Lexploria - Legal research enhanced by smart algorithms
Lexploria beta Legal research enhanced by smart algorithms
Menu
Browsing history:

FARMANYAN v. ARMENIA and 8 other applications

Doc ref: 15998/11;15964/11;16015/11;16024/11;16030/11;16035/11;16046/11;16055/11;16060/11 • ECHR ID: 001-157435

Document date: September 1, 2015

  • Inbound citations: 0
  • Cited paragraphs: 0
  • Outbound citations: 1

FARMANYAN v. ARMENIA and 8 other applications

Doc ref: 15998/11;15964/11;16015/11;16024/11;16030/11;16035/11;16046/11;16055/11;16060/11 • ECHR ID: 001-157435

Document date: September 1, 2015

Cited paragraphs only

Communicated on 1 September 2015

THIRD SECTION

Application no 15998/11 Vachagan FARMANYAN and Others against Armenia and 8 other applications (see list appended)

STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. The circumstances of the case

The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows.

1. Information concerning the applicants and their deceased relatives

The applicants are the relatives of nine persons who died during or as a result of the post-presidential election protests of 1-2 March 2008. More specifically:

(a) The applicants Vachagan, Lyudmila and Vardanush Farmanyan (application no. 15998/11) are the father, mother and sister of Mr Armen Farmanyan , who was born in 1974 and died on 1 March 2008.

(b) The applicants Hovsep Khachatryan, Alla Hovhannisyan and Aram Khachatryan (application no. 16035/11) are the father, mother and brother of Mr Tigran Khachatryan , who was born in 1985 and died on 1 March 2008.

(c) The applicants Sargis Kloyan, Azatuhi Manukyan and Ruzanna Hunanyan (application no. 16060/11) are the father, mother and wife of Mr Gor Kloyan , who was born in 1979 and died on 2 March 2008.

(d) The applicant Mariam Hovhannisyan (application no. 16015/11) is the sister of Mr Zakar Hovhannisyan , who was born in 1977 and died on 2 March 2008.

(e) The applicant Jemma Vardumyan (application no. 16030/11) is the mother of Mr Davit Petrosyan , who was born in 1975 and died on 2 March 2008.

(f) The applicants Lilya Minasyan and Gayane Hovhannisyan (application no. 16046/11) are the wife and daughter of Mr Hovhannes Hovhannisyan , who was born in 1961 and died on 1 March 2008.

(g) The applicants Varduhi Baghdasaryan and Vahan Antonyan (application no. 15964/11) are the wife and uncle of Mr Grigor Gevorgyan , who was born in 1980 and died on 1 March 2008.

(h) The applicant Edik Harutyunyan (application no. 16055/11) is the father of Mr Samvel Harutyunyan who was born in 1979 and died on 11 April 2008 from injuries received on 1 March 2008.

(i) The applicant Ruzanna Harutyunyan (application no. 16024/11) is the mother of Mr Tigran Abgaryan , who was born in 1989 and died on 11 April 2008 from injuries received on 1 March 2008.

All of the deceased were civilians, with the exception of Mr Tigran Abgaryan who at the material time was a serviceman performing military service with the Police Troops of Armenia.

2. The 19 February 2008 presidential election in Armenia and post ‑ election demonstrations

On 19 February 2008 a presidential election was held in Armenia. The main contenders were the then Prime Minister, Mr Serzh Sargsyan, and the main opposition candidate, Mr Levon Ter-Petrosyan, who had also served as President of Armenia between 1991 and 1998.

It appears that immediately after the election, Levon Ter-Petrosyan announced that the election had not been free and fair and called on his supporters to gather at the central Freedom Square in Yerevan (also known as Opera Square). From 20 February 2008 onwards, nationwide protest rallies were held by thousands of Levon Ter-Petrosyan ’ s supporters, the main meeting place for them being Freedom Square and the surrounding park. A few hundred of the demonstrators stayed in that area around the clock, having set up tents. It appears that the first demonstration , held on 20 February 2008 , had been formally authorised, while the others followed spontaneously. The authorities did not make any attempt to interfere with these demonstrations until the events of 1 March 2008.

On 24 February 2008 the Central Election Commission announced that Prime Minister Sargsyan had won the election with around 52% of all votes cast, while Levon Ter-Petrosyan received around 21% of votes.

3. The events of 1 and 2 March 2008 and the deaths of the applicants ’ relatives

The applicants allege the following.

(a) Dispersal of the demonstration and the subsequent clashes

On 1 March 2008 at around 6 a.m. police forces arrived at Freedom Square and, without any prior warning or orders to disperse, unexpectedly attacked the several hundred demonstrators based in the square and started beating them with rubber truncheons, causing them bodily injuries and destroying their tents.

For two hours following the dispersal of the demonstration, the demonstrators were chased in the streets of Yerevan by the police forces, to the vicinity of the Myasnikyan monument. The demonstrators looked for a safe place from the police forces in the vicinity of the French Embassy (near the Myasnikyan monument) and built barricades for that purpose. They were spontaneously joined by thousands of others. All roads to the Myasnikyan monument were blocked by the police forces and they surrounded the area of the French Embassy. The gathering was peaceful and no violence took place during the whole period of the demonstration near the French Embassy.

From 7.30 to 8 p.m. the police forces, armed with firearms, attacked the participants in the gathering, provoking them to cross the barricades (a bus and another vehicle) in the direction of Leo, Mashtots and Paronyan Streets. It appears that clashes took place.

At 9.50 p.m. the police forces again attacked the gathering from the Paronyan Street side, but retreated to Leo Street in 20 minutes after facing resistance from the demonstrators.

At 10.30 p.m. the incumbent President Robert Kocharyan declared a state of emergency which, inter alia , prohibited the holding of any rallies and other mass public events for a period of twenty days. It appears, however, that the clashes continued into early 2 March 2008.

(b) The death of Mr Armen Farmanyan

Mr Armen Farmanyan was fatally wounded on Paronyan Street, according to the results of the parliamentary inquiry at around 9 p.m. on 1 March 2008. It appears that at 9.50 p.m. his body – with firearm wounds to the head – was delivered to the morgue for a forensic post-mortem examination which was performed the next day.

According to the results of the examination, the cause of his death was an injury to the left part of his head. There were foreign bodies inside the skull and multiple bruises to the head tissues and muscles, both soft and hard membranes, the brain tissue and the brain cavities. The hard membrane of the brain was torn and the brain was partly smashed, accompanied by a secretion. Two foreign bodies were removed from Mr Armen Farmanyan ’ s right cerebral hemisphere: one item measuring 3.9 by 1.85 cm with a cylindrical metal casing and the other one a whitish plastic cylindrical item measuring 2.35 by 1.9 cm.

According to the results of a forensic ballistic examination, the two pieces of plastic and metal removed from Mr Armen Farmanyan ’ s body were parts of a Cheremukha-7 gas grenade cartridge separated by a plug . The shot traces on the plug were characteristic of a KS-23 rifle.

(c) The death of Mr Tigran Khachatryan

Mr Tigran Khachatryan was fatally wounded at the junction of Leo and Paronyan Streets, according to the results of the parliamentary inquiry, on 1 March 2008 at some point after 8 p.m. His body was delivered by ambulance to the morgue for a forensic post-mortem examination at around 10 p.m. on 1 March 2008.

According to the results of the examination, Mr Tigran Khachatryan had received an open and blunt head injury. He died of serious malfunction of vitally important functions of the brain resulting from the head injury. During the autopsy, a piece of metal was removed from his skull.

According to the results of a forensic ballistic examination, the piece of metal removed from Mr Tigran Khachatryan ’ s body was a Cheremukha-7 gas grenade cartridge. The plastic plugs of the gas grenade had been detached, most likely due to a clash with some hard object or having passed through some obstacle.

(d) The death of Mr Gor Kloyan

Mr Gor Kloyan was wounded at the junction of Grigor Lusavorich Street and Mashtots Avenue, according to the results of the parliamentary inquiry, at around 9 p.m. on 1 March 2008. It appears that at around 9.30 p.m. he was transported by a group of unidentified persons to Yerevan Clinic no. 3 with a wound in the area of the left side of his groin. It appears that he underwent surgery and a piece of metal was removed from the area of the left side of his groin. Mr Gor Kloyan died at 4.30 a.m. on 2 March 2008. On the same day his body was delivered for a forensic post-mortem examination.

According to the results of the examination, there was a crushed fragmented injury in the area of the left side of the groin involving an avulsion of the thigh artery, damage to the thigh veins and fracture of the pubic bone. The injury was accompanied by acute blood loss and resulted in his death.

According to the results of a forensic ballistic examination, the piece of metal removed from Mr Gor Kloyan ’ s body was a Cheremukha-7 gas grenade cartridge together with its plastic plugs. The shot traces on the plugs were characteristic of a KS-23 rifle . The plug was deformed and torn, which could have happened due to a clash with some hard object or having passed through some obstacle.

(e) The death of Mr Zakar Hovhannisyan

Mr Zakar Hovhannisyan was shot next to the market on Mashtots Avenue, according to the results of the parliamentary inquiry, at around 1.30 a.m. on 2 March 2008. It appears that at 2 a.m. a group of unidentified persons delivered him, unconscious, to Yerevan Clinic no. 3 with a firearm wound to the abdomen. It appears that a 9 mm calibre bullet was removed from his body, but he died during surgery from the injuries received and at 2.55 a.m. his body was delivered by ambulance to the morgue for a forensic post-mortem examination.

According to the results of the examination, there was a firearm bullet entrance wound on the front surface of Mr Zakar Hovhannisyan ’ s abdomen, as well as pass-through injuries to the liver, the diaphragm, the lower part of the left lung and the waist muscle. Haemorrhage of the left part of the waist was recorded. The death resulted from acute blood loss.

According to the results of a forensic ballistic examination, the bullet removed from Mr Zakar Hovhannisyan ’ s body was part of a 9 mm calibre cartridge . Such cartridges were intended for PM and APS type guns. The shot traces on the bullet were characteristic of a PM type gun.

(f) The death of Mr Davit Petrosyan

Mr Davit Petrosyan was shot on Paronyan Street, according to the results of the parliamentary inquiry, shortly after 9 p.m. on 1 March 2008. The applicants state that an investigative documentary on the events of 1 ‑ 2 March 2008 alleged that the incident happened at 10.10 p.m. It appears that at around 10.30 p.m. he was delivered by a group of unidentified persons to Yerevan Hospital no. 2 with a firearm wound to his back, after which he was transported to Margaryan Hospital where apparently surgery was performed and a 9 mm calibre bullet was removed from his body. Mr Davit Petrosyan died in hospital at 12.30 a.m. on 2 March 2008 from his injuries. His body was then delivered for a forensic post-mortem examination which was performed on the same day.

According to the results of the examination, there was a firearm bullet entrance hole on the right back side of Mr Davit Petrosyan ’ s chest and pass ‑ through injuries to the right kidney, the liver, the diaphragm and the right lung which had been caused while he was alive and were the result of a firearm shot. The death resulted from acute blood loss.

According to the results of a forensic ballistic examination, the bullet removed from his body during surgery was part of a 9 mm calibr e cartridge. Such cartridges were intended for PM and APS type guns. The shot traces on the bullet were characteristic of a PM type gun. The bullet had a scratched deformation , which had happened due to a clash with some hard object, possibly a ricochet or having passed through some obstacle.

(g) The death of Mr Hovhannes Hovhannisyan

Mr Hovhannes Hovhannisyan was shot dead on Mashtots Avenue, according to the results of the parliamentary inquiry, at around 9.00 p.m. on 1 March 2008. The applicants state that an investigative documentary on the events of 1-2 March 2008 alleged that the incident happened at 10.05 p.m. It appears that his body – with a firearm wound to the chest – was transported by a group of unidentified persons to Yerevan Medical Centre no. 2 at around 9.40 p.m. on 1 March 2008, from where at 12.20 a.m. on 2 March 2008 it was taken by ambulance to the morgue for a post-mortem examination which was performed on the same day and a 5.45 mm calibre bullet was removed from his body.

According to the results of the examination, the cause of death was a blunt bullet wound to the chest and the ensuing acute internal bleeding.

According to the results of a forensic ballistic examination, the bullet removed from Mr Hovhannes Hovhannisyan ’ s body was part of a 5.45 mm calibre ball-cartridge. Such cartridges were intended to be used with AK-74 rifles and similar models.

It appears that the bullets removed from the bodies of Mr Zakar Hovhannisyan, Mr Davit Petrosyan and Mr Hovhannes Hovhannisyan were sent to the Expert Criminological Department of the Armenian Police in order to determine the specific units of weapon from which they had been fired. The conclusion of this examination stated that the bullets in question had been compared with the bullets found at the scenes of undisclosed crimes on the territory of Armenia and with the bullets registered at the national bullet and cartridge inventory. No matches had been revealed as a result of the comparison, which made it impossible to establish who were the owners of the weapons that fired those bullets.

(h) The death of Mr Grigor Gevorgyan

Mr Grigor Gevorgyan went to the area of mass protests with his brother ‑ in-law, R.B., at around 8 p.m. on 1 March 2008. It appears that they lost each other at the junction of Grigor Lusavorich and Zakyan Streets at around 9 p.m. because of the chaotic situation. According to the results of the parliamentary inquiry, at around 9.15 p.m. he went with a group of other protesters to the junction of Paronyan and Leo Streets where he was shot in front of a shoe repair shop and died on the spot. On 2 March 2008 a forensic post-mortem examination was performed.

According to the results of the examination, Mr Grigor Gevorgyan died from a pass-through firearm shot to the head, which entered in the area of the nose and exited the left part of the forehead, damaging the brain.

It appears that the type of firearm used remained unknown, since the bullet was never found.

(i) The death of Mr Samvel Harutyunyan

Mr Samvel Harutyunyan received a head injury at the junction of Grigor Lusavorich Street and Mashtots Avenue, according to the results of the parliamentary inquiry, at around 9 p.m. on 1 March 2008. It appears that at around 10 p.m. he was delivered in an unconscious state by a group of unidentified persons to Yerevan Clinic no. 3 with an open injury to his skull. He was then transported to the Armenia Medical Centre where he died on 11 April 2008 from the injuries received without regaining consciousness. On 13 April 2008 a post-mortem examination was conducted.

According to the results of the examination, Mr Samvel Harutyunyan had received an open, blunt and penetrating injury to the skull, involving a contusion in the left parietotemporal area with an avulsed defect of dura mater, crushing and secretion of the brain, and multi-fragmented fractures of the left parietal and temporal bones. The injuries had been caused while he was alive by a blunt object.

(e) The death of Mr Tigran Abgaryan

Mr Tigran Abgaryan was performing his service at around 7 p.m. on 1 March 2008 at Grigor Lusavorich Street as a serviceman of military unit no. 1033 of the Armenian Police Troops. He received a pass-through firearm wound to his neck on Leo Street in front of a shop called Svin, according to the results of the parliamentary inquiry, at around 11 p.m. The applicants state that an investigative documentary on the events of 1 ‑ 2 March 2008 alleged that the incident happened at 10.25 p.m. He was then transported to a hospital where he died from his injuries on 11 April 2008 without regaining consciousness. On 12 April 2008 a post-mortem examination was conducted.

According to the results of the examination, Mr Tigran Abgaryan died of failure of vital functions of the spinal cord as a result of his wound. The wound was caused by a bullet which passed from front to back on the right side of his neck.

It appears that the bullet was never found.

4. The criminal proceedings

On 24 February 2008 the National Security Service (NSS) instituted criminal proceedings no. 58200608 under Article 300 § 1 of the Criminal Code (CC) on account of the fact that Levon Ter-Petrosyan and a group of others had attempted to usurp power. This decision stated:

“[N.P., S.M., H.H., M.M., P.M.] and others, as well as the presidential candidate Levon Ter-Petrosyan, having learnt that, according to preliminary data, he had lost in the election by receiving 21.5% of the total number of votes, committed actions aimed at usurpation of state power in Armenia, violent seizure of state power in violation of the Armenian Constitution and overthrow of the constitutional order of Armenia, by means of creating an atmosphere of mistrust towards the country ’ s legitimate authorities, undermining the regular functioning of institutions, enterprises and organisations, and making calls inciting the formation of armed groups and their use in later events.”

On 1 March 2008 the Special Investigative Service (SIS) instituted criminal proceedings no. 62202508 under Article 225.1 §§ 1 and 2, Article 235 §§ 1 and 2 and Article 316 § 2 of the CC on account of the fact that Levon Ter-Petrosyan and his supporters had organised mass public events in violation of the procedure prescribed by law and had inflicted violence on public officials. This decision stated:

“After the announcement of the preliminary results of the presidential election of 19 February 2008, the presidential candidate, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, members of parliament, [K.S. and S.M.], the chief editor of “Haykakan Zhamanak” daily, [N.P.], and others organised and held mass public events on Yerevan ’ s Freedom Square in violation of the procedure prescribed by law and made calls inciting to disobey the decisions ordering an end to the events held in violation of the procedure prescribed by law, while a number of participants in the mass events illegally possessed and carried illegally obtained weapons and ammunition.

On 1 March 2008 at around 6 a.m., when the police took measures aimed at forcibly ending the public events held in violation of the procedure prescribed by law, in compliance with the requirements of Section 14 of the Assemblies, Rallies, Marches and Demonstrations Act, the organisers and participants of the events, disobeying the lawful orders of public officials performing their duties, namely the police, inflicted violence on the latter dangerous for their life and health with pre-arranged clubs, metal rods and other adapted tools, causing [them] injuries of varying gravity.”

On 2 March 2008 the SIS instituted another set of criminal proceedings, no. 62202608, under Article 225 § 3 and Article 235 § 2 of the CC. This decision stated:

“The self-nominated presidential candidate at the presidential election of 19 February 2008, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, and his followers and supporters, members of parliament [K.S. and S.M.], the chief editor of “Haykakan Zhamanak” daily, [N.P.], and others, not willing to concede defeat at the election, with the aim of casting doubt on the election, instilling distrust towards the results among large segments of the population, creating illusions of public discontent and revolt and discrediting the election and the authorities, from 1 March 2008 in the area of the Yerevan Mayor ’ s Office and central streets organised mass riots which involved murders, violence, pogroms, arson, destruction of property and armed resistance to public officials, effected with the use of firearms, explosives and other adapted objects.”

On the same date the SIS decided to join criminal cases no. 62202508 and no. 62202608 under the latter number on the ground that the events and the offences in question involved the same individuals. It appears that criminal case no. 58200608 was also joined with these two cases. It further appears that at least 140 persons were charged within the scope of the joined criminal case, including four opposition MPs and numerous other opposition leaders and supporters.

By a letter of 7 March 2008 the General Prosecutor gave the following instructions to a senior investigator at the SIS:

“Taking into account the necessity of full disclosure of the circumstances of all cases of death and physical injuries... I instruct:

1. Within the scope of the investigation into this criminal case, to clarify in a comprehensive, complete and objective manner:

1.1 All the circumstances of use of physical force, special means and firearms by the police officers, including the reasons and grounds for using or refraining from using such in each particular case;

1.2 The [identity of] persons who have been subjected to physical coercion or use of force;

1.3 In case of use of special means, their type, manner of use, the consequences and the actions of persons subjected to coercion at the moment when physical force or other type of coercion was applied;

1.4 In each case of use of firearms, the type, calibre, serial number and place of registration of the firearm, the place and time of receipt and return of the firearm and ammunition, the place and time of use of the firearm, the mode, target and direction of the shots, the number of bullets allocated and shot, the consequences of use of the firearm if known to the shooter.

2. During the interviews concerning the above issues and the questions arising from them, as well as the interviews of police officers and servicemen who have not used physical force, special means or firearms, or carried such special means or firearms, it is necessary to clarify what kind of physical or psychological violence they have been subjected to during group attacks and mass riots , what kind of weapons or ammunition ha ve been used against them or, in their presence, against other police officers or servicemen, what information they possess regarding the use of weapons, ammunition or other devices designed to cause destruction or arson by the participants in the mass riots and the consequences of such use.

3. When interviewing persons suspected or accused of participation in mass riots , it is also necessary to invite them to testify about the circumstances known to them of use of firearms, ammunition or other means mentioned above by police officers and servicemen, as well as by persons in civilian clothing.

4. I t is necessary to carry out an investigation among eyewitnesses of the events, especially those living in the area where the events related to the disturbances took place, in connection with the same circumstances, issuing a prior assignment to the Armenian Police to identify the eyewitnesses and to summon them for an interview pursuant to a procedure prescribed by law.

5. To clarify as soon as possible , by comparing the results of the investigation into the above circumstances and the conclusions of the relevant forensic examinations (or the experts ’ preliminary official conclusions), whether the injuries which are similar have been inflicted in the same location or locations.

To clarify by all means, i n case of firearm or extraordinary bodily injuries, whether the police officers or servicemen have used firearms of calibr e and type corresponding to the injuries in question or ammunition causing such injuries.

6. Within a tight deadline, to make official inquiries with the Armenian Police, Ministry of Defence and the [NSS] with a view to checking the completeness of their ammunition and the possibility of missing special means and means of personal security, especially firearms; to make the fact of each unit of special means, means of personal security or missing firearm a subject of special investigation. ”

It appears that in the course of the investigation various examinations, inspections and interviews were conducted.

On 13 May, 16 June, 19 June, 23 June, 24 June and 25 June 2008 the investigator decided to recognise the applicants Ruzanna Harutyunyan, Vachagan Farmanyan, Varduhi Baghdasaryan, Sargis Kloyan, Alla Hovhannisyan, Lilya Minasyan and Mariam Hovhannisyan respectively as victims for the purposes of criminal case no. 62202608. It appears that similar decisions were taken in respect of the applicants Edik Harutyunyan and Jemma Vardumyan on 25 and 26 June 2008 respectively.

On 3 February 2010 the applicants lodged complaints with the General Prosecutor, alleging that the SIS had failed to carry out an effective investigation. They argued that no criminal proceedings had been instituted on account of the murder of their relatives , that they had been recognised as victims with delays of about two to five months and that the crime scene had not been examined and photographed. They also raised arguments specific to their individual cases.

By decisions of 8 February 2010 the General Prosecutor dismissed all the complaints, finding that the SIS had carried out and continued to carry out a comprehensive and objective investigation. It appears that the General Prosecutor informed the applicants in writing about his decisions but no copies of these decisions were provided. The applicants ’ requests to receive such copies were rejected by the General Prosecutor on the ground that he was not obliged to provide copies.

On 2 April 2010 the applicants lodged complaints with the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan, alleging that the SIS had failed to carry out an effective investigation and to show due diligence in examining the circumstances of the deaths and seeking damages in this respect. They also complained that they had no access to the materials of the criminal case, which prevented them from filing motions and complaints and effectively defending their rights, and about the fact that the General Prosecutor had failed to adopt a decision on their complaints of 3 February 2010.

By decisions of 24 May, 2 June, 4 June and 8 June 2010 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan decided to dismiss the complaints. As regards the allegations of ineffective investigation, the District Court found that:

“...the Code of Criminal Procedure does not prescribe such investigative or procedural measures, whereas Article 290 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure prescribes that complaints may be lodged with the court against unlawfulness and unfoundedness of decisions and actions of the body of preliminary inquiry, the investigator, the prosecutor and the bodies carrying out operative and reconnaissance measures, which are prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Hence, this complaint falls outside the scope of judicial control over the investigation.”

As regards the alleged lack of access to the case file, the District Court found no violation of the applicants ’ rights since the rules of criminal procedure allowed full access to the case file only upon completion of the investigation. Lastly, the District Court found that there had been no inaction on the part of the General Prosecutor since the latter had adopted decisions on the applicants ’ complaints on 8 February 2010, of which they had been informed in writing.

On 2, 12, 14 and 18 June 2010 the applicants filed appeals.

By decisions of 2, 13, 17 and 19 July 2010 the Criminal Court of Appeal decided to dismiss the appeals and to uphold the decision of the District Court.

The applicants filed appeals on points of law which were declared inadmissible by the Court of Cassation ’ s decisions of 14 September and 22 October 2010.

On 26 December 2011 the SIS published a document entitled “Communication of information on the results of the investigation carried out within the scope of the criminal case examined by the SIS into the circumstances of the mass riots which took place in the capital on 1 ‑ 2 March 2008” (hereafter, the SIS document).

At the outset the SIS document set out the circumstances of the events of 20 February onwards, culminating in the clashes of 1-2 March, describing how the leaders and supporters of the opposition had allegedly organised the mass riots aimed at destabilising the internal political situation in the country. This description included, inter alia , one paragraph concerning Mr Armen Farmanyan, alleging that the latter had recruited and led a group of young people to the area of the clashes at around 2 p.m. on 1 March 2008. At around 4 p.m. he had given them wooden sticks, metal rods and Molotov cocktails, instructing them to be ready to attack the police officers. Such an attack was carried out later under his leadership.

The SIS document further stated that the police forces had been equipped with the following weapons and ammunition for the purpose of preventing the mass riots: (a) 16 units of AK-74 rifles with 1920 units of 5.45 mm calibre tracer bullets; (b) eight units of AK-74 rifles with 480 units 5.45 mm calibre blank cartridges; (c) ten units of Kornet type pistols with 130 rubber bullets; (d) four units of KS-23 rifles intended to be used with Cheremukha ‑ 7, Siren-7 and Volna R bullets; (e) seven units of SPSh type rifles intended to be used with Cheremukha-4 bullets; (f) 15 units of Cheremukha-1, 15 units of Cheremukha-5, 80 units of Siren-6 and 16 units of Dreif tear gas grenades; (g) seven units of Zarya and five units of Kasset type stun grenades; (h) 154 units of Cheremukha, 89 units of Cheremukha-7 and five units of Siren-7 type tear gas cartridges; and (i) 180 units of Volna R rubber bullets. Of these 79 units of Cheremukha-4, 56 units of Cheremukha-7, 129 units of Volna R, 29 units of Siren-6, four units of Dreif, four units of Zarya, four units of Kasset, 280 units of 5.45 mm calibre blank cartridges and 62 rubber bullets were used. Of the 1920 units of 5.45 mm calibre ball ‑ cartridges 1405 had been used, while 515 had been returned to the arsenal. In addition, the police sniper had been equipped with one SVD type sniper rifle with 20 units of 7.62 mm calibre bullets, of which 1 had been used and 19 had been returned to the arsenal.

The SIS document also described case by case the investigative and other measures taken for the purpose of disclosing the circumstances of the cases of death:

(a) Mr Armen Farmanyan ’ s body had been subjected to a post-mortem examination. Foreign bodies had been removed from his skull, which had been seized and subjected to a forensic ballistic examination . Based on the relevant court order, Mr Armen Farmanyan ’ s mobile telephone conversations had been examined. The investigation had established that Mr Armen Farmanyan had recruited participants for the mass riots, distributed metal rods and Molotov cocktails to them and directed their actions. Around 9 p.m., in front of School no. 24 on Paronyan Street , Mr Armen Farmanyan had received a firearm wound and died on the spot. His friend, A.V., and a group of unidentified persons had put his body on the roof of a car belonging to a third person, B.U., and demanded that he be transported to a hospital. They had driven to 7 Leo Street, where the body had been handed over to an ambulance. These circumstances had been established on the basis of interviews with about 15 persons, including A.V., B.U., the driver of the ambulance, L.K., doctor M.A. and nurse A.M., the record of photographic identification by nurse A.M., and the results of the examination of the scene where the body was placed in the ambulance. The applicant Vachagan Farmanyan had been recognised as the victim. The police and the NSS had been instructed to take operative measures in order to identify eyewitnesses to the incident and to identify and find those responsible.

(b) Mr Tigran Khachatryan ’ s body had been subjected to a post-mortem examination and his mobile telephone and clothes had been seized . A piece of metal had been removed from his skull and subjected to a forensic ballistic examination. Based on the relevant court order, Mr Tigran Khachatryan ’ s mobile telephone conversations had been examined. The investigation had established that Mr Tigran Khachatryan had gone to the area of the mass riots together with his friend, Ar.Ab., at around 7 p.m. At around 8 p.m. they had been separated because of the chaos, after which Mr Tigran Khachatryan had gone, together with a group of participants in the mass riots, to the arch near the intersection of Paronyan and Leo Streets, where he had been wounded and died. These circumstances had been established on the basis of interviews with about 20 persons, including Ar.Ab., S.K., the driver of the ambulance, N.S., doctor L.N., nurse A.M., the records of photographic identifications, the results of the examination of the scene where the body had been placed in the ambulance and other materials of the criminal case. The applicant Alla Hovhannisyan had been recognised as the victim. The police and the NSS had been instructed to take operative measures in order to identify eyewitnesses to the incident and to identify and find those responsible.

(c) Mr Gor Kloyan ’ s body had been subjected to a post-mortem examination. The piece of metal removed from his body during surgery at Yerevan Clinic no. 3 had been seized and subjected to a forensic ballistic examination. According to the results of a joint forensic ballistic and chemical examination, all the damage to his clothes had been the result of the same firearm shot. The investigation had established that Mr Gor Kloyan had gone to the area of the mass riots at around 8 p.m. At around 9.30 p.m. he had gone, together with a group of participants in the mass riots, to the intersection of Mashtots Avenue and Grigor Lusavorich Street, where he had been wounded. After that he had been transported in a taxi by a group of unidentified persons. These circumstances had been established on the basis of interviews with about 15 persons, including V.A. and K.A., the record of photographic identification by them, and other materials of the criminal case. The applicant Sargis Kloyan had been recognised as the victim. Based on the relevant court order, Mr Gor Kloyan ’ s mobile telephone conversations had been examined. The police and the NSS had been instructed to take operative measures in order to identify eyewitnesses to the incident and to identify and find those responsible. According to operative information, Mr Gor Kloyan had been engaged in the mass riots by Mr Armen Farmanyan.

(d) Mr Zakar Hovhannisyan ’ s body had been subjected to a post-mortem examination and his clothes had been seized. A 9 mm calibr e bullet had been removed from his body and subjected to a forensic ballistic examination. According to the results of a joint forensic ballistic and chemical examination, all the damage to Mr Zakar Hovhannisyan ’ s clothes had been the result of the same firearm shot. Based on the relevant court order, his mobile telephone conversations had been examined. The investigation had established that on 1 March 2008 at around 11 p.m. Mr Zakar Hovhannisyan, together with his friend, Ar.Av., having consumed alcohol, had gone to the area of the mass riots. Between midnight and 1 a.m. Mr Zakar Hovhannisyan, together with other participants in the mass riots, had been in the vicinity of Mashtots Avenue, where he had received a firearm wound. Ar.Av. had fled the scene, while Mr Zakar Hovhannisyan had been transported to hospital by a group of unidentified persons. Even though Ar.Av., who had avoided appearing before the investigating authority for one and a half years, had denied having gone to the area of the mass riots and witnessed the incident, this fact had been confirmed by interviews with about 15 persons, including Mr Zakar Hovhannisyan ’ s brother-in-law, V.S., his friends, N.M. and V.Y., the latter ’ s father, A.Y., and Ar.Av. ’ s friend, G.M., and other materials of the criminal case. The applicant Mariam Hovhannisyan had been recognised as the victim. The police and the NSS had been instructed to take operative measures in order to identify eyewitnesses of the incident and to identify and find those responsible. According to operative information, Mr Zakar Hovhannisyan had been engaged in the mass riots by Mr Armen Farmanyan.

(e) Mr Davit Petrosyan ’ s body had been subjected to a post-mortem examination and his clothes had been seized. The 9 mm calibre bullet removed from his body had been subjected to a forensic ballistic examination. According to the results of a joint forensic ballistic and chemical examination, the damage to his clothes had been the result of the same firearm shot. Based on the relevant court order, mobile telephone conversations of Mr Davit Petrosyan had been examined. The investigation had established that Mr Davit Petrosyan had gone to the area of the mass riots, namely Grigor Lusavorich Street, with his brothers-in-law, V.D. and K.D., and his cousin, N.V., at around 8 p.m. At around 9 p.m. he had been taking photographs with his mobile telephone at 2 Paronyan Street, and had temporarily separated from the others. Some while after they had found him wounded and transported him in an unidentified car to hospital, where he died. These circumstances had been established on the basis of interviews with about 15 persons, including the applicant Jemma Vardumyan, Mr Davit Petrosyan ’ s wife, L.D., V.D., K.D. and N.V., the conclusion of the computer technical examination, the results of the examination of the scene of the incident, and other materials of the criminal case. The applicant Jemma Vardumyan had been recognised as the victim. The police and the NSS had been instructed to take operative measures in order to identify eyewitnesses to the incident and to identify and find those responsible.

(f) Mr Hovhannes Hovhannisyan ’ s body had been subjected to a post ‑ mortem examination and his clothes had been seized. A 5.45 mm calibre bullet had been removed from his body and subjected to a forensic ballistic examination. According to the results of a joint forensic ballistic and chemical examination, all the damage to Mr Hovhannes Hovhannisyan ’ s clothes had been the result of the same firearm shot. Based on the relevant court order, his mobile telephone conversations had been examined. The investigation had established that at around 8 p.m. Mr Hovhannes Hovhannisyan, having consumed alcohol, had been standing next to the Myasnikyan statue with a beer bottle in his hand. At around 9 p.m., he had gone, together with other participants in the mass riots, waving a stick in his hand, towards the intersection of Mashtots Avenue and Grigor Lusavorich Street, where he had been shot and died. A third person, H.H., together with an unidentified woman, had transported his body to Yerevan Medical Centre no. 2. These circumstances had been established on the basis of interviews with about 20 persons, including H.H. and eyewitnesses of the incident, G.P. and K.H., and the results of the examination of the scene of the incident. The applicant Lilya Minasyan had been recognised as the victim. The police and the NSS had been instructed to take operative measures in order to identify other eyewitnesses to the incident and to identify and find those responsible.

(g) Mr Grigor Gevorgyan ’ s body had been subjected to a post-mortem examination and his mobile telephone and clothes had been seized. Based on the relevant court order, his mobile telephone conversations had been examined. The investigation had established that Mr Grigor Gevorgyan had been wounded at around 9 p.m. on 1 March 2008 in front of a shoe repair shop situated at the intersection of Leo and Paronyan Streets. After that his body had been transported by a group of unidentified persons to Zakyan Street, where it had been picked up by an ambulance and transported to the morgue. These circumstances had been established on the basis of interviews with about 20 persons, including the driver of the ambulance, M.M., nurse D.Z. and Mr Grigor Gevorgyan ’ s acquaintance living in the same neighbourhood, R.S., the records of photographic identification, and the results of the examination of the scene where the body was placed in the ambulance. According to the statements of the applicant Varduhi Baghdasaryan and her brother, R.B., Mr Grigor Gevorgyan had gone to the area of the mass riots together with R.B., but they lost each other at around 9 p.m. The applicant Varduhi Baghdasaryan had been recognised as the victim. The police and the NSS had been instructed to take operative measures in order to identify eyewitnesses to the incident and to identify and find those responsible.

(h) Mr Samvel Harutyunyan ’ s body had been subjected to a post-mortem examination. Based on the relevant court order, his mobile telephone conversations had been examined. A computer technical examination had been ordered and the medical files of the Armenia Medical Centre had been examined. The investigation had established that Mr Samvel Harutyunyan had gone to the area of the mass riots at around 6.30 p.m. with his friend, A.B., and his cousin, G.G. At around 9.30 p.m. Mr Samvel Harutyunyan, having separated from A.B. and G.G., had gone with a group of other participants in the mass riots to the intersection of Mashtots Avenue and Grigor Lusavorich Street, where he had advanced, while throwing stones, during which he had been injured and then transported by a group of unidentified persons to hospital. These circumstances had been established on the basis of interviews with about 20 persons, including A.B., G.G., eyewitnesses K.A. and V.A., and the applicant Edik Harutyunyan, the records of photographic identifications by K.A. and V.A., the results of an investigative experiment with their participation and other materials of the criminal case. The applicant Edik Harutyunyan had concealed from the investigation for about two months the identity of persons with whom Mr Samvel Harutyunyan had gone to the area of the mass riots, a fact which had been established through the examination of Mr Samvel Harutyunyan ’ s mobile telephone conversations and other investigative measures. The applicant Edik Harutyunyan had been recognised as the victim. The police and the NSS had been instructed to take operative measures in order to identify other eyewitnesses to the incident and to identify and find those responsible.

(i) Mr Tigran Abgaryan ’ s body had been subjected to a post-mortem examination. According to the results of a joint forensic ballistic, explosion ‑ technical and trace examination, the tear on the back of his military coat collar measuring 19 by 9 mm had resulted from a firearm shot with at least one bullet containing copper which had passed from front to back. Around 30 persons had been questioned, including his fellow servicemen, according to whom Mr Tigran Abgaryan had been shot at around 11 p.m. on 1 March 2008 by one of the participants in the mass riots. The shot had been fired from the corner of Grigor Lusavorich Street. The applicant Ruzanna Harutyunyan had been recognised as the victim. The police and the NSS had been instructed to take operative measures in order to identify eyewitnesses to the incident and to identify and find those responsible.

The SIS document further stated that the police officers and the servicemen of the Armenian Police Troops, who had taken part in the quelling of the mass riots, had been questioned. All registers containing records of exit and entry of weapons had been seized from the relevant military units of the Police Troops, the records had been studied, and all weapons which had been removed from the arsenal had been identified. All firearms and special means assigned to the police officers and the servicemen performing service in the area of the mass riots, as well as those which had been removed from the arsenal, had been seized and had undergone ballistic examination. The bullets removed from the bodies of Mr Davit Petrosyan, Mr Hovhannes Hovhannisyan and Mr Zakar Hovhannisyan had been matched with the cartridges found at the scene of the incident, as well as with the bullets registered at the national bullet and cartridge inventory and the bullets fired from the weapons assigned to the police officers and the servicemen of the Armenian Police Troops who had taken part in the quelling of the mass riots. No matches had been established, and the weapons from which the shots had been fired had not been identified. Taking into account the fact that the shot traces on the particles of the Cheremukha-7 gas cartridges removed from the bodies of Mr Gor Kloyan, Mr Tigran Khachatryan and Mr Armen Farmanyan were not fit for a match with a specific weapon, it had not yet been established from which weapon the fatal shots had been fired. In order to obtain clarification on that and other issues, requests had been made for examinations to be conducted by the relevant agencies of the Ministry of the Interior of Russia. These examinations had also confirmed that it was impossible to match the Cheremukha-7 gas cartridges removed from the bodies, with the weapons from which they had been fired. The movement of persons who had fired from special means, the number of shots fired, the locations from which the shots had been fired, and the trajectories of the shots had been established – as far as possible – through interviews. On 13 July 2009 a criminal case had been instituted under, inter alia , Article 373 § 3 of the CC on account of violation of rules for use of KS ‑ 23 type special means when quelling the mass riots and the resulting involuntary manslaughter of three persons. The investigation in that case had established that weapons of various types and calibre, as well as KS ‑ 23 type special rifles, had been used by the participants in the riots and the Police Troops, and various explosive devices, including military grenades, had been used against the police officers and the servicemen of the Police Troops. It had been further established that KS-23 type special rifles had been used in the area of Mashtots Avenue and Grigor Lusavorich, Leo and Paronyan Streets by officers L.H., A.A., M.G. and V.S. of the Police Troops. The examination conducted in Russia had confirmed that there was no ban on the use of Cheremukha-7 type cartridges in open spaces and the only ban was on firing directly at people. Cartridges could be fired near offenders or at objects, taking into account the direction of the wind ensuring the movement of the gas fumes towards the offenders. The examination conducted by the relevant agency of the Ministry of the Interior of Armenia had established that there were foreign traces on the plastic plugs of the Cheremukha-7 type gas grenade cartridges removed from the victims ’ bodies, such as deformation, tears and traces of rubbing and collision, which had resulted from a collision with a hard object or from passing through some obstacle. It had been further established that after ricocheting off a wall or other obstacle or after passing through some obstacle the Cheremukha-7 type gas grenade cartridges might cause injuries, including lethal ones, depending on the angle of the collision and the nature of the obstacle. Officers L.H., A.A., M.G. and V.S. had been charged under, inter alia , Article 373 § 3 of the CC for involuntary manslaughter of three individuals. Furthermore, during his visit to Yerevan from 19 to 24 November 2004 the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Thomas Hammarberg, had recommended to the Prosecutor General an Irish expert, C.B., competent in questions of use of special means. The expert had been invited to Yerevan in order to assist in the examination, for the purpose of matching the gas grenades removed from the victims ’ bodies with the actual rifles from which the Cheremukha-7 cartridges had been fired by the police servicemen. Having received all the information and materials by electronic mail, expert C.B. had stated that such matching was impossible.

On 9, 10, 11 and 13 December 2014 and 29 January 2015 the SIS decided to disjoin the proceedings concerning the murder of the applicants ’ relatives from criminal case no. 62202608 into separate individual criminal cases.

On 8 April 2015 the applicants applied to the SIS, requesting copies of materials of the criminal case or, in the alternative, information on the investigative measures taken within the scope of the investigation, in order to submit this data to the Court.

By letter of 9 April 2015 the Deputy Head of the SIS informed the applicants that the investigation was still pending, therefore no copies of materials or information on the investigative measures taken could be provided.

5. The parliamentary inquiry

On 16 June 2008 the National Assembly of Armenia set up an Ad Hoc Committee on Investigation of the Events having Taken Place in Yerevan on 1-2 March 2008 and the Reasons Therefor (hereafter, the Parliamentary Committee). A fact-finding group was created which was later apparently dissolved because of tensions. The group nevertheless produced several documents related to the cases of deaths, including one entitled “Circumstances of the death of Tigran Abgaryan, serviceman of the 2nd battalion of unit no. 1033 of the Armenian Police Troops” and another entitled “The findings on the examination of the facts related to the application of special means”.

On 17 September 2009 the Parliamentary Committee adopted its Conclusion which included a chapter dedicated to the examination of the circumstances of the deaths. The cases of deaths were studied individually, with the case of Mr Tigran Abgaryan receiving a more detailed examination. The Conclusion stated in respect of that case:

“Since the bullet causing the gunshot wound to Tigran Abgaryan was not found, a complex forensic trace, forensic ballistic and explosion-technical examination of his uniform was therefore ordered. The conclusion of the examination states: ‘ Damage present on the military winter jacket is that of a firearm, of a bullet nature, caused by a bullet containing copper and as a result of at least one shot in front-to-back direction. The described firearm damage to the military winter jacket is exit damage ’ . According to the hypothesis of the police and the preliminary investigation body, Tigran Abgaryan died of a gunshot fired from a firearm by a participant in the mass riots. However, since the preliminary investigation has not yet revealed the identity of the person whose firearm gunshot caused the death of Tigran Abgaryan, the Committee may not refute the hypothesis put forward by the police and the preliminary investigation body, or put forward another hypothesis.”

The Conclusion then examined the document concerning the circumstances of Mr Tigran Abgaryan ’ s death prepared by the fact-finding group and the comments made in reply by the SIS, reaching the following findings:

“The Committee, disagreeing with the statements and the style of the [SIS], and evaluating the arguments stated in the Document, the objections thereon received from the [SIS], testimony of servicemen who were serving with Tigran Abgaryan at the time the incident occurred, and of the command of the Unit during the visit of the Committee to Unit No. 10/33 of the Police Troops, clarifications of the head of division of the Republican Scientific-Practical Centre of Forensic Medicine of the Ministry of Health of the Republic of Armenia, [G.H.], who performed the autopsy on Tigran Abgaryan ’ s body and who was invited to the Committee, as well as by examining other materials submitted to the Committee by the preliminary investigation body, states that the position of the ‘ rapporteurs ’ is inconclusive. The Committee, discussing the contradictory opinions provided, invited experts [H. and A.] to the sitting of the Committee of 7 September 2009 to give clarifications on the aforementioned contradiction. The Committee arrived at a conclusion that the hypothesis put forward by the rapporteurs is inadmissible.

However, the Committee is not satisfied with the actions of the preliminary investigation body, since so far the circumstances of Tigran Abgaryan ’ s death, and particularly the perpetrator, as well as the instrument of crime, etc. have not been completely established.

As regards the conclusions of the forensic medical examinations, the Committee finds that a number of conclusions provided by the Republic Scientific-Practical Centre of Forensic Medicine of the Ministry of Health of the Republic of Armenia are sometimes incomprehensible even for professionals and, of course, resulted in various interpretations, assumptions, and ambiguities. The same applies to forensic ‑ chemical, forensic-ballistic, forensic explosion-technical, and other examinations.”

The Conclusion further examined the question of necessity and lawfulness of applying special means, including the document prepared by the fact-finding group and the comments made in reply by the SIS, reaching the following findings:

“Issues related to the lawfulness of applying special means by the Police Troops of the Republic of Armenia and to the adherence to safety rules during their application became a subject of special examination and consideration by the Committee, taking into account the fact that in particular the application of these means led to the death of three people and bodily injuries of various degrees to another three, as well as intoxication by tear gas which caused bodily injuries to eleven servicemen of the Police Troops.

The examination revealed:

On 1 March 2008, at about [7.30 p.m., G.G.], Commander of the Police Troops of the Republic of Armenia, together with about 800 servicemen of the Police Troops, was at the crossroads of G. Lusavorich Street and Mashtots Avenue. According to his instruction, 350 servicemen were taken to Shahumyan Square, and about 450 servicemen of the Police Troops remained in place, standing in three lines. The servicemen of the Police Troops that stood in the 1 st and 2 nd lines carried only rubber clubs and protective shields, whereas the non-commissioned officers positioned in the 3 rd line were also armed with special means.

According to the clarifications provided by [G.G.] during the sitting of the Committee, only the non-commissioned officers of Unit No. 1033 of the Police Troops and those of the Special Operations Detachment were armed with special means. At about [7.45 p.m.], a large group of participants in the mass riots, coming out from behind the barricade constructed next to the Russian Embassy, moved towards the intersection of G. Lusavorich Street and Mashtots Avenue. With a view to blocking their movement towards Mashtots Avenue, the troops moved forwards; while the barbed-wire-installing vehicle tried to block G. Lusavorich Street, across the width, with barbed-wire. However, the servicemen of the Police Troops encountered the active resistance of the participants in the mass riots, who threw stones, metal bars, as well as bottles filled with inflammable substances, that is, the so-called ‘ Molotov cocktails ’ , at them. During the clash, various servicemen of the Police Troops received bodily injuries of various degrees and of different nature, while the barbed-wire-installing vehicle was captured by the participants in the mass riots. In order not to increase the number of wounded among the personnel, and to provide them with medical assistance, [G.G.] decided to withdraw the personnel and move them towards the Leo-Paronyan streets, creating a turtle formation called ‘ testudo ’ , and to apply special means, rubber and blank cartridges, with the purpose of preventing the attacks.

The second big clash among the participants in the mass riots and the servicemen of the Police Troops took place in the territory of Leo-Paronyan streets, at about [9 p.m.], where Police Troops Officer [H.T.] received fragmentation injuries from the explosion of a grenade fuse, and the police troops were again compelled to use special means to halt the advancement of the participants in the mass riots and to prevent the attacks on them.

During the operations, the police troops had the following special means: 10 units of Kornet type pistols intended for firing rubber cartridges, 4 units of KS-23 rifles intended for firing Cheremukha-7, Siren-7 tear gas cartridges and Volna R type rubber cartridges, 7 units of SPSh type pistols intended for firing Cheremukha-4 type tear gas cartridges, 15 units of Cheremukha-1, 15 units of Cheremukha-5, 80 units of Siren-6, and 16 units of Dreif type tear gas grenades, 7 units of Zarya and 5 units of Kasset type stun grenades, 154 units of Cheremukha-4, 89 units of Cheremukha-7 and 5 units of Siren-7 tear gas cartridges, 180 units of Volna R type rubber cartridges and 130 rubber cartridges for Kornet pistols. Of the aforementioned means, 79 units of Cheremukha-4, 56 units of Cheremukha-7 tear gas cartridges, 29 units of Siren-6, 4 units of Dreif tear gas grenades, 4 units of Zarya, 2 units of Kasset stun grenades, 129 units of Volna R rubber cartridges, and 62 units of rubber cartridges for Kornet pistols were used. Of the 56 units of Cheremukha-7 tear gas cartridges used, 39 were used by two non-commissioned officers of the special operations detachment of the Police Troops of the Republic of Armenia (20 units and 19 units), while 17 units were used by two non ‑ commissioned officers of the Unit No. 10/33 (8 units and 9 units).”

The Conclusion finally contained the following general findings of the Committee:

“Considering the fact that during mass riots in the mentioned locations three citizens – Armen Farmanyan, Gor Kloyan and Tigran Khachatryan – died by special means cartridges, in particular “Cheremukha-7” type gas grenade cartridges, the Committee made a finding that they were probably used either in the direction of congregations of people or it happened as a result of shots rebounding off concrete walls, other barricades or barriers.

During the sitting of the Committee of 30 April 2009, in response to the question of [N.Z.], member of the Committee, on how it is possible to explain the fact that people died as a result of the use of Cheremukha-7 special means, [H.H.], former Head of the Police of the Republic of Armenia, answered that injuries may be caused if it is fired in the direction of people at close range. He continued: ‘ Maybe it was not fired at the right angle; maybe there were clashes, since at that time the situation was chaotic ’ .

The circumstance of using those tear gas cartridges in contravention of prescribed safety rules is also supported by the fact that 11 servicemen of the Police Troops were also poisoned and received bodily injuries of varying severity. This is also supported by [a number of expert conclusions].

Page 55 of the conclusion describes in detail that the gas grenades of 40% of the fired cartridges did not have noticeable gas leaks; low flying speed of gas grenades was recorded, the gas cartridges had been received in 1990, and their prescribed storage life is five years.

The Committee expresses its reservations with regard to the attitude of the Police of the Republic of Armenia since , despite the fact that the Committee applied to the Police requesting them to provide the relevant Instruction on safety rules for application and use of special means, the latter was not provided. Only in connection with the termination of the activities of the Fact-Finding Group was the Instruction that the Police had provided to the Group transferred to us , together with the other documentation.

The Instruction on the Procedure for the Application of Special Means by the Bodies of Internal Affairs and Internal Troops was approved by Order No. 127 of the Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR of 6 July 1989, which, however, was repealed in the Republic of Armenia in 2006, together with other legal acts. It means that up to the present moment the Police Troops of the Republic of Armenia do not have a procedure which prescribes the rules for keeping and using special means, nor the safety rules thereof.

Point 1.3 of the said Instruction defines the cases for application of special means; in particular, point 1.3.1 provides that special means shall also be used to prevent mass riots, as well as group violations of public order accompanied by violence. According to the “General Directions” chapter of the Instruction, KS-23 carbines are designed for opening aimed fire with Cheremukha-7 gas grenade cartridges (page 14); however, it is prohibited to open fire in the direction of congregations of people, as well as to fire at offenders at point-blank range.

Point 2.6 of the Instruction explicitly states: ‘ Cheremukha-7 type gas grenade is designed for opening aimed fire inside buildings, creating gas cloud therein ’ . Although the same Instruction does not contain any direct ban on the application of Cheremukha-7 special means in open spaces, however, we think that its use was inappropriate and inexpedient, since it could not lead to desirable results.

The Committee also notes that, although the above-mentioned Instruction was repealed in 2006, the Police of the Republic of Armenia have not yet adopted a new instruction replacing it.

In spite of detailed investigations carried out by the preliminary investigation body and by ourselves, the Committee states that, unfortunately, it was technically impossible to identify the KS-23 carbines and, consequently, the person armed with them, whose shots caused the deaths of three citizens ... For this purpose, forensic ballistic examinations were arranged both in the Republic of Armenia and the Russian Federation. In particular, KS-23 carbines that fired Cheremukha-7 cartridges, as well as Cheremukha-7 cartridges removed from the bodies of dead ... persons, were sent to the Expert Criminological Department of the Police of the Republic of Armenia to find out the following:

1. whether it is possible to identify Cheremukha-7 type gas grenades with the weapons which fired them;

2. whether there are traces – useful for identification – on Cheremukha-7 type cartridges removed from the corpses ... of the victims.

According to Conclusion No. 1466 of the Expert Criminological Department of the Police of the Republic of Armenia, the experts arrived at the following conclusions:

1. ’ In case of ricochet after having collided with a wall or any other obstacle, as well as after passing through any obstacle, Cheremukha-7 type gas grenades may, depending on the collision angle and characteristics of the material of the obstacle, cause bodily – including lethal – injuries to a human being ’ .

2. As a result of gas leaking from Cheremukha-7 type gas grenades cartridges, the plastic floating plugs undergo thermal reaction, melt, and are no longer useful for identification purposes. As a result of collision or contact with an obstacle, side mechanical traces – damage, scratches – appear, and these also impede identification.

3. Traces of shooting on the plastic floating plugs of Cheremukha-7 type gas grenades submitted for expert examination are unsuitable for identification of a specific unit of weapon, since the specifics of the bore are not clearly marked on them, and metallic corpuses of gas grenades do not bear traces of contact with the bore, and thus are unsuitable for identification of the shooting unit of the weapon.

The [SIS] also applied to the Special Equipment and Communication Research and Production Association State Institution of the Ministry of the Interior of the Russian Federation, providing KS-23 carbines that fired Cheremukha-7 gas grenade cartridges, as well as Cheremukha-7 gas grenades removed from the corpses ... of the victims, and asked for answers to the following questions:

a. What is the maximum storage life of Cheremukha-7 type cartridges? Are cartridges produced in 1986 and 1989 suitable for intended use?

b. When the storage life of cartridges has expired, is their use for intended purpose possible, taking into account the risk of causing injury to people ’ s health and life?

c. Is the application of Cheremukha-7 type gas grenade cartridges prohibited in open spaces? If not, what are the manners of their application?

d. Is there any methodology developed, and is identification of Cheremukha-7 type gas grenades with those rifles from which they were fired possible?

The following answers were received:

a. The maximum storage life of Cheremukha-7 type gas grenade cartridges is not more than five years.

b. In case of expiry of the storage life, the performance characteristics of Cheremukha-7 type gas grenade cartridges may undergo changes, that is reduced combat characteristics, reduced duration of tear smoke emission, reduced maximum flying distance of the gas grenade, failure of cartridges due to malfunction of percussion caps. Application of expired Cheremukha-7 type gas grenade cartridges against people will not cause injury to their health and life.

c. Application of Cheremukha-7 type gas grenade cartridges in open spaces is not prohibited.

While using Cheremukha-7 and Cheremukha-7 M type gas grenade cartridges, firing directly at a human being is prohibited. Fire may be opened against sites or objects around the offenders; moreover, the direction of the wind that provides the spread of the fume cloud over the offenders should be taken into account.

d. Our organisation is not entitled to conduct ballistic examinations and does not have any information on the methods of identification of the given type of cartridges and units of weapon. It is expedient to address this question to the Expert Criminological Centre of the Ministry of the Interior of the Russian Federation.

To obtain an answer to the last question, both the Committee and the [SIS] applied to the Expert Criminological Centre of the Ministry of the Interior of the Russian Federation, which provided Conclusion No. 913 stating that:

‘ Traces of bore of a firing weapon on the surface of metal shells of gas grenades were not detected.

This is explained by the fact that there is no direct contact between the surface of the shell and internal surface of the bore of gas grenades, since polymeric obturators – designed for sliding the grenade through the pilot segment of the barrel of the carbine and blocking the powder gases – cover the shell from both sides.

Traces of bore on the polymeric plugs are unsuitable for the purpose of identifying the unit of weapon originating those traces ’ .

With a request to identify Cheremukha-7 type gas grenade cartridges with the units of weapon from which they were fired, the Committee also applied to the group of experts who arrived from the USA and who ha d investigated the events of 11 September 2001, as well as to the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Thomas Hammarberg, for conducting a relevant examination by international experts; however, the answer was that it is technically impossible. This is also supported by the answer of Irish Expert [C.B.] addressed to the [SIS], ‘ I think it is not possible to establish which particular weapon it was fired from as grenades unlike bullets do not have a forensic signature ’ .

However, the Committee gave a positive assessment to the efforts of the Prosecutor General ’ s Office of the Republic of Armenia and the [SIS] of the Republic of Armenia aimed at revealing the circumstances of the deaths of three persons ... by Cheremukha-7 type gas grenades; specifically, a criminal case was instituted against four servicemen of the Police Troops, who had applied special means during the prevention of the mass riots; they were charged with breaching the rules for handling KS-23 carbines – a special means firearm.

...

One of the most important tasks of the Committee is to clarify the circumstances of the deaths of the deceased. In this regard, one fact should be initially stated: the Committee, within the scope of the powers vested in it, as well as based on the comparison of materials and facts at its disposal, should and may make findings only concerning circumstances such as the type of weapon which caused the death, as well as the time, place, and conditions of death, etc. Meanwhile, the Committee did not provide an answer to one of the most problematic issues, constituting a matter of public concern, that is, whose actions caused the death, since, even if the Committee so desired, it would not be able and it is not entitled to become a preliminary investigation body and exercise powers vested exclusively in the preliminary investigation body under the criminal procedure legislation.

However, the Committee is hopeful that the ongoing preliminary investigation will be able to achieve the task it was assigned. In connection with this, it is recommended that the [SIS] undertakes all necessary measures to reveal the causes of death, violence, causing bodily injuries, as well as other causes.

The Committee states that so far the operational-investigative activities were not effective, particularly:

(a) the ownership of the units of weapon, ammunition and other objects intended for causing bodily injury found, on 1 March 2008, in Freedom Square and territories adjacent to it, and the circumstances of their presence in the area have not been fully established;

(b) all circumstances of the deaths of ten persons during mass riots, the perpetrators thereof, as well as persons who caused bodily injuries to different people have not been revealed;

...

(d) all units of weapon used during mass riots and the persons who used these units of weapon, except for the case of [F.G.], have not been revealed;

(e) persons who were actively participating in mass riots and who are clearly pictured in circulated video records have not been found

(f) the identity of the person who fired at Tigran Abgaryan, serviceman of the Police Troops, and made an attempt at firing at other servicemen, has not been revealed, although the sniper of the Police Troops noticed and neutralised him by wounding (the sniper clearly described the given person, the precise location of injuries received);

...

(l) all the policemen who used physical force and violence against the participants of mass riots have not been revealed[.]”

B. Relevant domestic law

1. The Criminal Code (as in force at the material time)

Article 225 § 3 provides that organising mass riots, which involve violence, pogroms, arson, destruction or damaging of property, use of firearms or explosive materials or devices, or armed resistance to a public official, if accompanied by murder, shall be punishable by imprisonment for a period from six to twelve years.

Article 225.1 § 1 prescribes that organising and holding a public event in violation of a procedure prescribed by law shall be punishable by a fine of between 200 and 300 times the minimum wage or detention of up to two months. Article 225.1 § 2 prescribes that making calls inciting to disobey a decision ordering an end to a public event held in violation of the procedure prescribed by law shall be punishable by a fine of between 300 and 500 times the minimum wage or detention of up to three months.

Article 235 § 1 prescribes that illegal purchase, sale, possession, transportation and carrying of a firearm (except smoothbore firearms and their cartridges), ammunition, cartridges of a rifled bore firearm, and explosive materials or devices shall be punishable by detention for a period not exceeding three months or imprisonment for a period not exceeding three years. Article 235 § 2 prescribes that the same acts, if committed by a group of persons with prior agreement, shall be punishable by imprisonment for a period from two to six years.

Article 316 § 2 prescribes that inflicting violence, dangerous for life or health, on a public official or his next-of-kin, connected with the performance of their duties, shall be punishable by imprisonment for a period from five to ten years.

Article 373 § 3 prescribes that violation of rules on the use of weapons, ammunition, radioactive materials, and explosive and other dangerous devices, objects and materials, which resulted in involuntary manslaughter shall be punishable by imprisonment for a period from four to eight years.

2. The Code of Criminal Procedure

Article 290 § 1 prescribes that the suspect, the accused, the defence lawyer, the victim, the participants in the proceedings and other persons whose rights and lawful interests have been violated are entitled to lodge complaints with a court against the unlawfulness and unfoundedness of the decisions and actions of the body of preliminary inquiry, the investigator, the prosecutor and the bodies carrying out operative and reconnaissance measures, which are prescribed by the Code.

COMPLAINTS

The applicants complain under Article 2 of the Convention that the death of their relatives resulted from use of force which was not “absolutely necessary”.

The applicants complain under Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention that the authorities have failed to carry out an effective investigation into the circumstances of their relatives ’ deaths and that they had no effective remedy in that respect .

QUESTIONS

1. Has the applicants ’ relatives ’ right to life, ensured by Article 2 of the Convention, been violated in the present case?

In particular, did the applicants ’ relatives ’ deaths result from a use of force which was absolutely necessary for the purposes of paragraph 2 of this Article?

The Government are requested to answer the above-mentioned questions in respect of each case individually.

2. Having regard to the procedural protection of the right to life (see paragraph 104 of Salman v. Turkey [GC], no. 21986/93, ECHR 2000-VII), was the investigation in the present case by the domestic authorities in breach of Article 2 of the Convention ?

3 . Did the applicants have at their disposal an effective domestic remedy for their complaints under the procedural limb of Article 2 concerning the alleged lack of an effective investigation, as required by Article 13 of the Convention?

The Government are requested to submit copies of all the relevant documents, including the results of all the ballistic and other examinations conducted in the course of the investigation. They are further requested to submit all the documents prepared by the parliamentary fact-finding group.

APPENDIX

No

Application No

Lodged on

Applicant

Date of birth

Place of residence

Represented by

15964/11

28/02/2011

Varduhi BAGHDASARYAN

14/03/1981

Moscow

Vahan ANTONYAN

01/08/1953

Yerevan

Vahe GRIGORYAN

15998/11

28/02/2011

Vachagan FARMANYAN

14/03/1951

Yerevan

Lyudmila FARMANYAN

03/07/1954

Yerevan

Vardanush FARMANYAN

24/10/1981

Yerevan

Vahe GRIGORYAN

16015/11

28/02/2011

Mariam HOVHANNISYAN

19/02/1972

Yerevan

Vahe GRIGORYAN

16024/11

28/02/2011

Ruzanna HARUTYUNYAN

26/07/1953

Yerevan

Vahe GRIGORYAN

16030/11

28/02/2011

Jemma VARDUMYAN

22/11/1949

Vanadzor

Vahe GRIGORYAN

16035/11

28/02/2011

Hovsep KHACHATRYAN

28/04/1954

Yerevan

Alla HOVHANNISYAN

25/08/1963

Yerevan

Aram KHACHATRYAN

28/04/1954

Couillet, Belgium

Vahe GRIGORYAN

16046/11

28/02/2011

Lilya MINASYAN

07/06/1959

Yerevan

Gayane HOVHANNISYAN

21/11/1990

Yerevan

Vahe GRIGORYAN

16055/11

28/02/2011

Edik HARUTYUNYAN

21/02/1955

Yeghegnavan Village

Vahe GRIGORYAN

16060/11

28/02/2011

Sargis KLOYAN

31/08/1951

Yerevan

Azatuhi MANUKYAN

30/11/1958

Yerevan

Ruzanna HUNANYAN

19/12/1982

Yerevan

Vahe GRIGORYAN

© European Union, https://eur-lex.europa.eu, 1998 - 2026

LEXI

Lexploria AI Legal Assistant

Active Products: EUCJ + ECHR Data Package + Citation Analytics • Documents in DB: 401132 • Paragraphs parsed: 45279850 • Citations processed 3468846