CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE KŪRIS

1. There can be no doubt that the length of the criminal proceedings against the applicant did not meet the requirements of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. As a rule, in cases where a violation of Article 6 § 1 is found on account of the length of the criminal proceedings, the Court awards the non-pecuniary damage for the distress and anxiety the applicants might have suffered. This judgment follows that long-standing practice, by which I felt bound when voting with the majority on point 4 (a) of the operative part.

2. I wonder, however, whether that practice should not be more nuanced, at least to the extent that due account might be taken of comfort, benefits and other advantages which outweigh the applicant ’ s suffering (whatever it might have been) and render it purely nominal.

3. In the instant case, the applicant clearly benefited from the authorities ’ inactivity and the protraction of the criminal proceedings. The enforcement of his sentence was waived by the court which convicted him, as it had become time-barred. Had the domestic authorities acted with the requisite celerity, the applicant would have ended up in a penal institution. There, he would have spent two years (unless released earlier). What was formally a violation of the Convention was thus, in fact, a reward. Now, on top of that reward, a bonus of EUR 1,200 has been added.

4. There already is some (albeit sparse) case-law which would allow for some (perhaps moderate) exceptions to the above-mentioned rigid practice. Take, for instance, Gagliano Giorgi v. Italy (no. 23563/07, §§ 56-58, 6 March 2012). More generally, the Court ’ s underlying approach, which I find consistent and justified in principle, calls for a revisit. One size does not necessarily fit all; in real life it hardly ever does. Legalistic purity is often – and unavoidably – a bit at odds with life ’ s reality. Still, it would benefit both if the gap between them were retrenched, whenever possible.