SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE VERDROSS

(Translation)

I have approved paragraphs 1 to 52, 55 and 57 of the judgment but, to my great regret, I have not been able to vote for item 1 of the operative provisions or to accept the grounds given therefore (paragraphs 53-54 and 56). My reasons are as follows:

I am in agreement with the Danish Government ’ s starting point, which is upheld in the judgment, namely that no provision in the Convention prevents the Contracting States from integrating in their school systems instruction on sexual matters and from thereby making such instruction in principle compulsory. The second sentence of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-2) thus does not prevent the States from disseminating in State schools, by means of the teaching given, objective information of a religious or philosophical character. However, this freedom enjoyed by the States is limited by the second sentence of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-2) according to which parents may require that their religious and philosophical convictions be respected in this teaching.

Since the applicants in the present case consider themselves wronged in relation to their "Christian convictions", we can leave aside the question of how the term "philosophical convictions" is to be understood. It is sufficient for us to examine whether the Government complained against has respected the parents ’ Christian convictions in the context of sex education.

Admittedly, the applicants ’ assertions in this respect are not altogether precise. Their complaints are nevertheless sufficiently clear to show what is in issue. The applicants are in fact objecting to the State prematurely giving "detailed" teaching on sexual matters; they contend that the State ’ s monopoly in the realm of education deprives them of their basic right "to ensure their children ’ s education in conformity with their own religious convictions". This makes it quite plain that they are basing their complaints on a well established Christian doctrine whereby anything affecting the development of children ’ s consciences, that is their moral guidance, is the responsibility of parents and, consequently, in this sphere the State may not intervene between parents and their children against the former ’ s wishes.

The applicants admittedly subscribe to the same religion as the great majority of the country, but they belong apparently to a group more faithful to the Christian tradition than their compatriots who are liberal or indifferent to religion. However, as all the rights protected by the Convention and its Protocols are rights of individual human beings, the Court is not called upon to ascertain whether the rights of persons belonging to any given sect are violated or not. The Court has the sole obligation of deciding whether in the instant case the rights of the applicants have been respected or not.

The question thus arises whether the parents concerned in the current proceedings may, in pursuance of Article 2 (P1-2) cited above, oppose compulsory sex education in a State school even if, as in the present circumstances, such education does not constitute an attempt at indoctrination.

To be able to answer this question, it seems to me necessary to distinguish between, on the one hand, factual information on human sexuality that comes within the scope of the natural sciences, above all biology, and, on the other hand, information concerning sexual practices, including contraception. This distinction is required, in my view, by the fact that the former is neutral from the standpoint of morality whereas the latter, even if it is communicated to minors in an objective fashion, always affects the development of their consciences. It follows that even objective information on sexual activity when given too early at school can violate the Christian convictions of parents. The latter accordingly have the right to object.

Article 10 (art. 10) of the Convention, which embodies the freedom of everyone to receive and impart information, cannot be relied upon so as to counter this opinion, since Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-2) constitutes a special rule derogating from the general principle in Article 10 (art. 10) of the Convention. Article 2 (P1-2) of the said Protocol thus gives parents the right to restrict the freedom to impart to their children not yet of age information affecting the development of the latter ’ s consciences.

According to the judgment, it is true, the aforementioned clause of Article 2 (P1-2) prohibits solely education given with the object of indoctrination. However, this clause does not contain any indication justifying a restrictive interpretation of such a kind. On the contrary indeed, it requires the States, in an unqualified manner, to respect parents ’ religious and philosophical convictions; it makes no distinction at all between the different purposes for which the education is provided. Since the applicants consider themselves wronged in relation to their "Christian convictions" as a result of the obligation on their children to take part in "detailed" teaching on sexual matters, the Court ought to have restricted itself to ascertaining whether, should there have been any doubt, this complaint tallied or not with the beliefs professed by the applicants.

In this respect, the Court ’ s power seems to me to be similar to that possessed by the bodies responsible, in various countries, for verifying the truth of statements made by persons called up for military service who claim that their religion or philosophy prevents them from carrying arms (conscientious objectors). These bodies have to respect the ideology of the persons concerned once such ideology has been clearly made out.

The distinction between information on the knowledge of man ’ s sexuality in general and that concerning s exual practices is recognised under the Danish legislation itself. While private schools are required under the legislation to include in their curricula a biology course on the reproduction of man, they are left the choice whether or not to comply with the other rules compulsory for State schools in sexual matters. The legislature itself is thereby conceding that information on sexual activity may be separated from other information on the subject and that, consequently, an exemption granted to children in respect of a specific course of the first category does not prevent the integration in the school system of scientific knowledge on the subject.

The Danish Act on State schools does not in any way exempt the children of parents having religious convictions at variance with those of the legislature from attending the whole range of classes on sex education. The conclusion must therefore be that the Danish Act, within the limits indicated above, is not in harmony with the second sentence of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-2).

This conclusion is not weakened by the entitlement given to parents to send their children to a private school subsidised by the State or to have them taught at home. On the one hand in fact, the parents ’ right is a strictly individual right, whereas the opening of a private school always presupposes the existence of a certain group of persons sharing certain convictions in common. Since the State should respect parents ’ religious convictions even if there existed one couple alone whose convictions as to the development of their children ’ s consciences differ from those of the majority of the country or of a particular school, it can discharge this particular duty only by exempting the children from the classes on sexual practices. Moreover, one cannot fail to recognise that education at a private school, even one subsidised by the State, and teaching at home always entail material sacrifices for the parents. Thus, if the applicants were not entitled to have their children exempted from the classes in question, there would exist an unjustified discrimination, contrary to Article 14 (art. 14) of the Convention, prejudicing them in comparison with parents whose religious and moral convictions correspond to those of the Danish legislature.