RANINEN v. FINLANDPARTIALLY DISSENTING OPINION OF MRS. G.H. THUNE
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Document date: October 24, 1996
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PARTIALLY DISSENTING OPINION OF MRS. G.H. THUNE
I agree with the majority that there has been a breach of
Article 5 para. 1 of the Convention.
As regards Article 3 of the Convention I have voted against
finding a violation for the reasons expressed by Mr. Bratza in his
partially dissenting opinion which I share.
I also agree with Mr. Bratza that there has been no violation of
Article 8 of the Convention. My reasons, however, are slightly
different:
In the case of X and Y against the Netherlands the Court
expressed the view that the notion of "private life" is a broad one
covering the physical as well as the moral integrity of a person
(Series A no. 91, p. 11, para. 22). This notion cannot, however, be so
construed that any interference with physical integrity which does not
attain the level of severity required for a finding of a violation of
Article 3 more or less automatically is considered to be an
interference with a right guaranteed by Article 8 which would need to
be justified under para. 2 of that provision. This interpretation of
the Convention is supported by the Court's judgement in the Costello-
Roberts case, where Article 3 was found to be "the first point of
reference for examining a case concerning disiplinary measures in a
school" (Series A no. 247-C, pp. 60-61, para. 36). The punishment of
the small boy in question was not considered to have such adverse
effects on his physical or moral integrity as to bring it within the
scope of the protection afforded by Article 8.
Following this approach, it seems to me that the answer to the
question whether or not an allegation of interference with physical or
moral integrity comes within the ambit of Article 8 must depend on the
circumstances in casu.
In the present case the applicant's allegation under Article 8
refers to handcuffing during his transportation in a military police
vehicle. The Government have admitted that this measure was unnecessary
due to the applicant's peaceful behaviour and understandably he himself
considers that the handcuffing was an excessively severe measure. The
question still remains, however, whether this suffices for concluding
that the applicant's private life within the meaning of Article 8 para.
1 was affected. In my view this question must be answered in the
negative.
When the handcuffing took place, the applicant was already in the
hands of the military police. His unlawful arrest had in itself
repercussions on his private life and is also the basis for the
Commission's finding of a violation of Article 5 para. 1 of the
Convention.
I find it difficult to see that the particular circumstances of
the applicant's arrest could, in addition to being examined under
Article 5, be considered as an interference with his private life which
calls for justification under Article 8 para. 2. Accordingly, I
conclude that there has been no separate violation of Article 8.
(Or. English)
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