PARTLY CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE MULARONI

I would have preferred the Court to have examined the applicants ’ complaints under Article 8 of the Convention taken alone and to have concluded that it was unnecessary for it to rule on their complaint under Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 8. However, I a greed to vote with the majority as I considered it important to rule that Article 8 has been violated in this case.

I fully share the considerations set out in paragraphs 52 to 61 of the judgment.

However, I disagree with those contained in paragraph 49.

I consider that the applicants ’ argument, that because of the publicity caused by the enactment of the KGB Act on 16 July 1998 and its application to them they have suffered constant embarrassment as a result of their past activities , does not deserve the Court ’ s attention. The applicants worked for the KGB and they never contested that the KGB ’ s activities were contrary to the principles guaranteed by the Lithuanian Constitution or by the Convention (see paragraph 54 of the judgment ). The Court accepted that the restriction o n the applicants ’ employment prospects under the impugned Act pursued the legitimate aims of the protection of national security, public safety , the economic well-being of the country and the rights and freedoms of others (see paragraph 55 of the judgment ).

Everyone has to accept the consequences of his or her actions in life and the fact that the applicants continue to be burdened with the status of “former KGB officers” is , in my view, totally irrelevant to the question of the applicability (and the violation) of Article 8 of the Convention. The argument that they are stigmatised by society on account of their past association with an oppressive regime has , to my mind , nothing to do with the respondent State ’ s responsibility for the violation of Article 8 of the Convention.

I also consider that the argument that the applicants could not have envisaged the consequences their former KGB employment would entail for them is equally irrelevant to the issue of the applicability (and violation) of Article 8. If such an argument were accepted, any act, even the most reprehensible, committed by a dictator when in power could justify a finding of a violation of the Convention following the establishment of a democratic regime. It should not be overlooked in this connection that Article 17 of the Convention provides that “ [n]othing in [ the ] Convention m ay be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth ... in the Convention”.

In my opinion, it is conclusive that the ban on seeking employment affected to an extremely significant degree the applicants ’ opportunity to pursue various professional activities and that there were consequential effects on the enjoyment of their right to respect for their private life within the meaning of Article 8. I agree with the majority that the fact that the applicants were prevented from seeking employment in various branches of the private sector on account of the statutory ban constituted a disproportionate measure, even having regard to the legitimacy of the aims pursued by that ban. That in itself should have been sufficient to have led the Court to a conclusion that Article 8 was violated in the applicants ’ case.

PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE LOUCAIDES

I do not agree with the majority that Article 14 is applicable in the present case , for the following reasons .

It is established case-law that Article 14 safeguards individuals placed in an “analogous” or “similar” or “relevantly similar” situation (see Marckx v. Belgium , judgment of 13 June 1979, Series A no. 31, pp. 15-16, § 32 ; Van der Mussele v. Belgium , judgment of 23 November 1983, Series A no. 70 , pp. 22-23, § 46 ; Fredin v. Sweden (no. 1) , judgment of 18 February 1991, Series A no. 192, p.19, § 60; and Stubbings and Others v. the United Kingdom , judgment of 22 October 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-IV, p. 1507, § 72). Therefore, as pointed out in the case - law: “For a claim of a violation of this Article to succeed, it has therefore to be established, inter alia , that the situation of the alleged victim can be considered similar to that of persons who have been better treated” (see Fredin and Stubbings and Others , loc. cit. ) .

In examining this question , account should be taken of the aim and effects of the law or measure in issue. The Act under consideration imposed restrictions on the professional activities of persons who had in the past worked for the KGB, the activities of which were contrary to the principles guaranteed by the Lithuanian Constitution and by the Convention. The KGB Act aimed to protect national security, public safety a nd the rights and freedoms of others, by avoiding a repetition of previous experience which could occur if former KGB employees were to engage in activities similar to those of that organisation. It is therefore evident that the impugned restrictions provided by the law in question were directly connected to the status of “ former KGB officers ” of persons such as the applicants.

The majority found that Article 14 was applicable in this case because the applicants were treated differently from other persons in Lithuania who had not worked for the KGB (see paragraph 41 of the judgment ). However, in the light of the above, I do not see how the people who had not worked for the KGB were in an “analogous”, “similar” or “relevantly similar” situation to those who had.

Although I find that Article 14 is not applicable in the present case, I do find that the restrictions imposed on the professional activities of the applicants were, in the circumstances of the case as explained in the judgment, so onerous and disproportionate to the aim pursued that they amounted to an unjustified interference with the private li ves of the applicants. Consequently , I find that there has been a breach of Article 8 of the Convention.