PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE KŪRIS

1. I disagree with the majority regarding point 3 of the operative part of the judgment. In paragraph 64 it is stated that “the finding of a violation of Article 10 of the Convention constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant” (see paragraph 64 of the judgment). In my opinion, that compensation had to be awarded. It is not explained why it was not.

2. In Kar á csony and Others v. Hungary ([GC] (nos. 42461/13 and 44357/13, 17 May 2016) the applicants, who also were politicians, were likewise not awarded compensation for non-pecuniary damage, although the Court found that there had been a violation of Article 10 in their regard. The Grand Chamber did not specify the reasons for that decision not to award just satisfaction (see Kar á csony and Others , § 181). So, one may only guess what those reasons could have been.

I have grounds to think that the reasons were similar to those indicated in my partly dissenting opinions in the two Chamber cases, which preceded that Grand Chamber case (see Kar á csony and Others v. Hungary (no. 42461/13) and Sz é l and Others v. Hungary (no. 44357/13), both delivered on 16 September 201 4 ). In those cases I disagreed with the majority, who awarded the applicants compensation for non-pecuniary damage. I argued that “ awarding substantial financial ‘ satisfaction ’ to the applicants for the non-pecuniary damage which they [had] allegedly sustained encourage[d], even if indirectly, political conduct of such a kind that should normally be avoided in a parliamentary democracy”. Having regard to the political nature of that case, I maintained that “[f]or members of Parliament ..., winning such a case before the Court is, in itself, a satisfaction far greater than the money awarded ... for whatever non ‑ pecuniary damage [they] might have sustained”, so the “non-pecuniary damage allegedly sustained ... is already more than sufficiently compensated for by the findings of violations” of the Convention.

The Grand Chamber, too, adjudged the conduct of the applicants in that case as “ not a conventional manner for MPs to express their views” and as a “disrupt[ion of] order in Parliament” (see Kar á csony and Others v. Hungary [GC], cited above, § 149). It also found that “the impugned disciplinary sanctions which were imposed on the applicants were supported by reasons that were relevant for the legitimate aims pursued” (ibid., § 151). Thus, the applicants were criticised for their actions. However, the “interference with [their] right to freedom of expression” was found by the Grand Chamber to be “not proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued” (ibid., § 161).

3. The present judgment does not contain the slightest hint that t he applicant might have committed any act which would be not only illegal, but inappropriate or reprehensible. Nor does the Court even hint that sanctioning the applicant could be at least to some extent supported by reasons “relevant for the legitimate aims pursued”. On the contrary, “ while the applicant had recourse to a certain degree of hyperbole in his statements, ... it does not seem that he resorted to gratuitously offensive and inappropriate language or went beyond a generally acceptable degree of exaggeration” (see paragraph 54). Moreover, the Court disagreed with the view of the domestic courts “that the applicant was required to prove the veracity of his allegations” and found this requirement for the applicant “to fulfil a more demanding standard than that of due diligence” to be not in line with the Court ’ s case-law (see paragraph 56 of the judgment).

This reasoning (with which I agree) also means that there is neither a factual, nor, consequently, a legal basis for not awarding just satisfaction for non-pecuniary damage to the applicant, whose rights under the Convention have been violated.