JOINT DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES DEDOV AND POLÁČKOVÁ

1. To our regret, we have been unable to vote with the majority in finding that the investigation into Anna Politkovskaya’s killing did not reach the minimum threshold of effectiveness required by Article 2 of the Convention, for the following reasons.

2. We are in agreement with the reasoning and conclusions of the majority with respect to the preliminary objections raised by the Government concerning the scope of the case and the applicants’ alleged loss of victim status. We also fully share the majority’s reasoning that in cases where the victim of a killing is a journalist, it is of the utmost importance to check a possible connection between the crime and the journalist’s professional activity, and that the conclusions of an investigation must be based on a thorough, objective and impartial analysis of all the relevant elements, including the establishment of whether there is a connection between the threats and violence against journalists and other media actors and the exercise of journalistic activities or activities contributing in similar ways to public debate.

3. We regret, however, that we are unable to subscribe to the findings by our colleagues in the majority that there has been a violation of Article 2 in its procedural limb. That finding was based on the conclusion that the investigation into Anna Politkovskaya’s killing did not meet the adequacy requirement.

4. First of all we would like to note that at the end of the proceedings the authorities achieved the essential purpose of the investigation into Anna Politkovskaya’s killing. The investigation identified both the cause of the victim’s death and the persons directly responsible for the killing (compare Sarbyanova-Pashaliyska and Pashaliyska v. Bulgaria , no. 3524/14, § 42, 12 January 2017). Five people were convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment in a final judgment, and the third and fourth applicants were awarded damages.

5. The thrust of the applicants’ arguments concerning the alleged ineffectiveness of the investigation is the authorities’ failure to identify and prosecute the people who commissioned the contract killing. We understand that it must be frustrating for the applicants that those behind the killing have not been identified. However, we are not convinced that this in itself would suffice to conclude that the investigation into Anna Politkovskaya’s killing did not meet the Convention standard. The fact that the investigation did not succeed in identifying those who commissioned the killing does not necessarily mean that it was ineffective (see, mutatis mutandis , Trivkanović v. Croatia , no. 12986/13, § 79, 6 July 2017). In our opinion there were no concrete pieces of evidence in the present case that could have led the investigation in the direction of any person in particular, nor were there any identifiable potential witnesses who, if interviewed, could have shed light on the identities of those who had commissioned the killing (see, by contrast, Enukidze and Girgvliani v. Georgia , no. 25091/07, §§ 254 and 261, 26 April 2011).

6. It is clear from the case files that the applicants had their own theories regarding who could have been behind the killing. However, we would like to stress in this connection that Article 2 cannot be interpreted so as to impose a requirement on the authorities to launch a prosecution irrespective of the evidence which is available (see Gürtekin and Others v. Cyprus (dec.), nos. 60441/13 and 2 others, § 27, 11 March 2014). A prosecution, particularly the prosecution of such a serious charge as involvement in a killing, should never be embarked upon lightly. Given the presumption of innocence enshrined in Article 6 § 2 of the Convention, it can never be assumed that a particular person is so tainted with suspicion that the standard of evidence to be applied is an irrelevance. Speculation is a dangerous basis on which to base any steps that can potentially devastate a person’s life (see, mutatis mutandis , Borojević and Others v. Croatia , no. 70273/11, § 58, 4 April 2017).

7. Overall, regarding the adequacy of the steps taken by the Russian authorities, we are not persuaded by the applicants’ detailed submissions that there were significant oversights or omissions. In the circumstances, we cannot criticise the authorities for any culpable disregard, discernible bad faith or lack of will (see Zdjelar and Others v. Croatia , no. 80960/12, § 89, 6 July 2017). In our opinion, it cannot be said that the alleged leaks from the secret services referred to by the applicants affected the overall effectiveness of the investigation.

8. As to the requirement that an investigation be carried out promptly and with reasonable expedition (see Armani Da Silva v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 5878/08, § 240, ECHR 2016), we would like to point out that the criminal case was opened on the day of the killing. Initial investigative measures, such as the inspection of the scene of the incident and the collection of material evidence from it, as well as the collection of surveillance footage from the cameras in the vicinity, were taken without delay. Therefore we can accept that the authorities took sufficient measures to collect and secure evidence relating to the killing. As for the duration of the investigation in the present case, the period of almost ten years for an investigation and two subsequent sets of judicial proceedings over two levels of jurisdiction may be excessive according to the Court’s standards under Article 6 of the Convention. However, the purpose of the Court’s analysis under Article 2 is different. The requirement of promptness and reasonable expedition under Article 2 should not be examined in isolation and irrespective of the other parameters the combination of which makes an investigation effective (see, mutatis mutandis , Sarbyanova ‑ Pashaliyska and Pashaliyska , cited above, § 41, and Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç v. Turkey [GC], no. 24014/05, § 225, 14 April 2015). In view of the complexity inherent in the investigation of a contract killing, and in the absence of any indicators pointing at periods of conspicuous inactivity on the part of the investigators, we are of the opinion that the investigation and the court proceedings in the present case did not breach the promptness and reasonable expedition requirement.

9. Furthermore, assessing the proceedings as a whole, it cannot be said that Anna Politkovskaya’s relatives were excluded from the investigation to the extent that they were deprived of the opportunity to participate effectively in the proceedings. Article 2 of the Convention does not impose a duty on the investigating authorities to satisfy every request for a particular investigative measure made by a relative in the course of the investigation (see Ramsahai and Others v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 52391/99, § 348, ECHR 2007 ‑ II).

10. Nor are we inclined to agree with the applicants’ arguments that the investigation lacked independence, arguments which are essentially limited to an assertion that police and FSB officers were among the individuals investigated. Article 2 does not require that the individuals and bodies responsible for an investigation enjoy absolute independence, but rather that they are sufficiently independent of the individuals and structures whose responsibility is likely to be engaged (see Ramsahai and Others , cited above, §§ 343-44). The adequacy of the degree of independence is assessed in the light of all the circumstances, which are necessarily specific to each case (see Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç , cited above, § 223). The investigation was carried out by the Prosecutor General’s Office, a body that enjoys sufficient structural autonomy and independence from other law ‑ enforcement agencies. The applicants’ allegations to the contrary were not supported by specific evidence.

11. The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable us to conclude that the investigation into Anna Politkovskaya’s killing has not been shown to have infringed the Convention standard.

APPENDIX

[1] . McKerr v. the United Kingdom , no. 28883/95, ECHR 2001 ‑ III; Kelly and Others v. the United Kingdom , no. 30054/96, 4 May 2001; Shanaghan v. the United Kingdom , no. 37715/97, 4 May 2001; and Hugh Jordan v. the United Kingdom , no. 24746/94, ECHR 2001 ‑ III (extracts).

[2] . See Hugh Jordan v. the United Kingdom , cited above, § 105; Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy [GC], no. 23458/02, § 300, ECHR 2011 (extracts); Ramsahai and Others v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 52391/99, § 325, ECHR 2007 ‑ II; and Mastromatteo v. Italy [GC], no. 37703/97, § 91, ECHR 2002 ‑ VIII.