PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE HIRVELÄ

Although I can follow the majority in finding a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and that no separate issue arises under Article 8 as regards the length of the proceedings, I am neverthele ss unable to join the majority in finding a violation of the procedural aspect of Article 2 .

1. The death of the applicants ’ daughter in 2004 triggered t he procedural obligation under A rticle 2 of the Convention to investigate the cause of the death. The essential purpose of such investigation is to secure the effective implementation of the domestic laws which protect the right to life and to ensure the accountability of those responsible ( Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98, § 110, ECHR 2005 ‑ VII). In the case Å ilih v. Slovénia. [GC], no. 71463/01, § 192, 9 April 2009 this general principle of investigating a death in medical care is outlined as follows:

“ As the Court has held on several occasions, the procedural obligation of Article 2 requires the States to set up an effective independent judicial system so that the cause of death of patients in the care of the medical profession, whether in the public or the private sector, can be determined and those responsible made accountable (see, among other authorities, Calvelli and Ciglio , cited above, § 49, and Powell v. the United Kingdom , (dec.), no. 45305/99, ECHR 2000-V). ”

2. The requirement of effectiveness contains a number of elements. The persons who are responsible for the investigation and who conduct it must be independent and impartial, the investigation must be adequate in the sense that it must be capable of leading to a decision as to the cause and circumstances of the death and it must be initiated promptly and conducted with reasonable expedition ( Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], § 112, Šilih v. Slovénia [GC], § 195,196). In a word, the duty to examine as expressed in Article 2 calls for effectiveness, which comprises promptness, thoroughness and diligence.

3. When finding a violation of the procedural part of Article 2, the majority of the Court has taken into account delays in handling the case and the reason for such delays, namely that t he national court had considered it necessary to obtain further expert opinions . At issue in the case is the alleged neglect that occurred during the applicants ’ daughter ’ s medical care in early childhood, and its causal link with her untimely death at 23 years of age.

4. In my opinion , there ar e sufficient grounds to believe that investigating the existence of such causal link requires recourse to wide-ranging and profound medical expertise. In my view, the obtain ing of several expert opinions was justified and compatible with the obligation to conduct a thorough investigation. In addition , the decision to obtain further opinions was justified by the fact that the first applicant contested the evidential value of the earlier opinions. In my view for the Court to state , without knowing their contents, that the new opinions were superfluous amounts to substituting itself for the national decision- maker .

5. Thus, the justification for the violation of the procedural part of Article 2 is the long duration of the investigation. As stated above, the delay caused by the need to obtain expert opinions can be explained by the need to examine thorough ly the existence of a causal link . As to the o ther reasons for delay t his same justification has, however, been presented to the Court as a length of proceedings issue under Article 6. In the present case, it is beyond doubt that the length of the proceedings as a whole, which began back in 1987 when the applicants ’ civil action was lodged and are still pending , is unreasonable. In this sense the alleged excessive length has, however, come to be seen as a violation under Article 6 paragraph 1. In my opinion , this same delay should not be used as a reason for finding a violation under Article 2 as well. This would lead to a finding of a double violation, using the same justification, of both A rticles 2 and 6. In the Šilih case the Court, when finding a violation of the procedural aspect of Article 2, considered that it was unnecessary to examine separately whether the length of the proceedings was compatible with the reasonable time requirement under Article 6. In the circumstances of the present case I would have preferred the Court to have found a violation under Article 6 alone .

6. The above considerations also reflect my dissent on the amount awarded by the majority under Article 41 o f the Convention.