PARTLY DISSENTING, PARTLY CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE O’LEARY

1. The present case stemmed from the criminal conviction of members of a group linked to an international movement known as BDS (Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions) following protests in a French supermarket in September 2009 and May 2010.

2. I support the unanimous decision of the Chamber to find a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. There can be no question but that French law, as interpreted and applied by the domestic courts, violates the right to freedom of expression protected under the Convention.

3. I am, regretfully, unable to join my colleagues in finding no violation of Article 7 of the Convention. The applicants raised serious questions before this Court and at domestic level in relation to the foreseeability, within the meaning of the Court’s case-law, of the French regulatory framework as interpreted and applied to the protesters. Those questions could have been addressed either pursuant to Article 7 or pursuant to the “prescribed by law” requirement under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention.

4. Whichever route was chosen, it was not sufficient for the Chamber to rely on the previous judgment of the Court in Willem v. France (no. 10883/05, 16 July 2009) and, in particular, on the Court of Appeal and Court of Cassation judgments which preceded that 2009 Strasbourg judgment.

5. Since the Court of Cassation in its 2015 judgment relating to the applicants simply did not engage with the essence of their Article 7 complaint, it seems to me that both the highest French criminal court and the Strasbourg Court have persistently failed to address the question of the foreseeability of French law in relation to boycotts in recent years.

6. On 9 July 2004, the International Court of Justice handed down its Advisory Opinion on the legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian territory (I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 136).

7. The BDS movement, to which further reference will be made briefly below in relation to the Article 10 complaint, emerged one year later.

8. During the 2009 and 2010 supermarket protests, the applicants wore “Palestine Vivra” t-shirts, displayed avocados and baby wipes imported from Israel in trolleys, distributed pamphlets, encouraged customers to boycott products from Israel, in particular from the occupied territories, and asked customers to sign a petition addressed to the supermarket management. Videos of the protest were posted online. The political purpose of the protests, as stated in the judgments of the French courts, was to encourage a consumer boycott in order to put pressure on Israel to respect its obligations under international law.

9. It is uncontested that some protesters shouted “Israel assassin, Carrefour complicit”. Before the first-instance court it was established that the majority of those present distanced themselves from this slogan, indicating that they considered the terms used to be excessive and not in line with the protest in which they had undertaken to participate.

10. The applicants, all but one of whom had participated in the September 2009 protest, were summoned by the Colmar prosecutor to appear before the Mulhouse Criminal Court almost one year later on the basis of section 24, eighth paragraph, of the Law of 1881 on freedom of the press. No reference was made in the indictment to Article 225-2 of the French Criminal Code, which expressly sanctions economic discrimination. The first-instance Criminal Court examined the facts of the case and concluded in a judgment of 15 December 2011 that the constituent elements of the offence under the 1881 Law were not made out and that the legal basis for the indictment was inadequate. The actions of the protesters were indicative of possible economic discrimination directed at certain products which was not covered by section 24, eighth paragraph, of the 1881 Law or the indictment. The applicants, and a further May 2010 protester, were acquitted.

11. In November 2013, following an appeal by the prosecutor, the Court of Appeal of Colmar overturned the first-instance decision. According to that court, the simple fact that the applicants had incited third parties to proceed to discriminate between producers and suppliers in order to reject those from Israel was sufficient to characterise the material element of the criminal offence with which they had been charged under the impugned provision of the 1881 Law.

12. In its judgment of 20 October 2015, in a single, short paragraph, the Court of Cassation confirmed the decision of the appeal court (Cass. Crim., 20 October 2015, no. 14-80020). It held that the latter was sufficiently reasoned and without contradiction in that it had held correctly that the constituent elements of the offence proscribed by section 24, eighth paragraph, of the 1881 Law were present and that the exercise of the right to freedom of expression provided for by Article 10 of the Convention could be restricted by measures necessary, as in this case, in a democratic society.

13. Article 7 of the Convention, which embodies the principle that only the law can define an offence and prescribe a penalty ( nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege ), requires that the criminal law must not be extensively construed to an accused’s detriment, for instance by analogy (see Del Río Prada v. Spain [GC], no. 42750/09, § 78, ECHR 2013, and Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania [GC], no. 35343/05, § 153, ECHR 2015). The guarantee enshrined in Article 7 is to be construed and applied, as follows from its object and purpose, in such a way as to provide effective safeguards against arbitrary prosecution, conviction and punishment (see Del Río Prada , cited above, § 77).

14. In Article 10 § 2 of the Convention, the requirement that an interference with the rights guaranteed therein must be “prescribed by law” is one of the conditions that must be fulfilled in order for such an interference to be justified. This lawfulness requirement in Articles 8-11 of the Convention also serves to afford a measure of protection against arbitrary interferences by public authorities with the rights safeguarded by the Convention (see, for instance, Roman Zakharov v. Russia [GC], no. 47143/06, §§ 228-29, ECHR 2015, in respect of Article 8; Leyla Şahin v. Turkey [GC], no. 44774/98, §§ 88-91, ECHR 2005 XI, in respect of Article 9; Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], no. 38433/09, § 143, ECHR 2012, in respect of Article 10; and Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], nos. 29580/12 and 4 others, §§ 114-15, 15 November 2018, in respect of Article 11).

15. According to the Court’s established case-law, the concept of “law” in Article 7 alludes to the very same concept as that to which the Convention refers elsewhere when using that term; a concept which comprises statutory law as well as case-law and implies qualitative requirements, including those of accessibility and foreseeability (see Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v. Germany [GC], nos. 34044/96 and 2 others, § 82, ECHR 2001-II; Vasiliauskas , cited above, § 154; and Kudrevičius and Others , cited above, § 193).

16. Offences and the relevant penalties must be clearly defined by law, a requirement which is satisfied where the individual can know from the wording of the provision, if need be with the assistance of the court’s interpretation of it and after taking appropriate legal advice, what acts and omissions will make him or her criminally liable (see Del Río Prada , cited above, § 79, in relation to Article 7, or Kudrevičius and Others , cited above, § 109, and Navalnyy , cited above § 114 in relation to Article 11). The Court accepts that the wording of statutes is not always precise, given that laws must be of general application and that there will always be a need for courts to elucidate doubtful points and adapt to changing circumstances. The role of adjudication vested in the courts is precisely to dissipate such interpretational doubts as may remain (see Del Río Prada , cited above, § 93, and Kudrevičius and Others , cited above, § 110).

17. Both in the context of Article 7 and in the context of Article 10 § 2, the level of precision required of domestic legislation will depend to a considerable degree on the content of the instrument in question, the field it is designed to cover and the number and status of those to whom it is addressed (see, in respect of Article 7, Vasiliauskas , cited above, § 157, and in respect of Article 10 § 2, Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], no. 931/13, § 144, 27 June 2017).

18. However, given that a criminal charge or conviction is at issue, Article 7 § 1 requires the Court to examine whether there was a contemporaneous legal basis for an applicant’s conviction and it must satisfy itself that the result reached by the domestic courts was compatible with that Article (see, for instance, Kononov , cited above, §§ 197-98, and Rohlena v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 59552/08, §§ 51-52, ECHR 2015). Furthermore, regarding the role of judicial interpretation, the Court’s case-law appears more specific in respect of Article 7 than it is in respect of Articles 8-11. Although Article 7 does not exclude the gradual clarification of the rules of criminal liability through interpretation from case to case, the resulting development must be consistent with the essence of the offence and must be reasonably foreseeable (see Kononov , cited above, § 185, and Del Río Prada , cited above, § 93). While this requirement can be fulfilled even where the domestic courts interpret and apply a provision for the first time (see, as an example under Article 10, Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], cited above, § 150), judicial interpretation must generally follow a perceptible line of case-law consistent with the essence of the offence.

19. Before examining how these general principles should have applied in the circumstances of the present case, it is interesting to note as a preliminary aside that the nature and effect of the 2015 decision of the Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation was reported in the following terms in Le Monde :

“ No further doubt is possible : the simple fact of calling for a boycott of Israeli goods is totally illegal in France . And it is severely punished. Two judgments of the Court of Cassation ... render France one of the few countries in the world, and the sole democracy, where a call to boycott by an organisation or citizen for criticising the policies of a third country is prohibited”. [1]

20. In dismissing the applicants’ complaint under Article 7, the Chamber judgment relies solely on the Court of Cassation judgment of September 2004 which led to the Willem case and on that court’s interpretation of section 24, eighth paragraph, of the 1881 Law on the freedom of the press (see paragraph 39 of the Chamber judgment). Willem is, as the Chamber judgment correctly emphasises in its analysis under Article 10, a particular and different case. The mayor of a French municipality had been convicted under the latter provision of the 1881 Law for having directed municipal catering services not to buy Israeli products. His conviction at domestic level and the Court’s decision to find no violation of Article 10 in his case was based on the fact that the applicant had called on those municipal services, for which he was responsible in his capacity as a public official, to engage in a positive act of discrimination (see Willem , cited above, § 38 and the distinguishing of Willem in § 68 of the Chamber judgment).

21. The reliance in this judgment, without more, on the Willem judgment and on the two domestic court decisions which preceded it, is thus problematic for a number of reasons.

22. Firstly, it is uncontested that section 24 of the 1881 Law did not contain an express reference to economic discrimination. Such an express reference is and was to be found instead in Article 225-2 of the Criminal Code. Cross-reference is made to the latter provision in section 24, ninth paragraph, of the 1881 Law, whose scope is limited, but not in the eighth paragraph. The latter provision was adopted in 1972 as a means of combatting racial discrimination. The respondent Government suggest that economic discrimination can and should be read into the provisions of section 24, eighth paragraph, of the 1881 Law for the following reason: during the parliamentary debates which preceded its adoption, reference had been made to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination which, in Article 1, defines racial discrimination and refers to “the political, economic , social, cultural and any other field of public life”. This is an inventive and unorthodox way to interpret provisions of a criminal statute but it is hardly one that meets the standards of the Court’s case-law as outlined above. In essence, the latter provides that criminal law provisions should be accessible, foreseeable and must not be extensively construed to an accused’s detriment.

23. Secondly, the question whether the provision relied on in Willem (reliance now endorsed in Baldassi ) complied with the lawfulness requirement under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention had already been raised at domestic and Strasbourg level. In Willem the Court simply accepted that the criminal conviction of the applicant in that case had a legal basis. It added that, in the view of the Court of Appeal of Douai, sections 23 and 24, eighth paragraph, of the 1881 Law referred, at the time, to Articles 225-1 and 225-2 of the Criminal Code (see Willem , cited above, § 29). This was not and is not correct. As such, a problematic lawfulness question remained unanswered or was erroneously answered in Willem . This non-answer in a case which concerned very distinct facts and an earlier version of the 1881 Law has now been transposed without more to the actions of the protesters in Baldassi .

24. Thirdly, leaving aside the distinctions between this case and Willem , was it really foreseeable for the applicants that their participation in supermarket protests in September 2009 and May 2010 would lead to criminal charges and a conviction on the basis of section 24, eighth paragraph, of the 1881 Law? According to the Court’s case-law, foreseeability must be appraised from the perspective of the convicted person at the time of the commission of the offence charged (see Rohlena v. the Czech Republic [GC], cited above, § 56; Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v. Germany [GC], cited above, § 51; Veeber v. Estonia (No. 2) , no. 45771/99, § 33, 21 January 2003; and Korbely v. Hungary [GC], no. 9174/02, § 73, 19 September 2008). In my view the Chamber, to the extent that it even tried to answer this question, did so by placing itself in 2015 following the judgment of the Court of Cassation, and not in 2009, when the first set of protesters packed up their pamphlets and headed for Carrefour.

25. Two points are noteworthy in this regard.

26. On the one hand, the circular to which reference is made in paragraph 20 of the Chamber judgment (known as the “Alliot-Marie circular”) was issued to Court of Appeal prosecutors on the instructions of the then Minister of Justice on 12 February 2010. It thus followed several months after the first and largest Carrefour protest involving the applicants in September 2009. That circular did point to the fact that in 2009 various criminal proceedings had been instituted on the basis of section 24, eighth paragraph, of the 1881 Law against protesters involved in similar protests. However, it was clear that the outcome of those proceedings was far from uniform. Reference was made to just one judgment, handed down two days previously by the first-instance Criminal Court of Bordeaux, in which supermarket protesters had been convicted. Prosecutors were called upon to ensure a coherent and firm response to such protests and were requested to notify the authorities of any decisions not to take action and the reasons behind them.

27. On the other hand, an overview of first-instance and appeal court decisions in relation to similar protests at the material time and for several years thereafter demonstrate that the position in French law was far from clear. The first-instance Bordeaux court judgment, just mentioned, was upheld by the Court of Appeal and the Court of Cassation only in October 2010 and May 2012 respectively. Meanwhile, on 8 July 2011 the Paris Criminal Court acquitted a protester who had posted a video on line of an identical supermarket boycott ( tribunal de grande instance of Paris , 8 July 2011), finding as follows as regards section 24, eighth paragraph, of the 1881 Law:

“[this provision] cannot, with the degree of foreseeability required by Constitutional and Convention norms, be relied upon to prohibit, as such, an appeal calling for a form of conscientious objection that each person is free to express or not, without there being any constraint that might impede the freedom of consumers, emanating from NGOs with no public powers”.

28. This judgment was upheld by the Court of Appeal of Paris in a judgment of 24 May 2012, which regarded the actions at issue as a “passive criticism of State policy which belongs to free political debate” (“ critique passive de la politique d’un État relevant du libre jeu du débat politique ”). This judgment was left untouched on the merits by the Court of Cassation in a judgment of 19 November 2013 in which it rejected an appeal by the civil parties on procedural grounds (Cass. Crim., 19 November 2013, no. 12-08483).

29. In November 2011 the Court of Cassation had also confirmed (Cass. Crim., 8 November 2011, no. 09-88007) the following reasoning of the Paris Court of Appeal in relation to section 24, eighth paragraph, of the 1881 Law when judging a publication in which the author had engaged in a pejorative characterisation of the Tutsi community in Rwanda:

“the offence is made out only where there is proof of the existence of incitement to discrimination ... against the person or group in question; it does not suffice in this connection to find that the impugned [remarks] have aroused negative feelings [on the part of others] vis-à-vis a community or have caused offence, even for good reason, to individuals belonging to the group concerned, for [the accused] must be shown to have wilfully incited, provoked, or encouraged ... actual [discriminatory] conduct that is prohibited by law.” [2]

30. I am not suggesting that the fact that some proceedings based on section 24, eighth paragraph, of the 1881 Law were discontinued, or that some protesters were acquitted while others were not, is in itself proof of a lack of foreseeability within the meaning of Articles 7 or 10 § 2 of the Convention. The Court has clearly stated that the mere fact that other individuals were not prosecuted or convicted cannot absolve an applicant from criminal liability or render his conviction unforeseeable for the purposes of Article 7 (see Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia , no. 11082/06 and 13772/05, §§ 816-20, 25 July 2013). However, neither in the judgments of the Courts of Appeal or Cassation nor in the submissions of the respondent Government in this case does one find evidence of a perceptible line of case-law at the material time supporting the charging and conviction of civilian, non-violent protesters on the basis of section 24, eighth paragraph, of the 1881 Law (see furthermore Pessino v. France , no. 40403/02, §§ 34-36, 10 October 2006, on questions of accessibility and foreseeability). Indeed, at the material time, before the intervention of the Alliot-Marie circular, the “perceptible line of case-law” appears to have been that of the first-instance courts, which had found that the constituent elements of the offence as charged were not made out and indictments on that basis were inadequate. The finding of the Court of Cassation in 2015 may finally have introduced clarity as to the result where it had previously been lacking (although the absence of any reasoning on the Article 7 question was at the very least unhelpful). However, the foreseeability of the impugned provision has, as previously explained, to be assessed as at the time when the offences with which the applicants were charged were committed in September 2009 and May 2010.

31. It is striking that the respondent Government, relying on the opinion of the Advocate General before the Court of Cassation, characterised the actions and objectives of the protesters in the following terms:

“[T]he aim of the applicants’ action was to hinder the economic activity of the producers and distributors, as a decline in the purchase of their wares would have the effect of driving shops to cease doing business with them, thus rendering their economic activity more difficult. In that way the applicants were seeking, in support of their cause, to create economic consequences that were sufficiently serious for the State of Israel to be forced to react.”

32. An express provision of the French Criminal Code provided for the possibility of imposing criminal sanctions for economic discrimination against natural or legal persons if the constituent elements of such a crime were made out, namely Article 225-2. At the material time no such provision was made in section 24, eighth paragraph, of the 1881 Law (see also the dissenting opinion of Judge Jungwiert in Willem , cited above).

33. Finally, whether one agrees or disagrees with the Court’s reasoning in Willem (see further below in relation to Article 10), the status of that applicant and the impact of his actions were different from those of the supermarket protesters, who had no authority over the customers they engaged with and no possibility of determining how those customers disposed of their household budget. As also indicated previously, the status of an applicant is a key criterion when assessing the foreseeability of a law. In a different French case relating to the 1881 Law, Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France ([GC] , nos. 21279/02 and 36448/02, §§ 41-43, 22 October 2007), having noted that the relevant case-law on the disputed point was “dated and rather scant”, the Court emphasised the professional status of the applicants in question and the resulting obligation on them to apprise themselves of the relevant legal provisions and case-law in such matters, concluding in those circumstances that there had been no violation. Even if the applicants in the present case had taken specialised legal advice, it is difficult to see how the subsequent judicial interpretation and enlargement of the scope of the impugned provision of the 1881 Law to cover economic discrimination by civilian protesters could have been foreseeable to them or their lawyers at the material time.

34. It is for the above reasons – compounded by the absence of any engagement with the applicants’ Article 7 complaint by the Court of Cassation – that I find myself unable to vote in favour of no violation of that Article of the Convention in the present case.

35. The Chamber has found, unanimously, a violation of Article 10 of the Convention in the circumstances of the present case.

36. The legal question under Article 10 could have been approached in three different ways – as a classic Article 10 case (a), as a case specifically about boycotts (whether they constitute an expressive activity and, if so, their nature) (b), or as a case about BDS boycotts in particular (c). The difficulty which some may find with the judgment is that it tries to do a little of all three things while failing to engage fully with any. As such, it may be useful to elaborate on each one, albeit briefly.

37. As regards (a), as interpreted and applied by the French courts, French law prohibits in an absolute and general manner all boycotts of products based on their geographical origin. Of and in itself, this restriction of the right to freedom of expression of protesters who call for a boycott, and indeed of consumers who follow such a call, is in violation of Article 10 of the Convention. Such a generalised prohibition does not allow for the necessary analysis of the circumstances of a given case and does not leave space for the identification and balancing of the different rights and interests in play. Nor does it, crucially, allow distinctions to be made between what the Paris Court of Appeal (see above) has referred to as “passive criticism of State policy which belongs to free political debate” and quite different, sinister and disguised calls to hatred, intolerance and antisemitism, none of which are tolerated under the Convention.

38. As we see from the judgment of the Court of Appeal of Colmar, in recent years the practice of French courts has been to find that the simple fact of encouraging consumers not to buy goods of a particular origin constitutes an incitement to discriminate punished by law. Reliance, by those charged, on the fact that they were expressing a political opinion to justify their actions has therefore had no effect since freedom of expression has been rejected as a defence to an offence punishable under French law. In essence this means that a call for a boycott such as that in Carrefour in 2009 and 2010 is prohibited in principle and the application of Article 10 is excluded. Legal reasoning such as that of the Colmar Court of Appeal excludes the application of the Convention in a manner equivalent to Article 17. However that provision, which applies exceptionally, concerns a particular type of abusive behaviour; so abusive that it negates the application of the Convention. While the Court of Cassation adjusted this line of reasoning by basing its finding on Article 10 § 2 and declaring the impugned restriction of the right to freedom of expression as being necessary in a democratic society, it did not criticise the reasoning of the lower court but ostensibly endorsed it (see paragraph 17 of the Chamber judgment: “the Court of Appeal ... had rightly noted, ...”). In such circumstances, it is not sufficient to conclude that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention merely because the conviction of these particular applicants was not based on relevant and sufficient reasons. The violation stems more broadly from the French legal approach to boycotts of this nature, as follows from a careful reading of paragraph 75 of the judgment.

39. As regards (b), a boycott is characterised in paragraph 64 of the Chamber judgment as being:

“a particular form of the exercise of the freedom of expression in that it combines the expression of protest opinion with differential treatment such that, depending on the circumstances which characterise the boycott, it may constitute a call to discriminate against others.”

40. Thereafter, calls to violence, hatred or intolerance are referenced (citing Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC] , no. 27510/08, § 240, 15 October 2015), discrimination being included as a form of intolerance. The general reference to “differential treatment” in paragraph 64 could be misunderstood or misused, however, as references to differential treatment can quickly become references to discriminatory treatment, without any consideration of the significant legal differences between the two. The judgment in Willem provides a good example of this. Since in essence the Chamber judgment concludes that the French legal approach to boycotts is out of step with the requirements of Article 10 of the Convention, I have difficulty understanding why it is the French legal characterisation of boycotts which one sees imprinted in the Article 10 analysis in paragraph 64 of the judgment. The definition provided gives little if any guidance as to the compatibility of boycotts as a form of expression with the Convention. It contrasts with the approach of domestic courts, such as the German Federal Constitutional Court, which have long since regarded the right to call for a boycott as clearly following from the fundamental right to freedom of speech which “is not just a right to express one’s personal opinion without interference (a ‘negative’ freedom), but a political right to aim to affect and shape public opinion as a totality (a ‘positive’ freedom), which outweighs private rights when the expression is not aimed at private but at public purposes” (see Lüth , 1 BvR 400/51, 15 January 1958, discussed in M. Bot, “The right to boycott: BDS, law and politics in a global context” (2019), Transnational Legal Theory, vol. 10, issue 3-4, emphasis added).

41. Finally, as regards point (c), when seised of a case of this nature, the Court must seek to provide an interpretation of Article 10 of the Convention which is in conformity with its long-established case-law, while remaining aware that some parties may wish to implicate it in the political fray which forms the background to a given case. In this latter regard it cannot afford to be naïve. The Chamber has rightly sought to follow a judicious line. Referring to paragraph 18 of the 2019 report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur, in which the latter addresses the BDS movement (see the report referenced in paragraph 21 of the judgment), the Chamber confirms that non-violent calls to boycott are, as a general matter, legitimate speech that should be protected, while distinguishing expression that draws on antisemitic tropes or stereotypes, rejects the right of Israel to exist or advocates discrimination against Jewish individuals because of their religion. It is well established and worth repeating that forms of expression which are a cover for, or an incitement to, antisemitism do not attract the protection afforded by the Convention, either by virtue of Article 17 or by virtue of Article 10 § 2 interpreted in the light of the latter. In contrast, expressive activity, like that at issue in the present case, which seeks to condemn a government or a State, in line with “a respectable body of opinion”, including Council of Europe governments, the United Nations General Assembly, the European Union and the International Court of Justice (see the Court of Appeal of England and Wales (per Sales LJ) in The Queen on the Application of: Jewish Rights Watch Ltd (T/A Jewish Human Rights Watch) v. Leicester City Council , [2018] EWCA Civ 1551, § 38) can unquestionably fall within the scope of Article 10 of the Convention. This flows clearly from paragraphs 78-79 of the Chamber judgment.

42. Named after Captain Charles Cunningham Boycott, the first boycott was initiated by the tenants and residents of Lough Mask and the village of Ballinrobe in County Mayo, Ireland in 1880. It is clearly a long way from Mayo to a Carrefour supermarket in Illzach, Alsace and from there to Courts of Appeal in Douai and Colmar and onwards to the Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation in Paris.

[1] See J.-B. Jacquin, “L’appel à boycotter Israël déclaré illégal. Un arrêt de la Cour de cassation fait de la France l’un des rares pays à interdire les actions du mouvement pro-palestinien BDS”, Le Monde , 6 Novembre 2015. Author’s own translation, emphasis added, of the following passage: “Il n’y a plus aucun doute possible: le simple appel à boycotter des produits israéliens est totalement illégal en France. Et sévèrement puni. Deux arrêts de la Cour de cassation … font de la France l’un des rares pays du monde, et la seule démocratie, où l’appel au boycott par un mouvement associatif ou citoyen pour critiquer la politique d’un Etat tiers est interdit.”

[2] Paris Court of Appeal, 18 November 2009, cited by R. Medard Inghilterra, “Provocation à la discrimination et appel au boycott de produits étrangers : la Cour de cassation tranche le débat”, (2015) Actualités Droits-Libertés .