DISSENTING OPINION OF Mrs G.H. THUNE, MM. G. JÖRUNDSSON,

         H. DANELIUS, F. MARTINEZ, I. CABRAL BARRETO,

                 P. LORENZEN and A. ARABADJIEV

     We have voted against the Commission's conclusion that there has

been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention in the present case.

Our reasons are as follows.

     First of all, we recall that the applicant was not convicted and

sentenced for expressing the opinion that the municipal guards' actions

were illegal but for publicly referring to them by expressions commonly

regarded as insulting.

     We agree with the majority that in respect of civil servants,

acting in their official functions, the limits of acceptable criticism

are inevitably wider than in relation to a private individual. We are

of the opinion that civil servants who are entrusted with public power

should be open to close scrutiny and criticism and that this concerns

not least those officials who are responsible for maintaining public

order.

     At the same time, public confidence in civil servants is

essential for them to be able to carry out their duties efficiently.

They should therefore enjoy some protection against destructive and

unfounded attacks.

     We consider that, when calling the guards "oafish" and "dumb",

the applicant went beyond the limits of acceptable criticism, even if

his spontaneous response to the municipal guards' actions may have been

dictated by genuine civic considerations and the immediacy of the

incident in question could to some extent provide an excuse for

exaggeration.

     Taking into account the margin of appreciation which is left to

Contracting States in such circumstances (see Eur. Court HR, Lingens

v. Austria judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A no. 103, p. 25, para. 39),

we cannot find that the Polish authorities, by convicting the applicant

and sentencing him to a fine, failed properly to balance the various

interests involved in the present case. Consequently, the interference

with the applicant's right to freedom of expression could reasonably

be considered necessary in a democratic society for the prevention of

disorder and for the protection of the reputation and rights of others

within the meaning of Article 10 para. 2 of the Convention.