Communicated on 15 June 2016

FIRST SECTION

Application no. 39757/15 Sigurdur EINARSSON and others against Iceland lodged on 10 August 2015

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

The applicants were convicted of fraud by abuse of position ( umboðssvik ) and market manipulation (markaðsmisnotkun) , either as principal perpetrators or for aiding and abetting the crime in question. The applicants allege violations of their right to be heard by an independent and impartial tribunal and their right to a fair trial. As to the latter, they refer in particular to the principles of adversarial proceedings and equality of arms and their right to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of their defence and to question witnesses. They also allege a violation of their right to be presumed innocent. Lastly, the applicants claim a violation of their right to respect for their private lives.

QUESTIONS tO THE PARTIES

1. Have the applicants exhausted domestic remedies under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention as regards their complaint that Justice Á.K., one of the five Supreme Court Justices that decided the case on appeal, was not impartial within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention? If so, has there been a violation of Article 6 § 1 on that account? ( Morice v. France [GC], no. 29369/10, §§ 73-78, 23 April 2015, and Pétur Thór Sigurdsson v. Iceland , no. 39731/98, §§ 37-46, 10 April 2003).

2. Has there been a violation of the applicants ’ right to a fair trial under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 6 § 3 (d), as they were not given the opportunity during the trial to question witnesses Al Thani and Sheikh Sultan? ( Schatschaschwili v. Germany [GC], no. 9154/10 , § 100-131, 15 December 2015).

3. Has there been a violation of the applicants ’ right to a fair trial under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 6 § 3 (b), in particular taking account of the principles of adversarial proceedings and equality of arms and the applicants ’ right to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of their defence? In this regard:

(a) Were the applicants given the right during trial to review and assess the full collection of evidence ( heildarsafn gagna ) held by the police? (see Natunen v. Finland , no. 21022/04, § 39, 31 March 2009, and Row e and Davis v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 28901/95 , § 60, 16 February 2000, ECHR 2000 ‑ II).

(b) If the applicants ’ right to review and assess the full collection of evidence was limited in whole or in part:

( i ) was the limitation “strictly necessary” for the preservation of the public interest and “sufficiently counter-balanced by the procedures followed by the judicial authorities”? ( Natunen v. Finland , cited above, § 40 and 47, and Rowe and Davis v. the United Kingdom , cited above, § 61 and 63).

(ii) was the assessment of whether to limit the applicants ’ right to review and assess the full collection of evidence only performed by the investigatory authority and/or the prosecutor or was the scope, necessity and substance of the limitation also examined by the judicial authorities? ( Natunen v. Finland , cited above, § 47, and Rowe and Davis v. the United Kingdom , cited above, § 63).

4. As regards the applicants ’ complaint under Article 8 of the Convention, that telephone conversations between them and their defence counsel were recorded and reviewed by the investigatory authority, have the applicants exhausted domestic remedies under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention? ( Peacock v. the United Kingdom , no. 52335/12, §§ 32-41, 5 January 2016, and Roberts v. the United Kingdom , no. 59703/13, §§ 37-45, 5 January 2016).

If so, has there been an interference with the applicants ’ right to respect for their private lives, was the interference in accordance with the law, did it pursue a legitimate aim and was it necessary in a democratic society? ( R.E. v. the United Kingdom , no. 62498/11, §§ 115-143, 27 October 2015, and Bykov v. Russia [GC], no. 4378/02, § 69-83, 10 March 2009).