DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE JOÄŒIENÄ–

1. Violence against women, in particular domestic violence, can be described as a phenomenon of public importance which is a common problem not only in Lithuania but all over the world. Many important steps have been taken by international organisations (in both the United Nations and the Council of Europe framework) to combat violence against women, including domestic violence, to respond promptly to threats of domestic violence, to take preventive measures in this field and to provide effective and appropriate assistance to the victims of such crimes (see paragraphs 38-41 of the judgment; see also a summary of relevant international material in the Court’s judgment in Opuz v. Turkey , no. 33401/02, §§ 72-86, ECHR 2009, in particular Recommendation Rec(2002)5 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, of 30 April 2002, on the protection of women against violence).

2. In that Recommendation the Committee of Ministers stated, inter alia , that member States should introduce, develop and/or improve where necessary national policies against violence based on maximum safety and protection of victims, support and assistance, adjustment of the criminal and civil law, raising of public awareness, training for professionals confronted with violence against women, and prevention. The Committee of Ministers also recommended, in particular, that member States should penalise serious violence against women, and recommended that the member States classify all forms of violence within the family as criminal offences and envisage the possibility of taking measures in order, inter alia , to enable the judiciary to adopt interim measures aimed at protecting victims, by banning the perpetrator from contacting, communicating with or approaching the victim, or residing in or entering defined areas, to penalise all breaches of the measures imposed on the perpetrator and to establish a compulsory protocol so that the police and the medical and social services follow a set procedure.

3. According to the new Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, adopted by the Council of Europe on 7 April 2011 (not yet ratified by the Republic of Lithuania), the States must also take the necessary legislative and other measures to ensure that the intentional conduct of committing acts of physical violence against another person is criminalised, and also to ensure that effective investigations and judicial proceedings in relation to all forms of violence are carried out without undue delay and the people responsible are punished (see Articles 1, 3, 5, 35 and Chapter VI of the 2011 Convention).

4. In the case of Bevacqua and S. v. Bulgaria (no. 71127/01, §§ 53, 66, 77-84, 12 June 2008) the Court also relied on the position taken by the Commission on Human Rights of the UN Economic and Social Council (E/CN.4/2006/61; 20 January 2006), where the Special Rapporteur on violence against women considered that there is a rule of customary international law that “obliges States to prevent and respond to acts of violence against women with due diligence”. This conclusion was based mainly on analysis of developments in the case-law of several international bodies, including our Court (reference to Osman v. the United Kingdom , judgment of 28 October 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 ‑ VIII), the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (reference to the case of Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras), the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (reference to Report no. 54/01, Case 12.051, Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes (Brazil)) and the committee monitoring the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (reference to the case of A.T. v Hungary – 2005).

5. Domestic violence is a common phenomenon and a very sensitive issue in Lithuanian society (see § 40 of the judgment). The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women in its Concluding Observations concerning Lithuania (8 July 2008) noted the various efforts undertaken by the State party to combat violence against women, including domestic violence, ... including the adoption of the National Strategy for Combating Violence against Women, a number of recent amendments to the Criminal Code, the establishment of a network of crisis centres and the extension in 2008 of a specialised help-line service for battered women countrywide to a continuous 24-hour round-the-clock service.

6. However the Committee also noted that no specific law had been adopted in Lithuania to combat violence against women and grant full and effective protection to the victims, and expressed concern at the high prevalence of violence against women in Lithuania, in particular domestic violence (see paragraph 39 of the judgment).

7. Therefore the adoption on 26 May 2011 by the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania of the Law on Protection Against Domestic Violence ( Apsaugos nuo smurto artimoje aplinkoje įstatymas ), which entered into force on 15 December 2011, can be regarded as an important positive step forward in the effort to effectively protect people against domestic violence (see § 62 of the judgment). The Law acknowledges that domestic violence is a violation of an individual’s human rights and freedoms (Article 1) and provides some legal footing for the police to react effectively to instances of domestic violence. It is not the responsibility of the victim to lodge a complaint (Article 7 § 1).

8. With the adoption of this Law, Lithuania has fully endorsed the recommendation made by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women to introduce a specific law on domestic violence (see paragraph 39 of the judgment).

9. However, while the adoption of the Law in question is an important step forward, it is not in itself sufficient to combat such a sensitive and widespread phenomenon in Lithuanian society. [58] All necessary and appropriate steps must be taken at all levels by the competent Lithuanian authorities in order effectively to implement the newly enacted Law on Protection against Domestic Violence in practice. I hope that the country will take all the necessary steps to condemn and eliminate all forms of violence against women, including domestic violence, in an effort, according to the wording of the Preamble of the 2011 Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence “to create a Europe free from violence against women and domestic violence”.

10. Turning to the main legal issue raised by the present case, that is to say, whether the State fulfilled its positive obligation under the Convention to take all necessary measures in order to protect the applicant from the alleged sustained domestic violence, in my personal opinion the Court has incorrectly relied on Article 3 in the circumstances of the present case. This position of the Chamber is not supported by the Court’s case-law, where domestic violence cases are mostly examined from the perspective of Article 8 of the Convention.

11. Accordingly, and referring to the Court’s case-law on the subject, in my personal opinion, the applicant’s complaint in connection with the physical attacks on her should have been examined under Article 8 of the Convention and the applicant’s right to respect for her private life (see Bevacqua and S. v. Bulgaria , cited above, §§ 66, 77-84; Sandra Janković v. Croatia , no. 38478/05, §§ 31, 44 and 45, 5 March 2009; Hajduová v. Slovakia , no. 2660/03, §§ 45-46, 30 November 2010; and, most recently, Kalucza v. Hungary , no. 57693/10, §§ 13, 14, 16, 23 and 42, 24 April 2012), as this concept, as the Court has previously held in various contexts, also includes a person’s physical and psychological integrity (see X and Y v. the Netherlands , 26 March 1985, §§ 22 and 23, Series A no. 91; Costello-Roberts v. the United Kingdom , 25 March 1993, § 36, Series A no. 247 ‑ C; and Sandra Janković , cited above, § 45).

12. Of course, I can accept that in the specific circumstances of certain cases the authorities’ positive obligations under the Convention can vary and can also attract the application of either Article 2 or Article 3, while in other cases the Court could rely on Article 8 taken alone or in combination with Article 3 (see Bevacqua and S. v. Bulgaria , cited above, §§ 65, 12 June 2008, where the Court relied on Article 8 of the Convention as regards the State’s positive obligation to protect the applicant and her son from the aggressive behaviour of her former husband; Opuz v. Turkey , cited above, §§ 72-86, where the Court relied on Articles 2, 3 and even 14 of the Convention as regards the State’s positive obligation to protect people from domestic violence; or the Osman judgment, cited above, §§ 128-130, where the Court applied Article 2 and 8 of the Convention as regards the State’s positive obligation to take adequate and appropriate steps to protect the lives of the second applicant and his father from the alleged real and known danger).

13. In the present case the applicant relied in her application form on Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention only. As I have already said, I can accept that in some specific circumstances the State’s failure to investigate violence inflicted by private individuals and/or to put in place effective criminal-law provisions to deter the commission of offences against personal integrity can demand the application of Article 3 of the Convention (see Beganović v. Croatia , no. 46423/06, §§ 64-71, 86-87, 25 June 2009); and this requirement can also be extended to ill-treatment administered by private individuals (see Šečić v. Croatia, no. 40116/02, §§ 49- 60, 31 May 2007). In some cases even Article 2 can be affected when acts of violence or domestic violence which the competent authorities fail to stop end in the death of the victim (see the Opuz case cited above, §§ 136 and 145-149, where the Court also relied on Article 2 and found a violation of that Article, and, mutatis mutandis , Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98, §§ 95-97, ECHR 2005-VII).

14. Turning to the circumstances of the present case, I think that the attacks against the applicant did not attain the minimum level of severity to fall within the scope of Article 3 (see, on this point Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, § 120, ECHR 2000-IV; Selmouni v. France , [GC], no. 25803/94, § 100, ECHR 1999-V; and contrast Beganović , cited above, §§ 64-66, 68, and Opuz, cited above, §§ 9, 10, 13, 20, 23 and 161). In particular, in the Valiulienė case, although the applicant was beaten by her live-in partner on five occasions, each time she sustained only minor health impairment, which did not cause any short-term health problems (see paragraphs 7 and 8 of the judgment). The injuries sustained by the applicant were without any lasting consequences and did not result in her being unfit to work (contrast Iljina and Sarulienė v. Lithuania , no. 32293/05, §§ 11 and 47, 15 March 2011, where the Court, when finding a violation of Article 3, specifically took into account the fact that a forensic expert had deemed her to be unfit for work for 9 days).

15. Accordingly in the particular circumstances of the present case (very minor injuries), I cannot accept that the applicant was subjected to ill­treatment which was sufficiently serious to be considered inhuman and degrading and thus to fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention (see, most recently, Kalucza , cited above, §§ 13, 14, 16, 23, 61 and 62, 24 April 2012, and also Bevacqua and S. , cited above, §§ 66, 77-84, 12 June 2008). In my opinion, taking into account its specific circumstances, the case should have been examined exclusively under Article 8 of the Convention, and the Government’s unilateral declaration, submitted under Article 8 of the Convention (paragraph 5 of the judgment), should have been accepted.

16. However, the Chamber decided to examine the case under Article 3 of the Convention, so, in my opinion, the compensation for non-pecuniary damage under Article 41 should have been increased.

[1] It was only in 1989 that the CEDAW Committee included violence against women within its remit. General Recommendation no. 12 considered that States parties had to protect women against violence within the family, at the workplace and in any other area of social life and should include in their periodic reports to the Committee information on various topics related to this issue. Three years later, General Recommendation no. 19 confirmed that gender-based violence breached gender equality and that the “full implementation of the Convention required States to take positive measures to eliminate all forms of violence against women.” In A.T. v. Hungary , Communication no. 2/2003, 26 January 2005, the CEDAW Committee found that the rights of the author under Articles 5 (a) and 16 of the 1979 Convention had been violated owing to the fact that, after having been battered by her former common-law husband, she had been unable, either through civil or criminal proceedings, to temporarily or permanently bar him from the apartment where she and her children continued to reside. The Committee based its finding on the State’s positive obligation to ensure effective equality between the sexes. This reading was confirmed in Goecke v. Austria , Communication no. 5/2005, 6 August 2007; Fatma Yıldırım v. Austria , Communication no. 6/2005, 1 October 2007; V.K. v. Bulgaria , Communication no. 20/2008, 17 August 2011; Cecilia Kell v. Canada , Communication no. 19/2008, 26 April 2012; and Isatou Jallow v. Bulgaria , Communication no. 32/2011, 28 August 2012. The issue of domestic violence has been addressed in many Concluding Observations of CEDAW as well (for example, on New Zealand, 2012, paras. 22-24, Mexico, 2012, paras. 11-12, Mauritius, 2011, paras. 20-23, and Australia, 2010, paras. 28-29).

[2] G.A. Res. 48/104, A/48/49.

[3] In Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes v. Brazil , Case 12.051, Report no. 54/01, 16 April 2001, the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights found that the Brazilian State had failed to exercise due diligence to prevent and investigate a domestic violence complaint, this failure warranting a finding of State responsibility under the American Convention and the Belém do Pará Convention. More recently, in Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) et al. v. United States , Case 12.626, Report no. 80/11, 21 July 2011, the Commission held the US responsible for the systematic violation of its international obligation to protect individuals from domestic violence. The Inter-American Court also found, in Gonzales et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico , 16 November 2009, that the Mexican authorities had failed to prevent and investigate the rape and murder of circa 600 women in Ciudad Juarez.

[4] Thus, according to the Committee, domestic violence could constitute a violation of the right not to be ill-treated under Article 7. Domestic violence has been a major concern of the Committee, as evidenced in numerous Concluding Observations, such as on the Russian Federation, 2010, para. 10, Moldova, 2009, para. 16, Denmark, 2008, para. 8, Mauritius, 2005, para. 10, Uzbekistan, 2005, para. 23, Iceland, 2005, para. 12, Benin, 2005, para. 9, Albania, 2004, para. 10, Poland, 2004, para. 11, Morocco, 2004, para. 28, and Yemen, 2002, para. 6.

[5] Due diligence standard as a tool for the elimination of violence against women, Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, E/CN.4/2006/61, para. 29, citing CEDAW General Recommendation no. 19, para. 9; the Declaration on the elimination of violence against women, Article 4 (c); the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action, paragraph 125 (b); and the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women, Article 7 (b). According to the Special Rapporteur, due diligence requires States to use the same level of commitment in preventing, investigating, punishing and providing remedies for acts of violence against women as they do with other forms of violence (para. 35).

[6] Reparations to Women Who Have Been Subjected to Violence, Report of Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, A/HRC/14/22 (2010). This position corresponds to the general consensus of the international community, as results from CEDAW General Recommendation no. 28 on the core obligations of States parties under Article 2 of the Convention, para. 34; CEDAW, General Recommendation no. 19, cited above, para. 23 (t), (iii); the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, Article 4 (g); the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action, para. 125 (a); the Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, Yakin Ertürk, para. 83; the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women, Article 7 (f) and (g); the Additional Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women, Article 4 (2) (f); the EU guidelines on violence against women and girls, para. 3.2.7.1.; the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, Articles 20 and 23; WAVE, “More than a roof over your head: A survey of quality standards in European women’s refuges, 2002; the HRC Concluding Observations on the Russian Federation, 2009, para. 10, on Moldova, 2009, para. 16, and on Croatia, 2009, para. 8, and the critiques on the lack of shelter places for the victims in the cases of A.T. v. Hungary and Goecke v. Austria .

[7] ETS. No. 210. This new instrument of international law is crucial in interpreting the States parties’ obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights, even though it has only been ratified by three of them until now, not including the respondent State (for a justification of this method of interpretation, see my separate opinions in De Souza Ribeiro v. France (GC) , footnote 10, and Tautkus v. Lithuania , footnote 16). This is particularly obvious since this instrument was approved following a call of the Council of Europe Task Force to Combat Violence against Women for a legally binding convention on, inter alia , domestic violence (Final Activity Report, 2008) and the issuance of several recommendations of the Committee of Ministers, such as Recommendation No. R (85) 4 on violence in the family, Recommendation No. R (90) 2 on social measures concerning violence in the family, and Recommendation Rec(2002)5 of 30 April 2002 on the protection of women against violence. Lastly, the new instrument also took in account the Court’s case-law on an enforceable and justiciable positive obligation to protect women from domestic violence, established in Kontrova v. Slovakia , no. 7510/04, 24 September 2007; Bevacqua and S v. Bulgaria , no. 71127/01, 12 September 2008; Branko Tomasic and Others v. Croatia , no. 46598/08, 14 October 2010; Opuz v. Turkey , no. 33401/02, 9 September 2009; E.S. and Others v. Slovakia , no. 8227/04, 15 December 2009; A. v. Croatia , no. 55164/08, 14 October 2010; and Hajduova v. Slovakia , no. 2660/03, 30 November 2010.

[8] Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women, Article 5 (2) and Explanatory report, para. 59.

[9] In regard to the causes and effects of domestic violence, as well as the available prevention, outreach and redress programmes see, inter alia , Judd, Domestic violence sourcebook, Detroit, Omnigraphics, 2012; Preventing intimate partner and sexual violence against women: taking action and generating evidence. Geneva, World Health Organization, 2010; Walker, The battered woman syndrome, New York, Springer, 2009; Estimating the costs and impacts of intimate partner violence in developing countries: a methodological resource guide, Washington, International Center for Research on Women, 2009; McCue, Domestic Violence: A Reference Handbook, Santa Barbara, ABC-CLIO, 2008; Shipway, Domestic violence: a handbook for health professionals, London, Routledge, 2004; Violence against women: impact of violence on women’s health, Ottawa, Health Canada, 2002; Tjaden and Thoennes, Extent, nature and consequences of intimate partner violence: Findings from the national violence against women survey, US Department of Justice, 2000; Jacobson and Gottman, When Men Batter Women, New Insights into Ending Abusive Relationships, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1998; and Jasinski and Williams (eds.), Partner Violence: A Comprehensive Review of 20 Years of Research, Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage, 1998. The Court used the findings of modern psychology to support a common European standard, for example, in M.C. v. Bulgaria , no. 39272/98, § 164, 4 December 2003. I followed that approach also in my separate opinion in Konstantin Markin [GC], footnote 21.

[10] The concept of “domestic violence” is thus broader than “intimate partner violence”, since it includes child or elder abuse, or abuse by any member of a household. It also encompasses violence occurring in formal or informal partnerships, including same-sex partnerships, and after the cessation of the partnership (see Kalucza v. Hungary , no. 57693/10, § 67, 24 April 2012). The violence may assume the form of a continuum or a one-off incident. Violence against women can evidently occur within and outside the context of domestic violence. The case at hand lies in the intersection of these two forms of violence, i.e. domestic violence against women.

[11] See, for instance, the Yakin Ertürk report, cited above, para. 59.

[12] Again, the Yakin Ertürk report, cited above, para. 66, and Explanatory report of the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women, para. 216.

[13] For the opposite stance, see Opuz , cited above, § 147: “perpetrators’ rights cannot supersede victims’ rights to life and physical and mental integrity”. This statement can also be found in Fatma Yildirim , cited above, para. 12.1.5.

[14] As the Special Rapporteur on violence against women put it, “even though all women are at risk of experiencing violence, not all women are equally susceptible to acts of violence” (Rashida Manjoo’s Report on Multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination and violence against women, A/HRC/17/26 (2011). While pregnant, disabled, of minor age, elderly, displaced, migrant, refugee, or illiterate women are particularly vulnerable (see a non-exhaustive list in paragraph 87 of the Explanatory Report of the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women), any other woman may be vulnerable too if confronted with a bullying and violent partner. Furthermore, the Court has underlined, in general terms, the “particular vulnerability of the victims of domestic violence” since the very first judgments on domestic violence (see Bevacqua and S. , cited above, § 65, and Opuz , cited above, § 132). Thus, I cannot accept the line of reasoning presented in paragraph 69 of the judgment.

[15] Ever since CEDAW Recommendation no. 19, it has been widely acknowledged that violence between intimates affects women disproportionately, demarcating women as a group in need of proactive State protection. The same conclusion was reached, for instance, in the UN Secretary-General’s In-depth Study on All Forms of Violence Against Women, 2006, and the UNICEF report on Domestic Violence Against Women and Girls, Innocenti Digest, volume 6, 2000.

[16] As the UN Report on Violence Against Women in the Family had already stated in 1989, and the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action, para. 118, repeated, violence against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power relations between men and women. This inequality is fuelled by old fashioned prejudice about the role of women in society, as has been repeatedly noted (for example, CEDAW General Recommendation no. 19, para. 11, and Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, Access to Justice for Women Victims of Violence in the Americas, OEA/Ser.l/V/II, Doc. 68, 20 January 2007, para. 147). Since it is aimed to counter these real factual inequalities, the said gender-sensitive interpretation cannot be accused of patronising women as a stereotyped group of persons unable to protect themselves and in need of public protection. This differential legal treatment has therefore an “objective justification” in the sense affirmed in the Belgian Linguistic case (“certain legal inequalities tend only to correct factual inequalities”; see the same underlying idea in Article 4 (4) of the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence, HRC General Comment no. 18 on non-discrimination, para. 10, and CESR Comment no. 16, paras. 7 and 8). Conversely, a gender-blind interpretation of the Convention would only reinforce the prevailing inequalities that affect women.

[17] As confirmed by some of the research listed in footnote 9.

[18] The majority missed the opportunity to set out a principled reasoning to impute a violation of Article 3, and not of Article 8, to the respondent State, preferring once again to remain attached to the particular specificities of the case. Yet that reasoning was much needed in view of the current disparate case-law. In Bevacqua , Sandra Jankovic , and A. v. Croatia , the Court found a violation of Article 8 (bodily injuries), as well as in Hadjuova (threats), but in Opuz it found a violation of the applicant’s mother’s Article 2 right (killing) and the applicant’s Article 3 right (bodily injuries) and of Article 14 in conjunction with both Articles 2 and 3, and in Kontrova a violation of Articles 2 and 13 (killing). In E.S. and Others v. Slovakia , it found a violation of both Articles 3 and 8 (physical violence)! Finally, Kalucza appears to be a special case of an Article 8 violation, since there were mutual bodily injuries and verbal abuse. These different interpretations of the Convention are obviously not irrelevant, for compensation and other purposes. Moreover, having rejected the respondent Government’s unilateral declaration, which acknowledged a violation of Article 8, the Court had an additional duty to provide a thorough reasoning of its finding of a violation of Article 3.

[19] The expression is used in Article 18 (3) of the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence. It is important to note that the Court protects victims of domestic violence and female victims of violence regardless of any discriminatory intent of the offender. That is the reason why normally no additional article 14 violation is to be found in cases of female victims. Nevertheless, there might be situations where domestic violence and violence against women are perpetrated also with a specific discriminatory intention in regard to the victim, for example by denigrating her race or ethnic origin. In these cases, there will be a violation of both Articles 3 and 14.

[20] Osman v. the United Kingdom , 28 October 1998, § 116, Reports 1998-VIII. The Court has applied this standard in domestic violence cases (see for instance, Opuz , cited above, § 130, and Hajduova , cited above, § 50). The exact same criterion has been adopted on the other side of the Atlantic by the Inter-American Court (see the Cotton Field case, cited above, para. 282, and the Case of the Massacre of Pueblo Bello judgment, 31 January 2006, para. 152).

[21] The claim that domestic authorities should exercise an “even greater degree of vigilance” in view of the “particular vulnerability of victims of domestic violence”, made in Hajduova , cited above, § 50, corresponds in substance to this stricter standard.

[22] Bevacqua , cited above, § 82, and Sandra Jankovic v. Croatia , no. 38478/05, § 50, 5 March 2009. In the same vein, the ECJ concluded, in its judgment on the joined cases Magette Gueye and Valentin Salmeron Sanchez (C-483/09 and C-1/10), that the mandatory imposition of injunctions to stay away for a minimum period on persons who commit violence within the family did not breach Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA on the standing of victims in criminal proceedings, even when they were opposed by victims.

[23] The Court has already considered that it is in the public interest to prosecute even in a case where the victim withdraws the complaint ( Opuz , cited above, § 139).

[24] According to the data from the Government of the Republic of Lithuania’s Department of Statistics, 408 women and 69 men suffered violence from their spouses or cohabitants in 2007, and 359 women and 60 men suffered violence from their spouses or cohabitants in 2008. This data shows that women are victims of domestic violence six times more often than men (Domestic Violence in the South Baltic Region, Kaliningrad, Lithuania, Poland and Sweden, South Baltic - Violence Free Zone project report, September 2010, p. 20). On the evidential value of statistics, see Hoogendijk v. the Netherlands (dec.) , no. 58461/00, 6 January 2005, and Zarb Adami v. Malta , no. 17209/02, §§ 77-78, ECHR 2006-I. See also the CEDAW Concluding Observations on Lithuania, 2008, which expressed concern at the high prevalence of violence against women – particularly domestic violence – and at the insufficient number of crisis centres.

[25] Another complaint was presented to the police on 9 March 2001. The majority declares, in paragraph 66, that it cannot take this complaint into account, but in the following paragraph it goes on to admit that the applicant made “credible assertions” that she had been exposed to threats to her physical integrity.

[26] To quote paragraph 280 of the Explanatory Report of the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women.

[27] The district court’s decision of 15 December 2005 was wrong. Although it was revoked by the regional court, the mistake caused an additional delay in the proceedings, which finally became time-barred.

[28] The majority refrained, in paragraph 83, from considering that the applicant’s criminal complaint should have been pursued by the public prosecutor. Yet, the majority accepted the Government’s argument that the new law on domestic violence of 15 December 2011, which converted domestic violence into a public prosecutable offence, serves to acknowledge the “public importance” of the crimes affected by the public prosecutor’s decision of 2005. In other words, the majority is ready to apply retroactively the new Law against domestic violence to the detriment of the defendant, but is not willing to draw the conclusion that it was the public prosecutor’s fault that the case was wrongfully closed.

[29] I take inspiration, once again, in Justice Blackmun, who raised his voice for “Poor Joshua! Victim of repeated attacks by an irresponsible, bullying, cowardly, and intemperate father” in his famously dissenting opinion joined to the heinous case of the State’s failure before domestic violence DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. DSS , 489 U.S. 189 (1989).

[30] Le Comité pour l’élimination de la discrimination envers les femmes (Comité CEDAW) n’a inclus les violences envers les femmes dans son mandat qu’en 1989. La Recommandation Générale n° 12 considérait que les États parties devaient protéger les femmes des violences commises au sein de la famille, au travail, et dans tous les lieux de vie sociale et devaient inclure des informations sur divers sujets liés à cette problématique dans leurs rapports périodiques. Trois ans plus tard, la Recommandation Générale n° 19 confirmait que les violences basées sur le genre violaient l’égalité des sexes et que « pour appliquer intégralement la Convention, les États doivent prendre des mesures constructives visant à éliminer toutes les formes de violence à l'égard des femmes ». Dans l’affaire A.T. c. Hongrie , Communication n° 2/2003, 26 janvier 2005, le Comité CEDAW a considéré que les droits de l’auteur au titre des articles 5 a) et 16 de la Convention de 1979 avaient été violés du fait qu’elle n’avait pas été en mesure, après avoir été battue par son concubin, d’obtenir, par des procédures civiles ou pénales, son éloignement de l’appartement qu’elle et ses enfants continuaient d’occuper. Le Comité basait son raisonnement sur l’obligation positive de l’État d’assurer une égalité effective entre les sexes. Cette approche a été confirmée dans Goecke c. Autriche , Communication n° 5/2005, 6 août 2007 ; Fatma Yıldırım c. Autriche , Communication n° 6/2005, 1 er octobre 2007 ; V.K. c. Bulgarie , Communication n° 20/2008, 17 août 2011; Cecilia Kell c. Canada , Communication n° 19/2008, 26 avril 2012 ; et Isatou Jallow c. Bulgaria , Communication n° 32/2011, 28 août 2012. La question des violences domestiques a été traitée dans plusieurs observations finales du Comité (par exemple, sur la Nouvelle Zélande, 2012, paras. 22-24, Mexique, 2012, paras. 11-12, Maurice, 2011, paras. 20-23, et Australie, 2010, paras. 28-29).

[31] AGNU. Res. 48/104, A/48/49.

[32] Dans l’affaire Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes c. Brésil , 12.051, Rapport n° 54/01, 16 avril 2001, la Commission interaméricaine des droits de l’homme a considéré que le Brésil avait manqué à son devoir de due diligence dans la prévention et l’investigation des plaintes de violences domestiques, ce manquement justifiant sa responsabilité au regard de la Convention américaine et de la Convention de Belém do Pará. Plus récemment, dans l’affaire Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) et al. c. États-Unis , 12.626, Rapport n° 80/11, 21 juillet 2011, la Commission a considéré que les États-Unis étaient responsables de violations systématiques de leurs obligations internationales de protection des individus contre les violences domestiques. La Cour interaméricaine a également considéré, dans l’affaire Gonzales et al. (“Cotton Field”) c. Mexique , 16 novembre 2009, que les autorités mexicaines avaient manqué à leur obligation de prévention et d’enquête au sujet du viol et du meurtre d’environ 600 femmes à Ciudad Juarez.

[33] Ainsi, selon le Comité, les violences domestiques pourraient constituer une violation du droit de ne pas être maltraité au titre de l’article 7. Les violences domestiques sont l’une des préoccupations principales du Comité, ainsi qu’en témoignent de nombreuses observations finales, telles que celle concernant la Fédération russe, 2010, para. 10, Moldova, 2009, para. 16, Danemark, 2008, para. 8, Maurice, 2005, para. 10, Ouzbékistan, 2005, para. 23, Islande, 2005, para. 12, Bénin, 2005, para. 9, Albanie, 2004, para. 10, Pologne, 2004, para. 11, Maroc, 2004, para. 28, et Yemen, 2002, para. 6.

[34] Le critère de la due diligence en tant que moyen de mettre un terme à la violence contre les femmes, rapport du rapporteur spécial sur la violence contre les femmes, E/CN.4/2006/61, para. 29, citant la Recommandation Générale du Comité CEDAW n° 19, para. 9 ; la Déclaration sur l’élimination de la violence à l’égard des femmes, article 4 c) ; le Programme d’Action de Beijing de 1995, paragraphe 125 b) ; et la Convention interaméricaine sur la prévention, la sanction et l’élimination de la violence contre la femme, article 7 b). D’après le rapporteur spécial, la due diligence impose aux États d’employer le même degré d’engagement dans la prévention, l’investigation, la sanction et la mise à disposition de recours pour les actes de violences envers les femmes que celui qu’ils fournissent pour d’autres formes de violences (para. 35).

[35] Réparations accordées aux femmes ayant été victimes de violences, rapport de la rapporteure spéciale sur la violence contre les femmes, A/HRC/14/22 (2010). Cette position correspond au consensus général de la Communauté internationale, tel qu’il résulte de la Recommandation générale du CEDAW n° 19 citée ci-dessus, para. 23 t), iii)) ; de la Déclaration sur l’élimination de la violence à l’égard des femmes, Article 4 g) ; du Programme d’Action de Beijing de 1995, paragraphe 125 a) ; du rapport du rapporteur spécial sur la violence contre les femmes, Yakin Ertürk, para. 8 ; de la Convention interaméricaine sur la prévention, la sanction et l’élimination de la violence contre la femme, Article 7 f) et g) ; du Protocole additionnel à la Charte africaine des droits de l’Homme et des peuples sur les droits de la femme, Article 4 2) f) ; des Lignes directrices de l’UE sur les violences contre les femmes, para. 3.2.7.1. ; de la Convention du Conseil de l’Europe sur la prévention et la lutte contre la violence à l’égard des femmes et la violence domestique, articles 20 et 23 ; WAVE, « More than a roof over your head : A survey of quality standards in European women’s refuges », 2002 ; des Observations finales du Comité des droits de l’Homme concernant la Russie, 2009, para. 10 ; Moldova, 2009, para. 16 ; et la Croatie, 2009, para. 8; et des critiques du manque de place en abri pour les victimes dans les affaires A. T. c. Hongrie et Goecke c. Autriche.

[36] ETS. n° 210. Ce nouvel instrument de droit international est crucial dans l’interprétation des obligations étatiques au titre de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme, bien qu’il n’ait été ratifié que par trois des parties jusqu’ici, à l’exclusion de l’État défendeur (pour une justification de cette méthode d’interprétation, voir mon opinion séparée dans les affaires De Souza Ribeiro c. France (GC) , note 10, and Tautkus c. Lituanie , note 16). Ceci est particulièrement évident dans la mesure où cet instrument a été approuvé à la suite d’un appel de la Task Force du Conseil de l’Europe pour combattre la violence à l’égard des femmes par une convention contraignante sur, entre autres, les violences domestiques (rapport final d’activité, 2008) et l’adoption de plusieurs recommandations du Comité des Ministres, telles que la Recommandation n° R (85) 4 sur la violence au sein de la famille, la Recommandation n° R(90)2 sur les mesures sociales concernant la violence au sein de la famille, et la Recommandation Rec(2002)5 du 30 avril 2002 sur la protection des femmes contre la violence. Enfin, le nouvel instrument a également pris en compte la jurisprudence de la Cour sur une obligation positive exécutoire et justiciable de protéger les femmes des violences domestiques, établie dans les affaires Kontrova c. Slovaquie , n° 7510/04, 24 septembre 2007; Bevacqua et S c. Bulgarie, n° 71127/01, 12 septembre 2008 ; Branko Tomasic et autres c. Croatie , n° 46598/08, 14 octobre 2010 ; Opuz c. Turquie , n° 33401/02, 9 septembre 2009; E.S. et autres c. slovaquie , n° 8227/04, 15 décembre 2009 ; A. c. Croatie , n° 55164/08, 14 octobre 2010; et Hajduova c. Slovaquie , n° 2660/03, 30 novembre 2010.

[37] Convention du Conseil de l’Europe sur la prévention et la lutte contre la violence à l’égard des femmes et la violence domestique, Article 5 2) et Rapport explicatif, para. 59.

[38] À propos des causes et des effets des violences domestiques, ainsi que des programmes de prévention, d’aide sociale et de réparation disponibles voir, entre autres, Judd, Domestic violence sourcebook, Detroit, Omnigraphics, 2012 ; Prévenir la violence exercée par des partenaires intimes et la violence sexuelle contre les femmes : intervenir et produire des données, Genève, Organisation mondiale de la santé, 2010 ; Walker, The battered woman syndrome, New York, Springer, 2009 ; Estimating the costs and impacts of intimate partner violence in developing countries: a methodological resource guide, Washington, International Center for Research on Women, 2009 ; McCue, Domestic Violence : A Reference Handbook, Santa Barbara, ABC-CLIO, 2008 ; Shipway, Domestic violence: a handbook for health professionals, London, Routledge, 2004 ; Violence against women: impact of violence on women’s health, Ottawa, Health Canada, 2002 ; Tjaden and Thoennes, Extent, nature and consequences of intimate partner violence : Findings from the national violence against women survey, US Department of Justice, 2000 ; Jacobson and Gottman, When Men Batter Women, New Insights into Ending Abusive Relationships, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1998 ; and Jasinski and Williams (éds.), Partner Violence : A Comprehensive Review of 20 Years of Research, Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage, 1998. La Cour a utilisé les résultats de la psychologie moderne pour soutenir un standard européen, par exemple, dans l’affaire M.C c. Bulgarie , n° 39272/98, § 164, 4 décembre 2003. J’ai également suivi cette approche dans mon opinion séparée dans l’affaire Konstantin Markin (GC), note 21.

[39] Le concept de « violences domestiques » est plus large que celui de « violence exercée par un partenaire intime », puisqu’il inclut les maltraitances subies par les enfants ou les aînés, ou les maltraitances infligées par n’importe quel membre du foyer. Il englobe également les violences survenant au sein de relations officialisées ou non, incluant les relations entre personnes de même sexe, et après la fin de la relation (voir Kalucza c. Hongrie , n° 57693/10, § 67, 24 avril 2012). Les violences peuvent former un continuum ou un incident unique. La violence envers les femmes peut évidemment survenir au sein ou à l’extérieur du contexte de violence domestique. La présente affaire se situe à l’intersection de ces deux formes de violences, i.e. des violences domestiques envers les femmes.

[40] Voir, par exemple, le rapport de Yakin Ertürk cité ci-dessus, para. 59.

[41] Ici encore, le rapport de Yakin Ertürk cité ci-dessus, para. 66, et le rapport explicatif de la Convention du Conseil de l’Europe sur la prévention et la lutte contre la violence à l’égard des femmes et la violence domestique, para. 216.

[42] Pour la position opposée, voir Opuz , cité ci-dessus, § 147 : « les droits de l’agresseur ne peuvent l’emporter sur les droits des victimes à la vie et à l’intégrité physique et mentale ». Cette affirmation peut également être trouvée dans Fatma Yildirim , cité ci-dessus, para. 12.1.5.

[43] Ainsi que le rapporteur spécial sur la violence envers les femmes le formule, « bien que toutes les femmes encourent le risque de subir des violences, toutes les femmes ne sont pas susceptibles de commettre des actes de violence » (Rapport de Rashida Manjoo sur les formes multiples et par intersection de discrimination et de violences envers les femmes A/HRC/17/26 (2011)). Bien que les femmes enceintes, handicapées, mineures, âgées, déplacées, migrantes, réfugiées ou illettrées soient particulièrement vulnérables (voir une liste non exhaustive au paragraphe 87 du rapport explicatif de la Convention du Conseil de l’Europe sur la prévention et la lutte contre la violence à l’égard des femmes et la violence domestique), toute femme peut être également vulnérable si elle est confrontée à un partenaire agressif et violent. En outre, la Cour a souligné, en des termes généraux, la vulnérabilité particulière des victimes de violences domestiques, depuis ses tout premiers arrêts relatifs aux violences domestiques (voir Bevacqua et S. , cité ci-dessus, § 65, et Opuz , cité ci-dessus, § 132). Ainsi, je ne peux accepter le raisonnement présenté au paragraphe 69 de ce jugement.

[44] Depuis la Recommandation n° 19 du Comité CEDAW, il a été largement reconnu que les violences entre proches affectent les femmes de manière disproportionnée, les démarquant en tant que groupe nécessitant une protection proactive de l’État. La même conclusion a été retenue, par exemple, par l’étude approfondie de toutes les formes de violences à l’égard des femmes du Secrétaire général des Nations Unies, 2006, et le rapport de l’UNICEF sur les violences domestiques contre les femmes et les filles, Innocenti Digest, volume 6, 2000.

[45] Ainsi que l’énonce le rapport des Nations Unies sur la violence contre les femmes dans la famille de 1989, et que le Plan D’action de Beijing, para. 118, le répète, la violence contre les femmes est une manifestation des relations de pouvoir historiquement inégales entre hommes et femmes. Cette inégalité est nourrie par des préjugés d’un autre temps à propos du rôle des femmes dans la société, ainsi que cela a été plusieurs fois noté (par exemple, Recommandation générale n° 19 du Comité CEDAW, para.11, et Commission interaméricaine des droits de l’homme, Accès à la justice pour les femmes victimes de violences dans les Amériques OEA/Ser.l/V/II, Doc. 68, 20 janvier, para. 147). Puisqu’elle vise à contrer ces véritables inégalités factuelles, l’interprétation genrée mentionnée ne peut être accusée de condescendance envers les femmes comme groupe stéréotypé de personnes incapables de se protéger elles-mêmes et nécessitant une protection publique. Ce traitement différencié a en effet une « justification objective » au sens affirmé dans l’ affaire linguistique belge (« certaines inégalités de droit ne tendent d'ailleurs qu'à corriger des inégalités de fait » ; voir la même idée sous-jacente à l’article 4 4) de la Convention du Conseil de l’Europe sur la prévention et la lutte contre la violence à l’égard des femmes et la violence domestique, l’Observation générale du Comité des droits de l’Homme n° 18 sur la non-discrimination, para.10, et l’Observation générale du Comité des droits économiques sociaux et culturels n° 16, paras. 7 et 8). À l’inverse, une interprétation indifférente au genre de la Convention ne ferait que renforcer les inégalités préexistantes qui affectent les femmes.

[46] Ainsi que le confirment certaines des recherches listées à la note 9.

[47] La majorité a raté l’opportunité d’établir un raisonnement de principe pour imputer une violation de l’article 3, et non de l’article 8, à l’État défendeur, en préférant une fois encore rester attachée aux spécificités particulières du cas d’espèce. Pourtant, ce raisonnement était hautement nécessaire au regard de la jurisprudence disparate à l’heure actuelle. Dans les affaires Bevacqua , Sandra Jankovic , et A. s. Croatie , la Cour a conclu à la violation de l’article 8 (blessures corporelles), ainsi que dans l’affaire Hadjuova (menaces), mais dans l’affaire Opuz elle a conclu à une violation du droit issu de l’article 2 de la mère de la requérante (meurtre) et du droit issu de l’article 3 de la requérante (blessures corporelles) ainsi que de l’article 14 en conjonction avec les articles 2 et 3, et dans l’affaire Kontrova à une violation des articles 2 et 13 (meurtre). Dans l’affaire E.S. et autres c. Slovaquie , elle a conclu à la violation des articles 3 et 8 (violences physiques) ! Enfin, l’affaire Kalucza apparaît comme un cas de violation spéciale de l’article 8, puisqu’elle concernait des blessures corporelles et des violences verbales mutuelles. Ces différentes interprétations de la Convention ne sont évidemment pas hors de propos concernant la satisfaction et d’autres objectifs. En outre, du fait du rejet de la déclaration unilatérale du gouvernement défendeur par laquelle il reconnaissait la violation de l’article 8, la Cour a l’obligation de fournir un raisonnement détaillé du raisonnement la conduisant à conclure à la violation de l’article 3.

[48] L’expression est utilisée à l’article 18 3) de la Convention du Conseil de l’Europe sur la prévention et la lutte contre la violence à l’égard des femmes et la violence domestique. Il est important de noter que la Cour protège les victimes de violences domestiques et les victimes féminines de violences sans considération pour l’intention discriminatoire de leur auteur. C’est la raison pour laquelle normalement aucune violation supplémentaire de l’article 14 ne doit être relevée dans les cas de victimes féminines. Néanmoins, il peut y avoir des situations dans lesquelles les violences domestiques et les violences contre les femmes sont perpétrées avec une intention discriminatoire spécifique à l’égard de la victime, par exemple en dénigrant son origine raciale ou ethnique. Dans ces cas, il y aura une violation à la fois de l’article 3 et de l’article 14.

[49] Osman c. Royaume-Uni , 28 octobre 1998, § 116, Reports 1998-VIII. La Cour a appliqué ce critère dans des cas de violences domestiques (voir, par exemple, Opuz , cité ci-dessus, § 130, et Hajduova , cité ci-dessus, § 50). Le même critère a été adopté de l’autre côté de l’Atlantique par la Cour interaméricaine (voir l’affaire Cotton field , citée ci-dessus, para. 282, et Case of the Massacre of Pueblo Bello jugement, 31 janvier 2006, para. 152).

[50] L’argument selon lequel les autorités nationales devraient exercer un plus grand degré de vigilance au regard de la vulnérabilité particulière des victimes de violences domestiques, utilisé dans l’affaire Hajduova , citée ci-dessus, § 50, correspond en substance à ce critère plus strict.

[51] Bevacqua , cité ci-dessus, § 82, et Sandra Jankovic c. Croatie , n° 38478/05, § 50, 5 mars 2009. Dans la même veine, la CJUE a conclu, dans son jugement dans les affaires jointes Magette Gueye et Valentin Salmeron Sanchez (C-483/09 and C-1/10), que l’obligation d’imposer des injonctions d’éloignement d’une durée minimum aux personnes ayant commis des actes de violence au sein de la famille ne viole pas la Décision cadre 2001/220/JHA sur le statut des victimes dans les procédures pénales, même lorsqu’elles sont contestées par les victimes.

[52] La Cour a déjà considéré qu’il était dans l’intérêt public de poursuivre même dans un cas où la victime avait retiré sa plainte ( Opuz , cité ci-dessus, § 139).

[53] D’après les données émanant du département statistique du gouvernement de la République de Lituanie, 408 femmes et 69 hommes ont souffert de violences de la part de leurs époux ou concubins en 2007, et 359 femmes et 60 hommes ont souffert de violences de la part de leurs époux ou concubins en 2008. Ces données montrent que les femme s sont six fois plus souvent victimes de violences collectives que les hommes (Violences domestiques dans la région baltique sud, Kaliningrad, Lituanie, Pologne et Suède, rapport du projet Baltique Sud - Zone sans violence, septembre 2010, p. 20). Sur la valeur probatoire des statistiques, voir Hoogendijk c. Pays-Bas (dec.) , n° 58461/00, 6 janvier 2005, et Zarb Adami c. Malte , n° 17209/02, §§ 77-78, CEDH 2006-I. Voir également les Observations finales du Comité CEDAW sur la Lituanie, 2008, qui a exprimé ses préoccupations quant à la fréquence importante des violences contre les femmes – particulièrement des violences domestiques – et l’insuffisance de centres de crise.

[54] Une autre plainte a été déposée auprès de la police le 9 mars 2001. La majorité déclare, au paragraphe 66, qu’elle ne peut la prendre en considération, mais elle admet au paragraphe suivant que la requérante a fait des déclarations crédibles selon lesquelles elle avait été exposée à des menaces visant son intégrité physique.

[55] La décision de la Cour de district du 15 décembre 2005 était erronée. Bien qu’elle ait été révoquée par la Cour régionale, l’erreur a causé un délai supplémentaire dans les procédures, qui sont finalement devenues prescrites.

[56] La majorité s’est abstenue, au paragraphe 83, de considérer que la plainte pénale de la requérante aurait dû faire l’objet de poursuites par le procureur public. Pourtant, la majorité a accepté l’argument du gouvernement selon lequel la nouvelle loi sur les violences domestiques du 15 décembre 2011, qui a converti les violences domestiques en infraction susceptible de faire l’objet de poursuites publiques, visait à reconnaître l’« importance publique » des crimes affectés par la décision du procureur de 2005. En d’autres termes, la majorité est prête à appliquer rétroactivement la nouvelle loi contre les violences domestiques au détriment de la requérante, mais n’est pas prête à en tirer la conclusion selon laquelle c’est du fait de la faute du procureur que l’affaire a été close à tort.

[57] Je m’inspire, une fois encore, du Juge Blackmun, qui a fait entendre sa voix pour le « Poor Joshua! Victim of repeated attacks by an irresponsible, bullying, cowardly, and intemperate father » dans sa fameuse opinion dissidente jointe à l’odieuse affaire de manquement de l’État face aux violences domestiques DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. DSS , 489 U.S. 189 (1989).

[58] The ECHR has communicated another case concerning domestic violence – D.P. v. Lithuania , No. 27920/08 – to the Government of the Republic of Lithuania; see Internet page of the Ministry of Justice - http://www.tm.lt/eztt/naujiena/154.