CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE DE MEYER

(Translation)

In common with the other members of the Chamber, I am of the opinion that in the particular circumstances of the case the applicant ’ s fundamental rights were not violated.

Like the Fey case [1] , which was decided by a different Chamber, the present case demonstrates the difficulties which may arise in applying the principles stated by the Court since the Piersack [2] and De Cubber [3] judgments, with respect to the successive exercise by a judge of different functions. Further thought appears to be called for on this subject.

The question also arises more generally whether the Court is not sometimes more sensitive to appearances than to reality when considering the independence and impartiality of tribunals.

[*]  The case is numbered 71/1991/323/395.  The first number is the case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court in the relevant year (second number).  The last two numbers indicate the case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court since its creation and on the list of the corresponding originating applications to the Commission.

[*]  As amended by Article 11 of Protocol No. 8 (P8-11), which came into force on 1 January 1990 .

[*]  Note by the Registrar: for practical reasons this annex will appear only with the printed version of the judgment (volume 257-B of Series A of the Publications of the Court), but a copy of the Commission's report is available from the registry.

[1] Fey v. Austria judgment of 24 February 1993 , Series A no. 255.

[2] Piersack v. Belgium judgment of 1 October 1982 , Series A no. 53.

[3] De Cubber v. Belgium judgment of 26 October 1984 , Series A no. 86.