DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES SAJÓ AND TSOTSORIA

We agree with the majority that in cases where violence, injury or harm to any person is advocated, the danger of such consequences has to be clear and imminent (see paragraph 42 of the judgment). However, the issue in this case cannot be limited to the simple advocacy of violence. The applicants were found guilty of disseminating propaganda for an illegal, armed organisation, by way of incitement to use violent methods. Specifically, during a lawful demonstration commemorating the Sivas Massacre, they shouted slogans in favour of an armed, illegal organisation, adding that “It is the barrel of the gun that will call to account!”, “Political power grows out of the barrel of the gun” and “We are the public ' s bullet lodged in the barrel of a gun”) . Such sentences, printed in a pamphlet would not amount, per se , to a clear and imminent danger, as they are unspecific. However, supporting an illegal, armed organization at a mass demonstration with slogans which have “a violent tone” (see paragraph 41 of the judgment) is a different matter and may amount to support for the violence used by such organisations. In terms of clear and imminent danger, the risk of that danger materialising is significantly increased, given the ongoing terrorist activity. In this context it is irrelevant, in our view, that the demonstration commemorating the massacres was lawful: unlawful acts may be committed at a lawfully convened demonstration too. Vice versa, support of an illegal, armed organisation at an illegal meeting may be protected (see Yılmaz and Kılıç v. Turkey , no. 68514/01, 17 July 2008 ).

The majority are of the view that the case can be distinguished from Tasdemir v. Turkey ((dec.), no. 38841/07, 23 February 2010). According to the present judgment the slogan shouted in Tasdemir “had clearly amounted to an apology for terrorism” (see paragraph 43 of the judgment) and, a contrario , it does not in the present case. The majority does not explain the difference and we cannot see it. In both cases the slogan uttered at a demonstration was in support of a terrorist group and the language is clearly similar (“to the front line in retaliation” compared to “the barrel of the gun ... will call to account.”). Of course, the impact of such statements is contextual and the domestic courts are in a better situation to evaluate them in the given circumstances. In both cases the original conviction was serious (the domestic courts took into consideration other factors of culpability too). In the present case, however, the original conviction was reduced to ten months ' imprisonment and the appeal is still pending. With the exception of Ms Zehra Delikurt, none of the applicants was imprisoned. Ms Zehra Delikurt chose to benefit from the Reintegration of Offenders into Society

Act, after serving nearly three months in prison (see paragraphs 21-24 above).

The second reason given for distinguishing this case is that in Tasdemir the applicant was sentenced to twenty five days ' imprisonment, commuted to a fine of TRY 500. In the present case, however, according to the majority, the applicants were sentenced to three years and nine months ' imprisonment.

We accept that the length of the criminal procedure in itself might be disproportionate to the goal of the limitations authorised by Article 10. However, the proportionality of the sanctions applied is to be considered in the light of the actual impact which the expression has on the protected interest. In the present case the slogans supported the continued use of violence by an armed, illegal organisation. The applicants identified themselves with the violent means used by that organisation. Such identification may amount to the glorification of violent destruction and an expression of moral support ( Leroy v. France , no. 36109/03, § 43, 2 October 2008). Without taking a position on the specific application of the above consideration in other cases, we do not believe that moral support for terrorism per se deprives an expression of the protection of Article 10. It is possible, for example, that someone agrees with certain terrorists about an alleged injustice, which the terrorists claim to be the reason of their fight. Such agreement on matters of injustice is indirect support only, and does not amount, per se , to the support of terrorist methods. However, in the present case the moral support is expressly and without ambiguity related to the violent means of the illegal movement in a situation where the people present may not have had the benefit of an ulterior exchange of ideas. Moreover the impact of such support given to the illegal, armed group has to be seen in the context of the tensions of the late nineties in Turkey when the likelihood of violent reactions was considerable (for the relevance of local circumstances see Falakaoglou and Sayagli v. Turkey , nos. 22147/02 and 24972/03, 23 January 2007; Leroy , cited above, § 45.)

In view of the nature of the speech, the legitimate interests of the prevention of terrorist crime and the protection of public security, we are of the opinion that the limitation of the right resulting from the lengthy criminal procedure was not manifestly disproportionate in the circumstances of the present case. For the above reasons we respectfully dissent.

Finally, as to the applicant Mr Deniz Kahraman, we find his application inadmissible. According to the Government he never appealed against the Ankara Assize Court judgment. The applicant ' s lawyer conceded this fact, whilst acknowledging that his client, fearing imprisonment, had left Turkey and the lawyer no longer had contact with him. However, his lawyer continued to have his power of attorne y but failed to pursue domestic

remedies on his client ' s behalf. The majority is silent on the matter except that, in regard to the alleged violation of Article 6, it is stated that the Court is not required to decide on the preliminary objections of the Government because the main legal question in the case had been examined under Article 10 of the Convention (paragraphs 45-46 of the judgment). However, we note that the Government ' s preliminary objection had also been made in the context of Article 10 and, in our opinion, it necessitated a favourable response.