Information Note on the Court’s case-law 219

June 2018

Association of Academics v. Iceland (dec.) - 2451/16

Decision 15.5.2018 [Section II]

Article 11

Article 11-1

Freedom of association

Legislation introducing restrictions on trade unions’ strike actions and the imposition of compulsory arbitration: inadmissible

Facts – The applicant is an association of trade unions of university graduates in Iceland. Before t he Court, it represents its 18 member unions, many in the public health care sector. In December 2014 collective bargaining commenced between individual member unions and the Icelandic State, with the member unions authorising the applicant association to represent them in collective bargaining with the Icelandic State. In February 2015 the existing collective agreement between the member unions and the Icelandic State formally lapsed, subsequently, 17 of the 18 member unions voted to take collective action in the form of temporary and long-term strikes. The strike actions lasted between 11 and 67 days.

In June 2015, the Icelandic Parliament passed an Act which prohibited strike actions by the 18 unions, further work stoppages or any other measures designed to compel an arrangement to end the labour dispute which differed from the provisions of the Act. The Act also stipulated that, if a collective agreement between the parties was not signed by 1 July 2015, an arbitration tribunal would be appointed to deter mine the wages and employment terms of the union members, the decision being binding as a collective agreement upon the parties. In August 2015 the tribunal issued its decision, prolonging the validity of the existing collective agreements, with certain am endments to union members’ wages and employment terms.

The applicant association unsuccessfully challenged the Act before the domestic courts.

Law – Article 11: The restrictions on the member unions’ strike actions and the imposition of compulsory arbitrat ion constituted an interference with their right to freedom of association. The interference was prescribed by law and, having regard to the effect of the strikes on the patient care, pursued the legitimate aim of being in the interest of public safety and for the protection of the rights of others.

Assessing the necessity of the impugned measures the applicant association’s member unions had in fact exercised two essential elements of freedom of association, namely the right for a trade union to seek to pe rsuade the employer to hear what it had to say on behalf of its members and the right to engage in collective bargaining. The applicant association, on behalf of its member unions, had started negotiations with the Icelandic State in February 2015. Moreove r, after the dispute had been referred to the State Conciliation and Mediation Officer, the parties had 24 meetings to try to reach an agreement and the Act had not restricted the member unions’ right to collective bargaining immediately, when it entered i nto force. The parties did have 15 days to reach an agreement, before the process provided for in the Act would be instigated. Furthermore, the applicant association’s union members had been able to take strike action for between 11 and 67 days before they were restricted by the Act. All attempts to bring the dispute to an end by negotiations could thus be regarded as exhausted at the time when the disputed Act had been enacted. Although the process of collective bargaining and strike action had not led to the outcome desired by the applicant’s member unions and their members, this did not mean that their Article 11 rights were illusory.

As regards the fact that the disputed Act applied to all of the applicant association’s member unions, and not only to the unions on strike at the time the Act had been passed, it was not a disproportionate measure as the associations had themselves decide d to negotiate jointly and take various measures collectively in order to apply further pressure on the opposing party. If the legislation had only applied to the unions already on strike, it would not have prevented other unions from employing measures of the same kind for the benefit of the whole. Thus, the disputed Act did not go further than necessary in this respect.

The Supreme Court had evaluated the evidence presented in the case and weighed the interests at stake by applying the principles laid do wn in the Court’s case-law. It had acted within its margin of appreciation and struck a fair balance between the measures imposed and the legitimate aim pursued.

Conclusion : inadmissible (manifestly ill-founded).

(See also Dilek and Others v. Turkey , 74611/01 et al., 17 July 2007; Demir and Baykara v. Turkey [GC], 34503/97, 12 November 2008, Information Note 113 ; Enerjï Yapi-Yol Sen v. Turkey , 68959/01, 21 April 2009, Information Note 118 ; Hrvatski liječnički sindikat v. Croatia , 36701/09, 27 November 2014, Information Note 179 ; F ederation of Offshore Workers’ Trade Unions and Others v. Norway (dec.), 38190/97, 27 June 2002, Information Note 43 ; National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers v. the United Kingdom , 310 45/10, 8 April 2014, Information Note 173 ; and Trade Union in the Factory “4th November” v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (dec.), 15557/10 , 8 September 2015)

© Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.

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