Information Note on the Court’s case-law 66

July 2004

Pla and Puncernau v. Andorra - 69498/01

Judgment 13.7.2004 [Section IV]

Article 14

Discrimination

Rights of succession of an adopted child – exclusion from inheritance rights following judicial interpretation of the deceased’s will: violation

Article 8

Article 8-1

Respect for family life

Inheritance by an adopted child through his father of property be longing to a grandmother who had died prior to the adoption: Article 8 applicable

Facts : The applicants’ respective adoptive father and husband was the beneficiary of his mother’s will and heir to her property. In that will, dated 1939, the mother had stip ulated that her son and heir was to pass on his inheritance to a “child or grandchild from a legitimate and canonical marriage”. If those conditions were not met, the estate was to pass to other descendants. In 1969 the beneficiary of the will contracted a canonical marriage with the second applicant and they adopted the first applicant, assuming full parental responsibility. In 1995, by an act done in private, the first applicant’s adoptive father bequeathed to him the property he had inherited, the life-i nterest being awarded to his wife. The estate passed to the heirs in November 1996. Taking the view that, as an adopted child, the applicant could not benefit from the will drawn up by the testator in 1939, two of the latter’s great granddaughters – who we re also potential beneficiaries – brought civil proceedings. Their action sought primarily to have declared void and without effect the private document of July 1995 and to obtain an order to the effect that the applicants were to hand over to them all the assets making up their great-grandmother’s estate. The court of first instance dismissed the action. It considered that the testator’s wishes were to be inferred from the words used in the will. In the light of that circumstance and of the conditions in f orce when those wishes were expressed, the court concluded that the testator had not intended to exclude adopted or non-biological children from her estate, since, had that been her intention, she would have expressly stated it. Accordingly, the private do cument of 1995 was consistent with the will dictated in 1939. In May 2000 the High Court of Justice quashed the impugned judgement. It decided to interpret the testator’s wishes. Basing its assessment on various factors in force at the time when the testat or was alive, the High Court ruled that she had not wished to include adopted children as beneficiaries of the estate. Accordingly, the High Court cancelled the 1995 private document, declared that the great granddaughters were the legitimate heirs of thei r great grandmother’s estate and ordered the applicants to restore the assets in question. Further appeals by the applicants were also dismissed.

Law : Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 – Applicability (preliminary objection): Inheritance rights bet ween grandchildren and grandparents fell within the category of “family life”, even if the testator had died before her grandson’s adoption.

With regard to the interpretation of an eminently private instrument such as a clause in a person’s will, an issue of interference with private and family life could only arise if the national court’s assessment of the facts or domestic law were manifestly unreasonable or arbitrary or blatantly inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the Convention. The High Court of Justice had considered that the concept of “child” inserted in the 1939 will concerned only biological children. The Court could not a ccept that conclusion, since it considered that a reading of the will did not warrant a conclusion that the testator wished to exclude from the succession any adopted grandchildren. Since she could have done so, but did not, the only possible and logical c onclusion was that that was not her intention. The High Court of Justice’s interpretation of the clause in question was contrary to the general legal principle that where a statement was unambiguous there was no need to examine the intention of the person who made it. Since the testamentary provision, as worded by the testator, made no distinction between biological and adopted children, it was unnecessary to interpret it in that way. Any such interpretation amounted to judicial deprivation of an adopted ch ild’s inheritance rights. The Court did not discern any legitimate aim pursued by the distinction thus made nor any objective and reasonable justification on which it might be based. In the Court’s opinion, an adopted child, especially where the adoption e ntailed the assumption of full parental responsibility, was in the same legal position as a biological child of his or her parents in all respects: relationships and consequences related to his or her family life, and the resulting patrimonial rights. In a ddition, there was nothing to suggest that the distinction was required for public policy reasons. Even supposing that the clause in question did require an interpretation by the domestic courts, such an interpretation could not be made exclusively in the light of the social conditions prevailing in 1939 and 1949. The national court could not overlook the fact that a period of 57 years had elapsed between the date on which the will was drawn up and the date on which the estate passed to the heirs, during wh ich profound social, economic and legal changes had occurred.

Conclusion : violation (five votes to two).

Article 41 – The Court reserved the question of the application of this Article.

© Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights This summary by t he Registry does not bind the Court.

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