CONCURRING OPINION OF MRS. JANE LIDDY

      The interference complained of originates in Section 16 of the

1845 Collection Act, which aims at the collection of outstanding tax

debts.  The collection of taxes is an interference with the right

guaranteed in the first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, but

is justified under the second paragraph of this provision.  The

application of the "bodemrecht" in the present case was a measure taken

for the enforcement of the collection of outstanding taxes.  Although

it did involve a deprivation of a right in rem of a third party, I

consider that, in the circumstances of the present case, the

deprivation formed a constituent element of the procedure for the

collection of tax debts, which constitutes a control of the use of

property.  It is therefore the second paragraph of Article 1 of

Protocol No. 1, which is applicable in the present case (see Eur. Court

H.R., Agosi judgment 24 October 1986, Series A no. 108, p. 17,

para. 51).

      The second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 recognises

the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary, in

distinction to the second paragraphs of the Articles 8 up to and

including 11 of the Convention which only permit exceptions which are

necessary.  By making this distinction the founders of the Convention

underlined that it is for the national authorities to make the initial

assessment, in the field of taxation, of the aims to be pursued and the

means by which they are pursued; accordingly a margin of appreciation

is left to them.  The margin of appreciation must be wider in this area

than it is in many others (cf. No. 12560/86, Dec. 16.3.89, D.R. 60

p. 194).

      However, the finding that the application of the "bodemrecht" is

a measure which as such comes under the scope of the second paragraph

of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 does not bring it wholly outside the

control of the Convention organs.  The correct application of

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, like that of any other provisions of the

Convention, is in principle subject to their supervision.  This

supervision includes, apart from the examination whether a certain

measure is of such a kind that it can be reasonably considered as

necessary for one of the purposes enumerated in the Article, an

examination whether its application in the concrete case is not

disproportionate to its aim (cf. No. 13013/87, Dec. 14.12.88, D.R. 58

p. 163).

      Having regard to the State's margin of appreciation in taxation

matters, the fact that the "bodemrecht" can only be applied in respect

of goods found on a tax debtor's premises, the fact that Gasus only

lost its right to reclaim the concrete mixing machine and not its right

to receive payment from Atlas and taking into consideration that

parties to a commercial transaction in general take certain financial

risk and can inform themselves as to any relevant laws having an effect

on their contractual commitments, I do not consider that in the

circumstances of the present case the application of the "bodemrecht"

complained of was disproportionate.

      It is for these reasons that I consider that there has been no

violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

                                                             (ORG. E)