PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE SPANO

I.

1. I agree with the Court that the applicant ’ s right to freedom of expression under Article 10 has been violated on the facts of this case. However, as regards his complaint under Article 6 § 1, that the length of the domestic proceedings was unreasonable, I respectfully dissent.

2. According to the well-established case-law of th e Court, when examining complaints of this kind under Article 6 § 1, the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see Frydlender v. France , [GC], 30979/96, § 43, 27 June 2000).

3. I n many cases dealt with by the Court, it is evident right at the outset that the length of proceedings at domestic level ha s been excessive and no reasonable justification can be provided by the respondent G overnment. This applies especially in those contracting S tates where the Court has previously found systemic and structural problems within the judicial systems in relation to the length of proceedings (see paragraph 79 of the judgment and the case cited therein). In such cases, the Court is justified in applying the Frydlender criteria in a way that takes account of the effective and expeditious use of the Court ’ s limited resources, thus limiting somewhat its reasoning in the light of the particular facts of the case.

4. However, the Court must, in my view, always be mindful that the test to be applied under Article 6 § 1 demands, in principle, a case-by-case approach. If the G overnment can, in a particular case, provide plausible justifications for the length of the proceedings in question, it is incumbent on the Court to examine on the basis of the above-mentioned criteria (see paragraph 2 above ) whether there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 on the facts. This applies, at least, where the total period to be taken into consideration does not, prima facie , lead to the conclusion that it is evident that the length of the domestic proceedings has been excessive. Hence, a more in-depth examination of the facts is warranted.

In my view, this is such a case.

II.

5. The Court correctly concludes (see paragraph 77) that the proceedings in this case lasted approximately six years and a little over three months. As can be inferred from the lack of reasoning in paragraph 79, the Court held that this time frame, in and of itself, warranted the conclusion that an Article 6 § 1 violation had occur r ed, taking into account similar cases previously decided involving complaints of this type against the respondent G overnment.

6. The time-line of the judicial proceedings in this case is described in detail in paragraphs 13-38. In my view, the following chronological summary of events will demonstrate that if one examines the facts on the basis of the Frydlender criteria, as mentioned in paragraph 2 above , one should conclude that the length of the proceedings, examined in their entirety and in context, was reasonable within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

III.

7. The plaintiff in this case brought a civil action against the applicant for compensation on 29 November 2000. In examining the length of the ensuing proceedings it is important under the applicable test to note that in the present case the plaintiff ’ s personality rights and the applicant ’ s freedom of expression w ere implicated. It was therefore clearly justified for the domestic courts to pursue the matter in a comprehensive and diligent manner. In the course of the proceedings the first - instance court thus obtained expert s ’ reports, but the applicant object ed to the appointment of the experts in question and his actions in this regard undoubtedly ha d some effect on the timely progress of the proceedings.

8. On 25 October 2001, eleven months after the civil action was brought , the first - instance court gave judgment in the case, finding for the plaintiff.

9. The applicant appealed on an unspecified date. Just under seven months after the judgment of the first - instance court , the Fourth Division of the Court of Cassation gave judgment, quashing the lower court judgment. The plaintiff sought rectification of that judgment, which was rejected on 11 November 2002, just under seven months from the appellate judgment on the merits.

10. Three months later, on 4 February 2003, the first - instance court appointed new experts in the light of the judgment of the Fourth Division of the Court of Cassation, and on 21 April 2003, just over two and a half months later, a new expert s ’ report was submitted to the Court. The applicant again objected to the report and the appointment of the experts. Thus , on 1 October 2003, just over five months after the submission of the second expert s ’ report, the first - instance court appointed three new experts. Just over one month later, on 22 December 2003, the new expert s ’ report was submitted. Two months later, on 25 February 2004, the first - instance court gave judgment again.

11. The applicant appealed again. Just over seven months later, on 19 October 2004, the Fourth Division of the Court of Cassation gave judgment a second time and, again, quashed the judgment of the first - instance court, in the applicant ’ s favour. Just over a year later, on 8 November 2005, the first - instance court decided to disregard the judgment of the Fourth Division of the Court of Cassation and ordered the applicant to pay compensation.

12. Naturally, the applicant appealed a third time to the Court of Cassation, his appeal, according to domestic law, coming before the Plenary Session of the Court of Cassation. The Plenary Session gave judgment against the applicant on 10 May 2006, just over a year and a half after the first - instance court had disregarded the judgment of the Fourth Division. However, it is of some significance in this respect that the date of the applicant ’ s appeal to the Plenary Session is unspecified in the documents provided to the Court , nor is there any information on whether and when observations were submitted by the parties before the Plenary Session.

13. The applicant then requested the rectification of the judgment of the Plenary Session , which rejected his plea on 27 September 2006, just over four months after giving judgment in May of the same year. Just over two months later, on 16 November 2007, the Plenary Session decided, however, to reduce the amount of compensation. Lastly, four months later, on 14 March 2007, the Plenary Session rejected a request from both parties to rectify its judgment.

IV.

14. The length of the proceedings in th e present case w as , viewed objectively, rather long. However, the applicable test under the Court ’ s case law requires an examination on whether delays that may be attributed to the State were the predominant cause or whether other factors were at play. In my view, it is clear that taking into account the complexity of the factual and legal questions at stake , the need to obtain expert s ’ reports and the objections made by the applicant in that regard, the difficulty of the issue of plagiarism in the Turkish legal system and its ramifications within the academic environment, and, lastly, the issues involved for both parties, the G overnment ha ve adequately demonstrated that the length of the proceedings was, taken in its entirety and in context, justified.

In sum, I am of the opinion that there has been no violation of Article 6 § 1 in th e present case.

[1] . The book was first published in 1952. The latest edition was published in 2000.

[2] . The book was first published in 1946.

[3] . Higher Education Council.

[4] . An academic appointment equivalent to associate professor.

[5] . In the expert report Prof. Dr. G.C. represents herself as professor of English language and literature at At ı l ı m University.  However, it seems she was also working at Hacettepe University at the material time, as attested to by the official document submitted by that University suggesting her to the first-instance court.