CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE SPANO

1. This case discloses a clear-cut violation of Article 10 of the Convention. I therefore fully concur with my colleagues. I write separately to address an issue not examined in the Court ’ s judgment (see paragraph 98), namely whether the interference with the applicant ’ s Article 10 rights pursued a “legitimate aim” as required by Article 10 § 2.

2. The Court correctly concludes that the “early termination of the applicant ’ s mandate as President of the Supreme Court was a reaction against his criticism and publicly expressed views on judicial reforms and thereby constituted an interference with the exercise of his right to freedom of expression” (see paragraph 97 of the judgment).

3. When considering whether such a measure pursued a legitimate aim within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention, it bears re iterating that the right to freedom of expression has as its fundamental purpose the safeguarding of the democratic process, the “ rule of law ” being one of the “ fundamental princip ­ les of a demo ­ cratic society ” (see Klass and Others v. Germany , 6 September 1978, § 55, Series A no. 28 ). Furthermore, the Court has previously held in a case c on cerning the freedom of expression of civil servants that issues relating to the “ separation of powers ” can involve “ very important matters in a democratic society which the public has a legitimate interest in being informed about and which fall within the scope of political debate ” ( see Guja v. Moldova [GC], no. 142 77/04, § 88 , ECHR 2008).

4. In the present case, the highest judicial office-holder of a constitutionally separate and independent branch of government lost his position as President of the Supreme Court prematurely, due only to his expressive activity in furtherance of a statutory duty to promote the interests of the judiciary in its relations with the other branches. The measure used by the legislature to remove him from office was a singular law of consti ­ tutional pedigree, clearly directed at the applicant and at him alone. Hence, it is axiomatic that the premature termination of the appli ­ cant ’ s mandate, on the basis of his publicly expressed views on the separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary, did not and could not have pursued a legitimate aim within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention.

[1] Article 258 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFUE) gives the Commission, as guardian of the Treaties, the power to take legal action against a Member State that is not respecting its obligations under EU law.

[2] Cardinal Acts need a two thirds majority to be adopted or changed.

[3] The Fourth Amendment to the Fundamental Law of 25 March 2013 transferred the text of section 11 of the Transitional Provisions into point 14 of the Final Provisions of the Fundamental Law.