DISSENTING OPINION OF MR. E. BUSUTTIL

        I find myself unable to subscribe to the opinion of the

majority that the Supreme Court ban on the dissemination of

information about abortion services in the United Kingdom constituted

a breach of the applicant companies' freedom to impart information

regardless of frontiers ensured by Article 10 of the Convention.  I

consider that, while the information ban was an obvious interference

within the meaning of Article 10 para. 1, such interference was

justified in that it was prescribed by law and was necessary in a

democratic society for the protection of morals and the protection of

the rights of others under paragraph 2 of the same Article.

    (i) Prescription by law

        Irish law provides comprehensive protection of the right to

life up the unborn.  In terms of the Offences against the Person Act

1861, the procurement of abortion is a criminal offence; in addition,

aiding and abetting such an offence is itself an offence under the

general criminal law in Ireland.  Again, under the Censorship of

Publications Act 1946, the Censorship of Publications Appeals Board

may ban the sale and distribution of future issues of any publication

advocating the procurement of abortion.  The ban in the instant cases

concerns a roughly parallel situation.  Finally, and more importantly,

the Eight Amendment to the Irish Constitution, adopted by the Irish

people in a referendum and now enshrined in Article 40.3.3°,

acknowledges the right to life of the unborn as an overriding

principle of State policy in Ireland, involving a compulsive political

obligation of implementation.

        In those circumstances, it should have been reasonably

foreseeable by any Irish citizen of voting age and ordinary

intelligence that any activity which might at some stage have led to

the procurement of an abortion, even if it occurred abroad, would

sooner or later have been open to challenge in the Irish courts since

the effects of such an abortion would ultimately have been felt in

Ireland.

   (ii) Legitimacy of the aim pursued

        I accept the position of the Irish Government that the problem

of abortion and information about abortion procurable in neighbouring

countries is a moral issue with a profound dimension.  The Irish

people have rejected abortion in a referendum held fairly recently,

culminating in a constitutional amendment by virtue of which the State

acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and guarantees respect

for that right in its legislation.  Accordingly, there is a general

acknowledgement in Ireland that the unborn must be protected from the

moment of conception, not only from a moral standpoint, but also from

a recognition of their status as "others" within the meaning of

Article 10 para. 2 of the Convention.  Indeed, as the Court pointed

out in the Muller case (Eur.  Court H.R., Muller and Others judgment of

24 May 1988, Series A No. 133, para. 30), there is a natural link

between the protection of morals and the protection of the rights of

others.

        For these reasons, the interference with the applicants'

freedom of expression in the present cases had the legitimate aim of

protecting morals and the rights of others.

  (iii) Necessity for the interference in a democratic society

        The Court has consistently held that the word "necessary" in

Article 10 para. 2 implies the existence of a "pressing social need".

Contracting States have a certain margin of appreciation in assessing

the existence of the need, but such assessment is ultimately subject

to the supervisory jurisdiction of the Convention organs embracing

both the legislation and the decisions applying it.  In exercising

their jurisdiction, the Convention organs remain free to determine

whether the interference at issue is proportionate to the legitimate

aim pursued and whether the reasons adduced by the national

authorities to justify it are relevant and sufficient.

        In the instant cases, the pressing social need emanated from

the overriding principle of State policy embodied in Article 40.3.3°

of the Irish Constitution protecting the right to life of the unborn.

The means employed were a court injunction inhibiting within the Irish

jurisdiction the dissemination of information to pregnant women about

abortion services in the United Kingdom which could ultimately have

resulted in the destruction of the life of the unborn.  The

information inhibited was thus extremely limited.  Viewed against the

background of the seriousness of the moral issue involved, it cannot

be deemed to have been disproportionate.

        Today, as at the time of the Handyside judgment, it is still

not possible to find in the legal and social orders of the Contracting

States a uniform European conception of morals.  In view of the

absence of such uniformity, the national authorities are in principle

in a better position than the Convention organs to judge the moral

requirements of a particular society, as well as the necessity of any

restrictions imposed with a view to meeting them.  As far as the

present cases are concerned, it is also essential not to lose sight of

the fact that the Irish authorities had been in direct touch with

vital public opinion in Ireland through a recent referendum on the

subject.

        In all the circumstances, therefore, and having particular

regard to the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the national

authorities under Article 10 para. 2, I come to the conclusion that

the Irish courts were entitled to consider it "necessary" for the

protection of morals and the rights of others to restrict the abortion

referral information provided by the applicant companies in order to

sustain the logic of the constitutional protection afforded to the

unborn in the Irish Constitution.