JOINT PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES LORENZEN , MARUSTE AND BORREGO BORREGO

We disagree with the majority ' s assessment of the defamation action brought by Mr K.

We accept that Mr K. was under no legal obligation to submit information about his visit to a psychiatrist during the defamation proceedings. He did so on his own initiative, apparently seeking to convince the court that the applicants ' first publication had perturbed him and caused him damage. However, as the majority rightly stressed, t he document was made available to the applicants in their standing as defendants and it must be assumed that it was read out in court as part of the written evidence, in accordance with the procedural requirements of the RSFSR Code of Civil Procedure. Thus, the information was accessible not only to the parties to the case but also to those members of the general public present in the courtroom. Although the applicants ' publication of it undeniably contributed to wider dissemination of the information in question, Mr K. could not reasonably have expected that it would be afforded the same degree of protection as that enjoyed by confidential medical material held in private files. For that reason we cannot subscribe to the domestic courts ' finding that the applicants should be liable for the disclosure of information received in confidence.

Admittedly, the applicants commented on Mr K. ' s visit to a psychiatrist in a jesting way, implying that he might be not fit for military command. In this connection the Court has reiterated that journalistic freedom covers possible recourse to a degree of exaggeration, or even provocation (see Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria , judgment of 26 April 1995 , Series A no. 313, § 38). We are of the opinion that the impugned publication did not resort to offensive or intemperate language and did not go beyond a generally acceptable degree of exaggeration or provocation. Granted, the commanding officer of a regiment is not a politician. However, he is certainly a public figure, who has authority over 200 soldiers and is responsible for their wellbeing. Consequently, he is also subject to closer than usual public scrutiny and criticism.

Further, we would note that the problems faced by the military command and the professional aptitude of military personnel are issues of general interest, on which journalists have the task of informing the general public (see, mutatis mutandis , Thorg eir Thorgeirson v. Iceland , judgment of 25 June 1992, Series A no. 239, § 63). We recall that, in this particular case, that interest was further aroused by the fact that a very large number of soldiers had fallen ill. The mental health problems of a military officer with more than two hundred conscripts under his command was undeniably a matter of general and particular public concern. We consider that public concern about the facts involved in this case overweighs the individual interests.

In these circumstances, we find that the domestic courts did not convincingly establish any “relevant and sufficient” reasons for giving priority to the protection of Mr K. ' s personality rights, rather than to the applicants ' right to freedom of expression and to the general interest in promoting that freedom. Accordingly, the interference complained of was not “necessary in a democratic society” within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. There has therefore been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention in connection with the proceedings instituted by Mr K.