P ARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE WOJTYCZEK

1. I respectfully disagree with the majority view that there has been a violation of A rticle 8 of the Convention in the present case. At the same time , I fully share the c oncerns expressed by J udge D e Gaetano and support the princip a l arguments developed in his partly dissenting opinion.

2. In the present case , the applicant knew the identity of his biological father. The Helsinki Court of Appeal has established that no legal impediment prevented the applicant from initiating proceedings within the statutory time-limit imposed by Finnish legislation. This time-limit , as applied in the circumstances of the present case , did not deprive the applicant of the possibility of fully exercising his rights protected under the Convention. In this c ontext , I agree with J udge D e Gaetano ’ s view that the applicant has only himself to blame for the situation in which he found himself after the expir y of the five - year transitional period to bring a n action for filiation. However , I am not certain whether we can qualify the situation of the applicant as a mistake of law (a mistake as to the content of legislation) or rather as a mistake as to the content of the official registers. This doubt is , nonetheless , irrelevant for the solution of the case.

3. The European legal culture widely recogni s es the principle vigilantibus leges sunt scriptae . Any legal system is based on the assumption that its addressees should show due diligence as to the official registration or recognition of the existing social and legal realities. This pertains also to family law. The requirement of due diligence is the necessary correlate of the legal recognition of individual freedom and personal autonomy. In other words , freedom and diligence are two sides of the same coin.

Legal certainty in family relationships is a prerequisite for the protection of the right to respect f or private and family life enshrined in A rt icle 8 of the Convention. The assumption that every adult is responsible for ensuring that the official registers reflect his family status may not be seen , in principle , as an interference with the rights protected by A rt icle 8 of the Convention.

4. I have doubts about the method of interpretation of the Convention underlying the present judgment. I am neither convinced by the argument referring to the content of legislation in the majority of the High Contracting Parties nor by the reference to an existing tendency among the High Contracting Parties (par agraph 52). Firstly , these arguments indirectly confirm that there is no unanimity among the High Contracting Parties on the issue. Secondly , it has not been ascertained that the tendencies referred to really constitute a practice in the application of the Convention which would be relevant for the purposes of its interpretation under the applicable principles of international law pertaining to treaty interpretation.