DISSENTING OPINION OF MR. N. BRATZA

     Contrary to the view of the majority of the Commission, I

consider that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention

in the present case. My reasons for so concluding are substantially

those set out in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Nørgaard and others. I

attach particular weight to the insufficiency of the procedural

safeguards to protect the applicant's right to respect for her private

life. As is noted in the dissenting opinion, the deficiency is in part

due to the fact that neither the Social Insurance Office nor the clinic

consulted or notified the applicant regarding the request and

subsequent submission of the applicant's medical records, with the

consequence that she was not in a position to object or agree to the

clinic's submission of the records. However, I also consider that the

preserving of a fair balance required that the applicant should have

had an opportunity of challenging the disclosure of the information

before  an independent authority prior to its disclosure, on the

grounds (inter alia) of its lack of relevance to the claim in question.

No such procedure was available to the applicant in the present case.

     As to the applicant's complaint under Article 6, I have not found

it necessary to resolve the question whether there was in the present

case an arguable right under Swedish law or a dispute as to the civil

rights of the applicant, and therefore whether Article 6 of the

Convention was applicable.

     Assuming the Article was applicable, my conclusion that there has

been a breach of Article 8 on the grounds, inter alia, that the

applicant was unable to challenge the disclosure of the information

before an independent authority in advance of its submission to the

Office makes it unnecessary for me to reach a separate conclusion as

to whether this deficiency also amounted to a breach of Article 6. As

to the position after disclosure, there existed a possibility for the

applicant to bring court proceedings to determine the lawfulness of the

disclosure: in such proceedings the courts could determine whether

Chapter 8 Section 7 of the Insurance Act had been correctly applied

and, in particular, whether it was necessary to forward the information

in question to the Social Insurance Office. At this stage, therefore,

the applicant had access to a court for the determination of her civil

rights, if any.

     In view of my conclusion in regard to the complaint under

Article 8 of the Convention, including the procedural aspects of that

provision, I have not found it necessary to examine whether there has

also been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention.