CASE OF LAAKSO v. FINLANDPARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE DE GAETANO
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Document date: January 15, 2013
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PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE DE GAETANO
1. I regret that I cannot agree with the majority that in this case there was a violation of Article 8. In my view the facts disclose at best only ignorance of the law on the part of the applicant , and at worst carelessness on his part which , given the publicity leading up to and subsequent to the enactment of the Paternity Act , can only be described as carelessness of a very high degree.
2. This was not the typical case where up to the time of the expiry of the period within which the action for filiation could be brought , the applicant was unaware of who was his or her biological father; or merely suspected that a particular person was or could be his or her biological father; or was otherwise impeded from bringing the action by an “unavoidable” obstacle , physical or otherwise. In the instant case the applicant positively knew that K.R. was his father , and this well before the law came into force. The only argument brought by the applicant is that he was not aware that , in spite of K.R. paying child support as ordered by a court , the said K.R. had not been legally registered as his father. In other words he was under the mistaken belief that as the domestic court had confirmed K.R. ’ s liability for the payment of child support , paternity had been legally established. This , to my mind , is a mistake of law , that is a mistake as to the legal consequences of the court ’ s decision on child support. This mistake was in any case easily avoidable if only the applicant had bothered to consult a lawyer. As the Helsinki Court of Appeal held (§ 12) no legal impediment had prevented the applicant from initiating proceedings within the five-year time-limit. In other words the applicant had only himself to blame – imputet sibi – for the situation in which he found himself after the expiry of the fi ve- year transitional period.
3. As this Court has had occasion to state , “ ... the existence of a limitation period per se is not incompatible with the Convention. What the Court needs to ascertain in a given case is whether the nature of the time-limit in question and/or the manner in which it is applied is compatible with the Convention” ( Phinikaridou v. Cyprus , no. 23890/02 , § 52 , 20 December 2007). The instant case is certainly not one where a legal presumption has been allowed to prevail in unreasonable circumstances over biological and social reality – the period of limitation was reasonable in length and pursued a legitimate aim , and the applicant was aware of the biological and social reality. Time-limits , which in themselves are designed to secure the proper administration of justice in compliance with the principle of legal certainty ( Mizzi v. Malta , no. 26111/02 , § 83 , ECHR 2006 ‑ I (extracts)) , cannot be circumvente d by the spurious argument that one was not aware of what the law said or provided , or was not aware of the legal effects or consequences of certain decisions (like the “incorrect perception” – see § 52 – as to the court order to pay child support). Even in Backlund v. Finland (no. 36498/05 , 6 July 2010 ) the Court was quick to dismiss “the applicant ’ s alleged ignorance of t he statutory time-limit” (see § 53 of that judgment) , although it then went on (wrongly , in my view) to find a violation of Article 8.
4. In the instant case , while I am pr epared to subscribe to the judg ment (on the Article 8 issue) as far as § 49 , I am unable to agree with the reasoning and conclusion in §§ 50 to 56. In particular neither the fact that many States do not set a time-limit for an action for filiation (§ 52) , nor the fact that the Finnish courts did not have the possibility to “balance the competing interests” (§§ 53 and 55) , are relevant to the issue at hand. Had the Finnish courts carried out this balancing exercise , they should nonetheless have dismissed the applicant ’ s request because a “fair balance was struck” in this case – the applicant had only himself to blame for ignoring the law.
5. This judgment could be read as not only condoning ignorance of the law and carelessness , but also rewarding it with EUR 6 , 000.
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