Information Note on the Court’s case-law 27

February 2001

Pitkevich v. Russia (dec.) - 47936/99

Decision 8.2.2001 [Section II]

Article 10

Article 10-1

Freedom of expression

Judge dismissed for allegedly having abused her office to proselytise: inadmissible

Article 6

Civil proceedings

Article 6-1

Civil rights and obligations

Disciplinary proceedings leading to dismissal of judge: Article 6 inapplicable

The applicant is a member of the Living Faith Church, which belongs to the Russian Union of Evangelical Christian Churches. She worked as a judge at the Noyabrsk City District Court. In February and March 1997 she stood for mayor of Noyabrsk. The candidate who was later to be elected accused her during the campaign of belonging to a sect. After his election, he requested the dismissal of the applicant from the judiciary. Disciplinary proceedings were instituted against her by an association of judges before the Judiciary Qualification Panel, composed of four judges. The applicant maintains that the Panel refused to call several witnesses in her favour. She was eventually dismissed on the grounds that she had “damaged her reputation as a judge” and abused her office for proselytism. She unsuccessfully appealed to the Supreme Judiciary Qualification Panel of the Russian Federation. She alleged that her representative had not been allowed to attend the hearing. The Supreme Court rejected her other appeal. She cl aimed that she was not present at the hearing because the date had been changed without her being informed.

Inadmissible under Article 6 § 1: (i) Insofar as the Government claim that the applicant has failed to exhaust domestic remedies, the re-examination of a case through “supervisory review” cannot be started by an individual but only upon the discretionary special appeal of the authorities. Moreover, at the material time, there was no statutory provision permitting an appeal on the merits against the ju dgment of the Supreme Court. No action for reinstatement of the time-limit for an appeal was open to her at the time either. No other remedy was available to the applicant by way of ordinary judicial review and she has therefore exhausted domestic remedies . (ii) As to the applicability of Article 6 § 1 to the proceedings, although the judiciary is not a civil service as such it can be considered nonetheless as a public service of paramount importance. A judge has specific responsibilities in the field of ad ministration of justice, a sphere in which States exercise sovereign powers. Thus, judges participate directly in the exercise of powers conferred by public law and perform duties designed to safeguard the general interest of the State. Therefore, the disp ute regarding the applicant’s dismissal from the judiciary did not concern her civil rights or obligations within the meaning of this Article, which was consequently not applicable: incompatible ratione materiae .

Inadmissible under Article 10: The applican t was dismissed for having expressed her religious belief whilst performing her judicial functions, which constituted an interference with her freedom of expression. However, the measure was prescribed by law and pursued the legitimate aims of protecting t he rights of others and maintaining the authority of the judiciary. As to whether it was necessary in a democratic society, by expressing herself on the morality of a party a judge may give the impression of being biased unless such an opinion appears to b e necessary to resolve the case and substantiate the forthcoming judgment. Concerning the proportionality of the interference in the present case, the applicant’s case was examined in her presence at two instances, including a disciplinary panel of 23 judg es. The panel’s conclusion was confirmed later by the Supreme Court. Nothing in the case-file suggests that the authorities lacked competence or good faith in the establishment of the facts. On the basis of numerous testimonies and complaints by State offi cials and private persons, it was established that the applicant had, inter alia , recruited colleagues of the same religious persuasion, prayed openly during hearings and promised certain parties to proceedings a favourable outcome of their cases if they j oined her religious community; moreover, those activities had resulted in delayed cases and a number of challenges against her. Such behaviour was found to be incompatible with the requirements of judicial office and prompted her dismissal. The grounds for her dismissal related exclusively to her official activities and not the expression of her views in private. Moreover, she was not prevented from running as a candidate in the local elections and thus expressing her political opinion. The fact that the ma yor and local officials criticised her serving on the judiciary during the disciplinary proceedings did not result in an interference with her freedom to express her political views. Overall, it clearly appeared that the applicant had breached her statutor y duties as a judge and had jeopardised the image of impartiality which a judge must give to the public. Thus, allowing a certain margin of appreciation in this respect, the reasons adduced by the authorities were sufficient to justify the interference: ma nifestly ill-founded.

© Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.

Click here for the Case-Law Information Notes