Information Note on the Court’s case-law 203

January 2017

Saumier v. France - 74734/14

Judgment 12.1.2017 [Section V]

Article 14

Discrimination

Difference in amount of damages recoverable depending on whether injury or illness is caused by negligence of an employer or of a third-party: no violation

Facts – The applicant contracted an occupational illness which left her severely disabled and, among other things, requiring permanent assistance. The courts found that there had been inexcusable negligence by her employer. However, the statutory ceiling on compensation for certain heads of damage, as applied by the Court of Appeal, considerably reduced the total amount of damages awarded (the cost of permanent assistance by a third person, for example, was not dealt with separately). The court of first instance, which had identified further autonomous heads of damage not covered by that limit, had awarde d a level of damages eight times higher.

Under French law, liability for work-related accidents or occupational disease is governed by a special set of rules, which, irrespective of any liability on the part of the employer, are based on automatic cover by the health insurance fund (cover for that risk being funded by specific contributions from the employer). The heads of damage covered by those rules are exhaustively listed and the quantum of damages (in the form of annuity or capital) is a lump-sum amoun t. In the event of inexcusable negligence by the employer, the victim can claim a limited increase in the sums awarded (for which the fund can then claim reimbursement by the employer). Full redress can only be obtained from the employer for the heads of d amage which the courts find not to be covered by those rules.

Law – Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1: The existence of inexcusable negligence by the employer having been made out, the applicant considered t hat her inability to obtain full compensation for the damage, as an exception to the ordinary rules of civil liability, was unjustified. The Court held that there had been no discrimination, however, on the following grounds.

Employees who had suffered an accident at work or contracted an occupational disease as a result of negligence by their employer were not in an analogous or comparable situation to that of individuals who had sustained physical injury or damage to health as a result of negligence by a third party.

Admittedly, the two situations were similar in some respects. In both cases the persons concerned had suffered physical injury or damage to health as a result of another’s negligence and sought to obtain compensation. However, the situation o f employees was a special one in several respects.

Generally, the employer-employee relationship was a contractual one in which the employee was legally subordinate to the employer and which involved particular rights and obligations for both parties, whi ch clearly distinguished it from the general rules governing relations between individuals.

The special rules of civil liability applicable in this area reflected that special relationship. They were distinguishable from the rules of ordinary law in that, to a large extent, they were not based on proof of negligence, a causal link between that negligence and the damage, and a judge’s decision, but on solidarity and automaticity. They were also distinguishable in that they applied in three phases: first, aut omatic cover for temporary total unfitness for work; second, automatic compensation for permanent unfitness for work; and, third, the possibility of obtaining additional compensation in the event of inexcusable negligence on the part of the employer.

As had been observed by the Constitutional Council (decision no. 2010-8 QPC (preliminary question of constitutionality)), employees who had been injured in a work-related accident or had contracted an occupational disease were entitled to compensation wher e the accident had occurred as a result of or during their employment, during the journey to or from their workplace or, in the event of occupational disease – even where they had themselves committed an act of inexcusable negligence. Moreover, irrespectiv e of the employer’s situation, compensation was paid by the health insurance fund, which meant that employees did not have to sue their employer and prove negligence on the latter’s part. Those special rules ensured that compensation was automatic, speedy and secure.

Furthermore, with regard specifically to injury incurred by the employee as a result of inexcusable negligence by the employer, it was noteworthy that this supplemented the damages automatically received by the former, which also distinguished his or her situation from the position under the ordinary law.

Accordingly, the situation of an employee who had suffered an accident at work or contracted an occupational disease was not the same as that of an individual who had suffered damage occurring in a different context.

Another difference concerned the person liable for the damage. Liability for damages for a work-related accident or occupational disease was in the first place incurred not by the employer but by the collective body of employers (th e “work-related accidents and occupational disease” section of the health insurance fund being funded by contributions from the employers).

In sum, different sets of legal rules applied to persons in different situations.

Conclusion : no violation (unanimously).

© Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.

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