ÁRNASON v. ICELAND and 1 other application
Doc ref: 42655/16;27495/18 • ECHR ID: 001-200780
Document date: January 10, 2020
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Communicated on 10 January 2020 Published on 27 January 2020
SECOND SECTION
Applications nos. 42655/16 and 27495/18 Sigurjon Thorvaldur ARNASON against Iceland and Sigurjon Thorvaldur ARNASON against Iceland lodged on 15 July 2016 and 28 May 2018 respectively
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
The application concerns the applicant ’ s indictment and convictions for financial crimes, following the financial crisis of 2008.
The applicant was the CEO of Landsbanki Íslands hf. (hereinafter “ Landsbanki ”). On 13 January 2011 he was arrested and questioned by the police, and his home and office were searched pursuant to a warrant. On 14 January 2011 the District Court of Reykjavík issued an order for his placement in pre-trial detention until 25 January 2011. He challenged the order before the Supreme Court, which upheld it by judgment of 18 January 2011. He was released from pre-trial detention on 21 January 2011. Following his release from pre-trial detention, his telephone was tapped, pursuant to a warrant.
The applicant was indicted on 15 March 2013 and charged on five counts of fraud by abuse of position ( umboðssvik ) and market manipulation. By decision of the District Court of Reykjavík of 12 June 2013, the case was divided into two, with one of the counts (count I) being separated from the remaining four counts (counts II-a, II-b, III and IV).
In the first set of proceedings (concerning counts II-IV), the applicant was acquitted by the District Court of Reykjavík on 5 June 2014. That acquittal was appealed against to the Supreme Court of Iceland, which partly overturned the acquittal. It found the applicant guilty on counts II-a, II-b and III, and sentenced him to three years and six months ’ imprisonment by judgment of 8 October 2015.
In the second set of proceedings (concerning count I), the District Court rendered a judgment on 19 November 2014. It found the applicant guilty of market manipulation on five business days, from 29 September to 3 October 2008, and sentenced him to twelve months ’ imprisonment, of which nine months were suspended for two years. The Supreme Court however, by judgment of 4 February 2016, found the applicant guilty of market manipulation on all 228 business days concerned by the indictment, from 1 November 2007 to 3 October 2008, and increased his sentence to one year and six months ’ imprisonment.
Firstly, the applicant complains of a violation of his rights under Article 7 due to the allegedly insufficient clarity of the legal provisions relevant to his prosecution. Secondly, the applicant complains that his trial was not conducted within a reasonable time, in violation of Article 6 § 1.
The applicant makes the above complaints primarily in the context of the second set of proceedings, but asserts that these are closely connected to complaints relating to the first set of proceedings.
In addition, in a subsequent application lodged on 28 May 2018, the applicant complains that his right to be heard by an independent and impartial tribunal was violated due to the alleged financial interests of Supreme Court Justices sitting on the panel in his cases, namely E.T., M.S. and V.M.M.
QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES
1. Has the applicant complied with the six-month time-limit laid down in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention as regards his complaints relating to the Supreme Court judgment of 8 October 2015?
2 . Did the applicant ’ s conviction entail a violation of the principle of nullum crimen sine lege as guaranteed by Article 7 of the Convention (see, inter alia, Haarde v. Iceland , no. 66847/12, § 127, 23 November 2017, and Kononov v. Latvia [GC], no. 36376/04, § 185, ECHR 2010)?
3. Was the length of the criminal proceedings in breach of the “reasonable time” requirement of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see, inter alia, Pélissier and Sassi v. France [GC], no. 25444/94, § 67, ECHR 1999 ‑ II) ?
4. In respect of the complaints regarding the independence and impartiality of the Supreme Court panel, has the applicant complied with the applicable six-month time-limit in accordance with Article 35 § 1 of the Convention as regards each of the two Supreme Court judgments against him? In the light of the nature of these complaints, on which date did the time-limit for the applicant to lodge a complaint before the Court commence?
In respect of the complaints regarding the independence and impartiality of the Supreme Court panel, has the applicant exhausted available domestic remedies, as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention? In particular, what was the available domestic remedy with respect to the applicant ’ s complaints related to the alleged impartiality of Justices E.T., M.S. and V.M.M.? At what time did the remedy become available to the applicant? What relevance in this respect should be ascribed to the procedure which was then in force under Article 9 of the Rules No. 463/2000, on Additional Functions of District Court and Supreme Court Judges and their Ownership in Companies and Undertakings, for requesting information on the ownership in companies of serving judges from the Committee on Judicial Functions ( nefnd um dómarastörf ) ?
Has there been a violation of the applicant ’ s right to be heard by an independent and impartial tribunal under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see, inter alia, Pétur Þór Sigurðsson v. Iceland , no. 39731/98, ECHR 2003 ‑ IV and Sigur ð ur Einarsson and Others v. Iceland , no. 39757/15, 4 June 2019)? In particular, did three of the five Supreme Court Justices who decided the criminal case against the applicant on appeal, namely E.T., M.S. and V.M.M., have financial interests in one or more of the three collapsed Icelandic banks, Landsbanki , Glitnir and Kaupthing , when the events occurred which formed the basis for the applicant ’ s convictions? If so, what was the relevance for the assessment of their alleged impartiality of the condition in Article 7 § 3 of Rules No. 463/2000 (see above), then in force, that a serving judge was required to seek permission from the Committee on Judicial Functions to own more than ISK 3,000,000 in a company listed on the stock exchange, or to hold more than a 5% share in other companies?
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