JOINT PARTLY CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGES KJØLBRO AND RANZONI

1. Although we voted for finding a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, we do not agree with the assessment that the revocation of the applicant’s liquidator’s licence was not lawful within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (paragraphs 95 to 99 of the judgment). In our view and as explained below, the interference was a lawful but disproportionate measure.

2. Any interference by a public authority with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions has to be lawful, and the principle of lawfulness presupposes that the applicable provisions of domestic law are sufficiently accessible, precise and foreseeable in their application (see Broniowski v. Poland [GC], no. 31443/96, § 147, ECHR 2004 ‑ V). However, the Court has limited power to review compliance with domestic law (see Beyeler v. Italy [GC], no. 33202/96, § 108, ECHR 2000 ‑ I). It is in the first place for the national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law, and unless the interpretation is arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable, the Court’s role is confined to ascertaining whether the effects of that interpretation are compatible with the Convention (see Beyeler , cited above, § 108; Jahn and Others v. Germany [GC], nos. 46720/99 and 2 others, § 86, ECHR 2005 ‑ VI; and Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, § 149, 20 March 2018).

3. The applicant’s liquidator’s licence was revoked in 2011 as a consequence of his conviction in 2010 for criminal offences that had been committed in 2003 and 2004 (see paragraph 9 of the judgment). The revocation was based on sections 108 and 109 of the Financial Operations Act, which had entered into force on 1 October 2008, and in accordance with which the Minister of Justice “must revoke” a licence if the person “has been convicted ... of a publicly prosecutable criminal offence committed with intent” (see paragraph 29). It transpires from the transitory provisions that liquidator licences issued under the Bankruptcy Act were to be considered as equivalent to licences issued under the Financial Operations Act (see paragraph 32).

4. The applicant was convicted of a publicly prosecutable criminal offence committed with intent (see paragraph 6) and it is undisputable that the applicant’s liquidator’s licence had to be revoked if sections 108 and 109 of the Financial Operations Act were to be applied.

5. Before the domestic authorities, the applicant argued that sections 108 and 109 of the Financial Operations Act could not be applied retrospectively and that the question of revocation had to be assessed on the basis of the legislation applicable when the criminal offences were committed. The applicant’s arguments were dismissed by the Ministry of Justice and subsequently by the Administrative Court, the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court (see paragraphs 9, 11, 13 and 14 of the judgment).

6. If revocation of a liquidator’s licence is to be regarded as a “legal consequence of conviction” within the meaning of the Criminal Code, there may seem to be a certain contradiction between Article 99 of the Criminal Code (paragraph 34 of the judgment) and sections 108 and 109 of the Financial Operations Act (see paragraph 29 of the judgment). Thus, Article 99 § 2 of the Criminal Code clearly stipulates that legal consequences cannot be imposed if the person is sentenced to a “suspended sentence” while sections 108 and 109 of the Financial Operations Act provide for revocation in the event of a conviction for a crime committed with intent, even if the sentence is suspended. Likewise, Article 99 § 4 stipulates that only those legal consequences that were prescribed by statute at the time the crime was committed can be imposed, while revocation in the applicant’s situation does not seem to have been possible under the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act (see paragraph 28 of the judgment).

7. That being stated, and having regard to the Court’s limited power to review compliance with domestic law, we find it difficult to characterise the interpretation and application of domestic law by the Ministry of Justice, the Administrative Court, the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court as arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable. The wording of sections 108 and 109 of the Financial Operations Act is unambiguous. The transitory provisions clearly indicate that the provisions of the Financial Operations Act were to be applied, even though the applicant’s licence had been issued prior to the entry into force of the Act. Therefore, if the question of revocation of the applicant’s liquidator’s licence was to be assessed under sections 109 and 108 of the Financial Operations Act as decided by the domestic authorities, the outcome was more than foreseeable, and the interplay between the provisions of the Financial Operations Act and the Criminal Code is a question concerning the interpretation of domestic law which falls to be decided by the domestic authorities.

8. Thus, we cannot subscribe to the reasoning and conclusion according to which the interference was not lawful within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

9. Consequently, and accepting that the measure pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the public by ensuring the integrity of those carrying out the function of liquidator, it is necessary for us to proceed with an assessment of proportionality.

10. Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 requires of any interference that there should be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim pursued. This fair balance will be upset if the person concerned has to bear an individual and excessive burden (see G.I.E.M. S.R.L. and Others v. Italy [GC], nos. 1828/06 and 2 others, § 300, 28 June 2018).

11. In the present case, the revocation of the applicant’s liquidator’s licence was applied as an automatic consequence of the fact that he had been convicted of a publicly prosecutable criminal offence committed with intent. The relevant provisions in the domestic law did not require or allow for a concrete assessment of the specific circumstances of the case, including the nature and the seriousness of the offence, the time elapsed since the offence was committed, whether the offence was related to or had a bearing on the exercise of the function of liquidator and the appropriate duration of the revocation compared to the gravity of the offence. In other words, the relevant domestic provisions did not allow for any concrete assessment of proportionality.

12. As regards the specific circumstances of the applicant’s case, there is no indication that his criminal conviction for violent behaviour was related to his professional activities. Furthermore, his licence was revoked more than six years after the offence in question had been committed, although he had been able to perform his job during that time without any legal repercussions. What is more, the revocation was of a permanent nature, since he was unable to reapply for a liquidator’s licence even after the conviction had been expunged from his criminal record.

13. Having regard to the foregoing and to the seriousness of the consequences for the applicant, who was unable as a result of the impugned measure ever to resume employment as a liquidator, we consider that a fair balance was not struck between the interference and the aim it pursued. There has therefore been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.