PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE SAJÓ

While I agree with most of the findings in the present case, to my regret I cannot follow the majority in their conclusion regarding the substantive violation of Article 3.

Although recourse to physical force when not absolutely necessary is in principle an infringement of the right set forth by Article 3 (see Ribitsch v. Austria , 4 December 1995, § 34 , Series A no. 336 ; Tekin v. Turkey , 9 June 1998 , §§ 52 - 53 , Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 ‑ IV ; and Assenov and O thers v. Bulgaria , 28 October 1998, § 94, Reports 1998-VIII ), no direct evidence of injuries to the plaintiff can be found in the present case. In the absence of substantiated medical reports, visible physical injury, apparent mental suffering, or corroboration by an unbiased witness, sole reliance on the testimony of the plaintiff and his lawyer V.J. Đ . constitutes insufficient evidence for a finding of guilt. The plaintiff himself admitted that he had failed to acquire a medical report, though he had a whole week to obtain one. Nor did he take a photograph that would have shown his injuries. The Court ’ s judgment relies on unsubstantiated claims of abuse from other detainees concerning their treatment, as well as the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff ’ s confession, as indirect evidence of wrongdoing. On the latter issue – the circumstances surrounding the confession – this in itself does not convincingly demonstrate the mental suffering or intimidation required for “inhuman” or “degrading treatment”; the plaintiff ’ s ultimate decision to confess falls within the scope of what one may reasonably expect during the course of police detention. Admittedly, the repeated detention of Mr Hajnal amounted to harassment and would appear prima facie to have been illegal but these characteristics alone do not constitute a violation of Article 3. As a result, no violation of the substantive aspect of Article 3 was made out and therefore the burden of proof was not reversed, although the objections raised by the applicant should have triggered an investigation into the alleged police brutality. I thus respectfully dissent with regard to the finding of a violation of the substantive aspect of Article 3.