FUHRMANN v. AUSTRIADISSENTING OPINION of Mrs. J. Liddy
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Document date: August 31, 1993
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DISSENTING OPINION of Mrs. J. Liddy
The majority opinion in this case is based upon the case of
Zumtobel v. Austria (Comm. Report 30.6.90) in which the Commission came
to the conclusion that the Administrative Court had full jurisdiction,
as required by Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.
I did not participate in that case myself, but have had the
benefit of reading the dissenting opinion annexed to the Report of
30 June 1992. I agree with it and consider that the effect of
Section 41 of the Administrative Court Act, providing that the
Administrative Court must examine the contested decision on the basis
of the facts as accepted by the authority against which the appeal is
directed, is ameliorated but not nullified by Section 42 of that Act,
which enables the Administrative Court to quash the contested decision
as being unlawful due to procedural defects. The Administrative Court
does not have the full jurisdiction required by Article 6 para. 1.
To find otherwise, notwithstanding the limitation in Section 41,
might have the effect in practice of limiting an individual's right to
a judicial assessment of the facts of a case not only in civil
proceedings, but also in the administrative criminal proceedings known
to Austrian law which can carry deprivation of liberty as a sanction
(cf. the Commission's decisions on admissibility dated 10 May 1993 in
Applications Nos. 15523/89, 15527/89, 15963/90, 16713/90, 16718/90 and
16841/90). This in turn would serve as an illustration of Judge
Matscher's concern, expressed in his separate opinion in the case of
Ruiz Mateos v. Spain (Judgment of 23 June 1993), that the extension of
the applicability of Article 6 results in the limitation of the
substance of the procedural guarantees contained therein in a way which
is scarcely compatible with the aim of the provision.
Having accepted, as I do the applicability of Article 6 in this
case, I am compelled to the conclusion that Section 41 deprives the
Administrative Court of full jurisdiction to establish the relevant
facts and that there has, accordingly, been a violation of the
applicants' right to have their case determined by a tribunal within
the meaning of Article 6 para. 1.
APPENDIX I
HISTORY OF PROCEEDINGS
Date Item
_________________________________________________________________
8 April 1990 Introduction of the application
8 May 1990 Registration of the application
Examination of Admissibility
15 October 1991 Commission's deliberations and
decision to invite the Government to
submit observations on the
admissibility and merits of the
application
7 February 1992 Government's observations
4 June 1992 Applicant's observations in reply
1 December 1992 Decision to declare the application
admissible
Examination of the merits
18 December 1992 Decision on admissibility
communicated to the parties
3 April 1993 Commission's consideration of the
state of proceedings
31 August 1993 Commission's deliberations on the
merits, final vote and adoption of
the Report
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