SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE VERDROSS

(Translation)

I agree with the Court that, for th e reasons stated in the present judgment, it has jurisdiction to interpret its judgments.

On the contrary, as regards the substance I regret that for the following considerations I am unable to accept either the Court ’ s decision or its reasoning.

Under Article 50 (art. 50) of the Con vention, the Court has power to "afford just satisfaction to the injured party". It in no way follows from this provision that the Court has competence to restrict the rights of the creditors of the applicant entitled to such satisfaction, since the compensation due to Ringeisen by the Republic of Austria and interference with his creditors ’ rights are two entirely different matters. The first concerns a relationship between the applicant and the Republic, the second a relationship between the applicant and his creditors. To enable the Court to restrict the rights of the applicant ’ s creditors, it would therefore be necessary to have a special provision in the Convention. In the absence of such a provision the Court has no power to order that the satisfaction afforded to the applicant shall be free from attachment by his creditors.

Since every juridical act must be in terpreted in so far as possible consistently with the law as it stands, it may not be presumed that the Chamber which delivered the judgment of 22 June 1972 wished to exceed the jurisdiction conferred upon it by the Convention. It follows that the sentence in that judgment reading "the Court considers that it can leave this point" - payment to the applicant of compensation free from attachment by his creditors - "to the discretion of the Austrian authorities" - leaving it to them to apply in this case, by analogy, the provisions of two Austrian Acts mentioned in the same paragraph - must be interpreted according to the ordinary meaning of the words used and as it may be understood by any government acting in good faith. For if the Chamber had wished to oblige Austria , in a mandatory way, to act in the manner I have indicated, it could and should have said so clearly.

Faced with the judgment, th e Austrian Government, being an administrative body, could not do anything other than deposit with the competent court the sum of money awarded against it, leaving it to the court to apply the above-mentioned Austrian laws in this given case before it. The reference made to Austrian law would be devoid of meaning if the Chamber was empowered to award, under Article 50 (art. 50) of the Convention, compensation free from all attachment, since Austria law is not identical to this purported rule in that maintenance allowances may be deducted from compensation.

This opinion is not upset by the fac t that the operative provisions fixed the compensation in German marks, for the operative provisions of a judgment must always be interpreted having regard to the reasons. From the wording of the operative provisions ("twenty thousand German marks") one may deduce, first that the wording was chosen because the applicant is resident in the Federal Republic of Germany, secondly that the compensation is to be remitted to him in German marks without prejudice, however, to the principal question considered above.

I also dissent from the operative pro visions of the present judgment even though, taken on their own, they could be interpreted in a manner compatible with my opinion; for operatic provisions cannot be construed independently of the reasoning which accompanies them.

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE ZEKIA

The points which fall for decision in this case are three in number.

Point 1 is the one taken up by the Aus trian Government and it relates to the competence of the Court to entertain a request for the interpretation of its judgment; and in this connection it has been submitted that the procedure laid down by the Rules of Court, that is Rule 53 §§ 1 to 5, is ultra vires because no provision has been made in the Articles of the Convention for such a course to be taken. I have no doubt that interpretation of the judgment lies within the inherent jurisdiction of the Court which gives the judgment.

On this point I am content to associate myself with the decision of the majority of the Court.

Points 2 and 3 have been raised by the Commission: we have been asked to interpret the judgment of 22 June 1972 in the Ringeisen case, the operative part of which reads

"For these reasons, the Court

Unanimously affords to the applicant Mi chael Ringeisen compensation in the sum of twenty thousand German marks to be paid by the Republic of Austria ."

Point 2

The interpretati on sought is what did the Court mean by "the order for payment of compensation in D. marks" by the Republic of Austria .

Here, I am in agreement with the m ajority opinion that the Court, being informed at the time of the issue of the judgment that Ringeisen was resident in the Federal Republic of Germany, awarded compensation expressed in German currency, with the implication that the money was to reach Ringeisen in the Federal Republic of Germany. I have some doubts, however, in view of the absence of an express statement as to the place of payment in the judgment, whether payment of the sum mentioned in Austria or elsewhere would not have had the effect of discharging the respondent Government of its liability under the terms of the judgment. I am also not sure whether by way of implication the Court is entitled to add to or subtract from a judgment on the face of which no ambiguity exists.

Point 3

The second question raised by the Com mission was whether the payment of compensation was to be "free of any lawful claims made against it under Austrian law, or subject to such claims".

Reading the judgment of the Court a s a whole, I would say that the Court at the time of the issue of its judgment expected the Republic of Austria to make payment of the amount awarded without any incumbrances and free of claims and attachments. However, the Court - as it appears to me - refrained from taking a firm stand in the matter and did not go to the extent of imposing an obligation on the part of the Austrian Government to pay the amount awarded to Ringeisen ignoring all other claims made or which might have been made by other persons on the amount awarded.

This is borne out, in my vie w, by the immediately preceding paragraph 27 of the judgment, which reads

"At the hearings before the Court the question was argued as to where the sum awarded to Ringeisen would go: could it be paid to him directly or could it be claimed by the trustee, on recommencement of the bankruptcy, for the purpose of making an additional payment to the creditors.

The Court considers that it can leave this point to the discretion of the Austrian authorities. The Court notes in this regard that under the terms of Section 2 of the Act of 18 August 1918 [on compensation for detention on remand] ... ‘ no attachment or seizure may be made against a right to compensation except to secure payment of maintenance as provided for by law ’ , and that a similar provision appears in Section 4 of the Federal Act of 8 July 1969 on compensation for detention and conviction by the criminal courts. It would seem to be a matter of course that the same exemption from seizure must be allowed in the case of compensation due under a decision of the Court to a person whose detention on remand has been prolonged beyond the reasonable time laid down in Article 5 § 3 (art. 5-3) of the Convention."

The Court in plain words left to the discretion of the Austrian authorities the question whether the money was to be paid directly to Ringeisen or possibly to the trustee in bankruptcy. In the exercise of its discretion, the Government lodged the sum of 143,808 Schillings, equivalent to 20,000 German marks, with the Vienna Central District Court asking for directions to be made by that court as to payment. The Vienna Central District Court declared that the money deposited would be paid out on application to the beneficiaries, one of whom is Ringeisen , or pursuant to a final court order to the person or persons who might be found to be entitled to it. It seems to me that the Austrian Government properly exercised the discretion entrusted to it by the Court, although in so doing it perhaps did not strictly adhere to the course indicated by our Court.

Furthermore, in the second sub-paragra ph of paragraph 27 cited above, the passage beginning "The Court notes in this regard" down to "... Article 5 § 3 (art. 5-3) of the Convention" read together with the first part amounts, in my view, only to an expression of opinion in the nature of an obiter dictum not having binding effect on the party concerned.