise have added weight to the Chamber judgment.

6. Indeed, the Grand Chamber has consistently emphasised that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 goes no further than prescribing “free” elections held at “reasonable intervals”, “by secret ballot” and “under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium , 2 March 1987, § 54, Series A no. 113, and Sitaropoulos and Giakoumopoulos , cited above, § 65). Admittedly, the deprivation of the passive electoral rights of some 30% of the Moldovan population who held both Moldovan and Romanian citizenship may, by its nature and extent, have impaired the very essence of free elections, thus violating Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, as the Grand Chamber unanimously found in Tănase (cited above). Two years later, however, the Grand Chamber unanimously held in Sitaropoulos and Giakoumopoulos (cited above) that the impossibility of remote voting in the case of the applicants, who were among four million Greeks living abroad (as compared to ten million living in the mainland), did not violate the same provision. The impact in the present case of the restrictions on the right to be elected in Russia is simply incomparable to that of the restrictions observed either in Greece or in Moldova. The majority’s conclusion is therefore contradicted by both the case-law and the reality on the ground.

7. Lastly, the Chamber regrettably missed a crucial point of what “citizenship” (“ citoyenneté ”) may really mean beyond “nationality” (“ nationalité ”) in different political and cultural contexts. According to the Russian Constitutional Court, “ the right to be elected to public office is vested specifically in Russian citizens as people who have stable political and legal ties with the State. ... Since a citizen of the Russian Federation who also has citizenship of a foreign State has political and legal ties with the Russian Federation and at the same time with the respective foreign State, towards which he or she has constitutional obligations and obligations based on the laws of that State, the importance of his or her Russian citizenship as an expression of the political and legal value of the tie with [Russia] objectively decreases ” (see paragraph 20 of the judgment for more details). The Chamber remained deaf to this line of reasoning, limiting its analysis to the loyalty and security discourse to such an extent that it strikingly failed to recognise the legitimate aim of the legal restrictions at issue (see paragraphs 43-44 and 49 of the judgment).

8. The misunderstanding of citizenship as an ensemble of stable political and legal ties with the State and of its variable implications has led the majority, in my view, to erroneous legal conclusions which are at odds with the predominant approach in the Court’s case-law. The attempt to find support in the Council of Europe’s reports and recommendations is of little help in the present case. None of the texts referred to by the majority forms a basis for concluding that, as the law currently stands, States are under an obligation to grant the right to be elected to persons with dual citizenship (see, mutatis mutandis , Sitaropoulos and Giakoumopoulos , cited above, § 75).