DISSENTING OPINION OF Mr. C.L. ROZAKIS

                     JOINED BY Mr. G. RESS

     We regret that we are unable to agree with the majority of the

members or the First Chamber that, in the circumstances of the case,

there has been no violation of Article 8 with regard to the applicant's

right to respect for her home and private life. On the contrary, we

believe that the case presents problems concerning the balancing of the

interests involved under the test of necessity in a democratic society.

     First, we note that the police entered the applicant's home on

30 October 1989 using their common-law power, preserved under

section 17 para. 6 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, to

enter private premises to prevent a breach of the peace. However, we

also note that, under section 17 para. 1 (e) of the same Act, the

police have the power to enter, without a warrant, any premises for the

purpose of saving life or limb or preventing previous damage to

property. The practical effect of section 17 para. 6 of the 1984 Act

would, therefore, appear to be to preserve the power of the police to

enter private premises in situations which do not involve any threats

to life or limb and where there is no risk of serious damage to

property. We consider, however, that serious questions arise as to the

necessity of the existence of such a power in a democratic society.

Entering private premises without the occupier's consent and without

a warrant issued by a judicial authority to prevent something less that

a threat to life or limb, or a threat of serious damage to property

appears to us a disproportionate measure.

     Secondly, we think that the police acted in a manner which gives

the impression that they took sides in favour of the former husband of

the applicant, rather than acting objectively by preventing what was,

in the circumstances of the case, a possible breach of the peace. We

hold that the negligence of the police was, principally, in failing to

take care to examine the court order of 28 September 1989, which

allowed the applicant to deliver to her former husband the property

identified in the list before 6 October 1989. Had they asked to examine

the order, they would have realised that 3 October 1989 was not the day

of the delivery and that the applicant had not consented to her former

husband's entering the premises and taking away the property identified

in the list. In other words, the police should have appreciated that,

in the absence of an agreement between the parties and in view of the

contents of the order, the husband of the applicant did not have an

automatic right to enter her premises; and by acting as they did, they

legitimised by their presence and participation an otherwise illegal

act, namely trespassing. As a consequence of their primary omission in

failing to examine the order, the police would appear to have acted for

the former husband, rather than as neutral guardians of the correct

application of the law. The lack of impartiality on the part of the

police is further evidenced by the fact that one of the police officers

told the applicant's mother that they, the police, were from the court

and had a court order to execute, which statement is recorded in the

affidavit sworn by the applicant's mother on 21 November 1990 and has

never been disproved; and the fact that, when the applicant arrived,

one of the police officers intervened insisting that the van should not

be unloaded and that the applicant's former husband should be allowed

to drive away. In consequence of their behaviour, the police assisted

the applicant's former husband both in entering the applicant's home

illegally and in removing the property therein without restraint.

     Under such circumstances, we believe that Article 8 has been

violated.