C.G. v. AUSTRIAOPINION OF Mrs. J. LIDDY
Doc ref: • ECHR ID:
Document date: January 11, 1995
- 0 Inbound citations:
- •
- 0 Cited paragraphs:
- •
- 0 Outbound citations:
OPINION OF Mrs. J. LIDDY
With hesitation I voted for a finding of violation of Article 6
in this case.
The majority are of the view that an allegation that the
legislation at issue conflicted with the constitutional guarantee of
the right to property is not, in itself, sufficient to constitute a
"right" in domestic law. This is because the successful invocation of
the constitutional right would only have resulted in the quashing of
the relevant legislative provision.
While I see the force in the latter argument, this seems to me
to relate more to whether the proceedings would have been "decisive"
for the determination of the applicant's right, rather than whether
there was a "right" in domestic law to begin with. It appears to me
inconceivable that the quashing of such a provision would not result
in the legislature taking fresh action to remedy a situation which, in
the eyes of the Constitutional Court, infringed a fundamental right of
an individual. On the facts of the present case, the position is even
clearer. Section 33(2)(a) of the Unemployment Insurance Act, which
provides for the nationality condition, is clearly severable and the
offending words could have been deleted by the Constitutional Court,
without any lacuna in the law calling for legislative action. The
Constitutional Court could then have remitted the case to the
administrative appeal authority in order for a decision to be made on
the basis of the law as it stood in the light of the deletion, and the
applicant would then have obtained a decision on the facts of his own
case. Accordingly, a challenge to the constitutionality of the law
would have been decisive for the applicant's rights.
Moreover, the right in issue was "civil": the Commission has
accepted the applicability of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The right
was of a pecuniary nature. It is true that emergency payments under
the ALVG have public-law characteristics, but as pointed out by the
applicant, they are inextricably linked to the fact that the recipient
had a contract of employment. I note in this connection that the
amount of an emergency payment is assessed by reference to the
individual's entitlement to unemployment benefit, which is earnings-
related and funded partly from contributions.
The applicant was unable to obtain a hearing of his case before
the Constitutional Court, which declined to deal with the case. The
Administrative Court was not competent to deal with his complaint.
Accordingly, there was no fair hearing before an independent and
impartial tribunal.
For these reasons I voted in the sense indicated.
APPENDIX I
HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Date Item
_________________________________________________________________
17 May 1990 Introduction of application
29 October 1990 Registration of application
Examination of admissibility
2 September 1992 Commission's decision (First Chamber) to
communicate the case to the respondent
Government and to invite the parties to submit
observations on admissibility and merits
19 November 1992 Government's observations
8 January 1993 Applicant's observations in reply
11 January 1994 Commission's decision to declare the application
admissible
Examination of the merits
28 January 1994 Decision on admissibility transmitted to
parties. Invitation to parties to submit further
observations on the merits
2 March 1994 Applicant's observations
7 April 1994 Government's observations
27 April 1994 Government's further observations
8 July 1994 Applicant's further observations
17 May 1994 Commission's consideration of the state of
proceedings
18 October 1994 Commission's consideration of the state of
proceedings
11 January 1995 Commission's deliberations on the merits, final
vote and consideration of text of the Report and
adoption of Report