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TSAVACHIDIS v. GREECEPARTLY CONCURRING, MOSTLY DISSENTING OPINION

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Document date: October 28, 1997

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TSAVACHIDIS v. GREECEPARTLY CONCURRING, MOSTLY DISSENTING OPINION

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Document date: October 28, 1997

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         PARTLY CONCURRING, MOSTLY DISSENTING OPINION

          OF MM K. HERNDL, B. CONFORTI AND C. BÎRSAN

     We regret that we cannot concur with the opinion of the majority

to the effect that in the present case there has been a violation of

Article 8 and that no separate issue arises under Article 11 of the

Convention. Our legal assessment of the situation, following our

reading of the facts, leads to the conclusion that neither of these

provisions has been violated.

     The following is a comprehensive presentation of how we look at

the case as a whole.

1.   No violation of Article 8

     The point of departure must be - and this is common ground - that

whenever it is alleged that measures of surveillance are actually

applied (by State authorities), in particular when such measures fall

outside the law, the Convention organs must be satisfied that there is

a reasonable likelihood that such measures were indeed applied

(Eur. Court HR, Halford v. the United Kingdom judgment of 25 June 1997,

para. 57).

     The majority consider themselves "satisfied that the report of

7 March 1993" (hereinafter called the "report", ie. the sheet which was

found in the court file concerning the applicant) "was compiled by a

State authority".  The majority however soften their position

subsequently by adding "and in any event there is at least 'a

reasonable likelihood' that this was so" (para. 43).

     The majority further consider "that there can be no doubt that

the collection of this information was the result of an organised

operation of surveillance - 'watching' - of the applicant's life

mounted by a State authority" (para. 46).

     These statements have to be contrasted with the repeated

insistence of the defendant government in their observations that the

applicant was never subjected to surveillance by the National

Intelligence Service.  The Head of that service formally declared that

such had never been the case and so informed the Court of Kilkis.

     The origin of the "report", unsigned and unmarked as it was,

remaining entirely unclear, we are not convinced that there are

sufficient, or even appropriate, elements to conclude that there was

indeed any State involvement in the "report's" compilation and

drafting. There is even less reason to speak of an "organised operation

of surveillance".  In this connection one ought not to lose sight of

the fact that most, if not all, of the details mentioned in the

"report" were more or less public knowledge.  Would any "organised

operation of surveillance of the applicant's life" lead to nothing else

but a meagre compilation of publicly known facts?

     But even assuming that the "report" had been drafted by some

public authority, we believe that there could have been no violation

of the applicant's right to respect for his private life.  While the

report mentions the applicant's name, gives some particulars about a

religious movement and contains some details on the premises in the

city of Kilkis, over which the movement and the applicant exercised

control, and the activities which took place there, this information

was by its very nature potentially accessible to everybody.  It was,

as we have already said, more or less in the public domain.  In our

view it follows that this information did not belong to the "private"

sphere and, as a result, the collection and putting on paper of this

type of information could not amount to an interference with the

applicant's rights under Article 8 of the Convention.

2.   No violation of Article 9

     The majority have concluded that there was no violation of

Article 9, albeit on the basis of a different argument.  We do agree

with the statement of non violation for the simple reason that

according to us there has been no violation of Article 8 due to the

quasi-public nature of the information contained in the "report".  A

fortiori there was no violation of the applicant's rights under

Article 9.

     Here again we cannot see how the mere existence of the "report"

and the fact that it found its way into the court file might have

violated the applicant's right to freedom of thought, conscience and

religion.  Moreover, the applicant was charged with illegally operating

a place of worship and was acquitted.  Consequently, he cannot be

considered a victim of a violation of Article 9 resulting from the

possible use, in the course of the criminal proceedings, of the

information contained in the "report"

3.   No violation of Article 11

     The majority felt that in view of their finding of violation of

Article 8 no separate issue arose under Article 11.  We are of the view

that in the present case no violation of Article 11 can be discerned

and that this should have been stated by the Commission.  Our reasons

are the same as those advanced above in the framework of our

consideration of Article 9.

     The information contained in the "report" being basically

available to everybody, it is indeed difficult to see how the summary

of facts, called the "report", which for unknown reasons appeared in

the court file, could have infringed the applicant's freedom of

peaceful assembly and of association with others.  Again, considering

that the charge brought against the applicant concerned the illegal

operation of a place of worship where he and others were assembling,

and that the applicant was acquitted of that charge, he cannot be

considered to be a victim of a violation of Article 11 resulting from

the possible use, in the course of the criminal proceedings, of the

information contained in the "report".

4.   No violation of Article 14

     It is only legitimate to state in connection with Article 14 that

as in the present case we do not see any breach of Convention law as

far as the substantive articles at stake are concerned (Articles 8, 9

and 11), there can, by definition, not exist a violation of Article 14.

It was, therefore, logical for us to concur with the majority that it

was not necessary to examine whether there has been a violation of

Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Articles 8, 9

and 11.

                                                 (Or. English)

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