OPINION OF Mrs. J. LIDDY

     In Kokkinakis v. Greece (Series A, Vol. 260) both the Commission

and the Court were of the majority view that Section 4 of Law

no. 1363/1938 was supplemented by a body of published, settled case-law

sufficient to enable the applicant in that case to regulate his

conduct. Accordingly, the requirement under Article 9 (2) that the

interference be "prescribed by law" and the requirements of Article 7

where met in that case.

     Since that judgment of 25 May 1993 the scope of Greek law

prohibiting proselytism has become considerably more obscure. In its

judgment of 30 July 1993 in the present applicants' case the Court of

Cassation found that the law on proselytism criminalises attempts to

intrude on the religious beliefs of another with the aim of changing

them contrary to the obligation to respect the religious beliefs of

every person of a different religious persuasion. In marked contrast

to the understanding of the Commission and Court at the time of the

Kokkinakis case which was that Section 4 was "designed only to punish

improper proselytism" (para. 48 of the judgment), the Court of

Cassation has apparently accepted that simple statements of belief

which nevertheless "intrude" on another's beliefs are punishable. It

is noteworthy that the Court of Cassation upheld the reasoning of the

first instance and appeals courts which either failed entirely to

explain what was improper or exploitative about the conversations in

question (for example, in relation to the first applicant's conviction

for proselytising G. Antoniadis) or described the conduct as

"importunate" without indicating the circumstances of time and place

or how the discussions had been initiated.

     Secondly, no precedent has been cited concerning the application

of the law to military officers who do not hold pacifist convictions.

It seems clear that young men liable for military service, and possibly

action, will be of a certain maturity. It also seems clear that on the

one hand such young men may wish to engage in discussions on

fundamental questions concerning matters of religious belief, as

witness the practice in many if not all countries of providing army

chaplains, but that on the other hand senior officers could abuse their

power if entitled to initiate such discussions, at least during duty

hours. However, there appears to be no regulation in Greek law of the

circumstances, if any, in which superior officers may engage in such

discussions with their juniors. The applicants stress that

G. Antoniadis testified, in respect of the only incident of alleged

proselytism identifiable in place and time, that he was approached by

the first applicant "after hours" (see decision on admissibility). In

the absence of specific regulation or precedents governing potentially

exploitative conduct by superior officers it cannot be said that

Section 4 of Law no. 1383/1938 was sufficiently clear to enable the

applicants to know in advance that their discussions could be

punishable.

     For these reasons I consider that neither the requirement under

Article 9 (2) that the interference be "prescribed by law" nor the

requirements of Article 7 were met in the present case. There have

therefore been violations of Articles 7 and 9 in relation to all the

sentences imposed.

                                                 (Or. English)