JOINT PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES PASTOR VILANOVA AND SCHUKKING

1 . Our dissenting opinion concerns, exclusively, the payment of just satisfaction to the applicant in respect of non-pecuniary damage under Article 41 of the Convention. We have drafted this joint opinion to express our disagreement with the majority position in the Chamber on this point.

2 . We are of the view that the judgment in the present case: (a) does not justify its departure from the Court ’ s case-law in such matters, and (b) in doing so it overlooks the need for reasoning under Article 45 § 1 of the Convention.

3 . Firstly, it is to be noted that the Court has found on many occasions that it does not follow from its finding of a violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention that an applicant was wrongly convicted. Indeed, it is impossible to speculate as to what might have occurred had there been no breach of the minimum rights listed in Article 6 § 3. In such circumstances the Court often takes the view that a finding of a violation constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction ( see Sejdovic v. Italy [GC], no. 56581/00, § 134, 2006 ‑ II; Ibrahim and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 50541/08 and 3 others, § 315, ECHR 2016; and Beuze v. Belgium [GC], no. 71409/10, § 199, 9 November 2018). It is noteworthy that no less than three Grand Chamber judgments, two of which are recent, have taken such an approach. However, the Chamber now appears to be turning its back on this well-established doctrine.

4 . Secondly, the Court has also taken the view that there is no need to make an award for non-pecuniary damage when the applicant is able to obtain the reopening of the domestic proceedings, after having previously been convicted. In the present case the possibility of a retrial exists under domestic law. In this respect the Court has reiterated many times that when an individual has been convicted following proceedings that have entailed breaches of the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention, as a rule, a retrial or the reopening of the case, if requested, represents in principle the most appropriate form of redressing that violation ( see, among other authorities, Sejdovic v. Italy , cited above, § 1 26; Öcalan v. Turkey [GC], no. 46221/99, § 210 in fine , ECHR 2005 ‑ IV; Cabral v. the Netherlands , no. 37617/10, §§ 42-43, 28 August 2018; and Chernika v. Ukraine , no. 53791/11, §§ 82-83, 12 March 2020). Once again, this well-established case-law seems to have been ignored.

5 . Lastly, Article 45 § 1 of the Convention requires that reasons must be given for the Court ’ s judgments and decisions. This provision seems clear and no exception is permitted. As it is not otherwise stipulated, it can be inferred that the obligation to give reasons concerns the entire text of the judgment or decision and not merely certain passages of the judicial ruling. Consequently, even if the majority wished to base their findings on a different strand of case-law, or to depart from the authorities relied upon by the minority, they were under an obligation, we respectfully submit, in terms of the duty of the European adjudicator, to explain the reasons for their position. Such reasoning would have enhanced the principle of legal certainty in the present case.