DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE POWER-FORDE JOINED BY JUDGE ZUPANČIČ

Although the applicant is not a member of the Christian minority in Iraq, nevertheless, for the same reasons of principle as those set out in my dissenting opinion in the case of M.Y.H. and Others v. Sweden , I voted against the majority in finding that Article 3 would not be breached in the event that the deportation order made in respect of this applicant were to be executed.

My dissent is based on the failure of the majority to test whether the requisite guarantees as required by the Court ’ s case law prior to a deportation based on internal flight options have been established in this case.

The majority accepts that, in view of the passage of time since the date of the attacks upon the applicant, it would be ‘ reasonable ’ to assume that the applicant is no longer at the same risk of ill-treatment by members of his former fiancée ’ s family (§36). The perpetrators of the crimes visited upon the applicant ’ s fiancée cannot be considered as ‘ reasonable ’ people and, to my mind, it cannot be assumed that the passage of time has abated their desire for revenge.

Furthermore, apart from the personal threat to the individual it is clear on the evidence adduced that he will not be accepted in the Kurdish region. As noted in §35 of the Court ’ s Judgment in MYH and Others v Sweden there is confirmation from the Joint Finnish/Swiss Fact-Finding Mission that “s ingle male Sunni Arabs without a sponsor in the KRG area are refused ”.

The applicant being a single male Sunni without a sponsor clearly comes within this category. The question arises as to the precise place of safety to which it is proposed to deport him. The guarantees required under the Court ’ s case law on internal flight options necessitate that the place of safety be identified by the deporting State so that the risks in terms of transit thereto and admittance and settlement therein may be assessed.

The majority refers only to the fact that there is no indication that it would be impossible for him “ to find a place to settle ” (§58) outside his home region. When the life and safety of a person is at risk, such vagueness is unacceptable, particularly given the current situation in Iraq. Absent knowledge of the proposed place of safety, the Court is precluded from being assured that the guarantees as to the applicant ’ s safe transit, actual admittance and capacity to settle in the proposed relocation area have been met.