CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE LEMMENS

1. I agree with the conclusion that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, but I would prefer to base that conclusion on a more narrow reasoning.

Although the applicant states that her complaint refers to a “continuing situation created as a result of the domestic legislation” (paragraph 23), the application of that legislation has resulted in the judicial determination of a concrete claim. In cases arising from individual petitions the Court’s task is not to review the relevant legislation in the abstract. Instead, it must confine itself, as far as possible, to examining the issues raised by the case before it (see, for a recent authority, Kotov v. Russia [GC], no. 54522/00, § 130, 3 April 2012). If we are to take subsidiarity seriously, it is, in my opinion, the decisions of the courts, in particular those of the court of appeal and the Court of Cassation, which should be the starting point of this Court’s review.

2. On the basis of that approach, the Government’s objection based on the six-month rule should be answered differently than the majority does in paragraphs 24-25. The majority rejects the objection on the ground “that the applicant’s complaint concerned a continuing situation which did not come to an end as a result of her unsuccessful attempt to secure access to a court”. In my opinion, the reason for rejecting the objection should be that the final decision in her case was delivered by the Court of Cassation on 12 March 2011, and that therefore the application, filed on 29 July 2011, was within the six-month time-limit.

3. As a result of this interpretation, there are further a number of paragraphs that I would prefer to draft with closer reference to the judgments handed down in the applicant’s case, in light of my more limited understanding of the object of the complaint.

I should add that I agree with the majority that the general character of the prohibition on direct access to a court and the absence of any regular review by a court at reasonable intervals of the applicant’s legal capacity (or other procedural safeguards) (see paragraph 39) are indicative of the disproportionate character of the restriction applied in the applicant’s case, as they result in the restriction being absolute and of indefinite duration.