CASE OF TURAN AND OTHERS v. TURKEY
Doc ref: 75805/16, 75794/16, 6556/17, 11888/17, 12991/17, 13875/17, 14126/17, 15011/17, 15048/17, 15066/17, 1... • ECHR ID: 001-213369
Document date: November 23, 2021
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- Cited paragraphs: 14
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- Outbound citations: 35
SECOND SECTION
CASE OF TURAN AND OTHERS v. TURKEY
(Applications nos. 75805/16 and 426 others – see appended list)
JUDGMENT
Art 5 § 1 • Lawful detention • Pre-trial detention of judges suspected of membership of an illegal organisation following a coup attempt, on the basis of an unreasonable extension of the concept of in flagrante delicto
STRASBOURG
23 November 2021
FINAL
04/04/2022
This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Turan and Others v. Turkey,
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Jon Fridrik Kjølbro, President, Carlo Ranzoni, Egidijus Kūris, Branko Lubarda, Pauliine Koskelo, Marko Bošnjak, Saadet Yüksel, judges, and Hasan Bakırcı, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the applications (nos. 75805/16 and 426 others– see appended list) against the Republic of Turkey lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by 427 Turkish nationals (“the applicants”), on the various dates indicated in the appended table;
the decision to give notice to the Turkish Government (“the Government”) of the complaints under Article 5 §§ 1, 3, 4 and 5 of the Convention and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the applications;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 19 October 2021,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
INTRODUCTION
1. The present applications mainly concern the arrest and pre-trial detention of the applicants – all of whom were sitting as judges or prosecutors at different types and/or levels of court at the material time – on suspicion of their membership of an organisation described by the Turkish authorities as the “ Fetullahist Terrorist Organisation / Parallel State Structure ” (Fetullahçı Terör Örgütü / Paralel Devlet Yapılanması, hereinafter referred to as “FETÖ/PDY”), in the aftermath of the coup attempt of 15 July 2016.
Loading citations...THE FACTS
2. A list of the applicants is set out in the appendix. At the time of the events giving rise to the present applications, they were members of the Court of Cassation or the Supreme Administrative Court, or served as judges in lower courts (hereinafter referred to as “ordinary judges”) or as prosecutors.
3. Some of the applicants were represented by lawyers, whose names are listed in the appendix. The Government were represented by their Agent, Mr Hacı Ali Açıkgül, Head of the Department of Human Rights of the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Turkey.
4. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
5. During the night of 15 to 16 July 2016 a group of members of the Turkish armed forces calling themselves the “Peace at Home Council” attempted to carry out a military coup aimed at overthrowing the democratically installed National Assembly, government and President of Turkey. Further information regarding the events of that night may be found in the case of Baş v. Turkey (no. 66448/17, § 7, 3 March 2020 ).
6. The day after the attempted military coup, the national authorities blamed the attempt on the network linked to Fetullah Gülen, a Turkish citizen living in Pennsylvania (United States of America) and considered to be the leader of FETÖ/PDY.
7 . On 16 July 2016 the Bureau for Crimes against the Constitutional Order at the Ankara public prosecutor’s office initiated a criminal investigation ex proprio motu into, inter alios , the suspected members of FETÖ/PDY within the judiciary. According to the information provided by the Government, this investigation against judges and prosecutors, including members of high courts, was initiated in accordance with the provisions of the ordinary law, on the ground that there had been a case of discovery in flagrante delicto falling with the jurisdiction of the assize courts.
8 . In instructions issued to the Directorate General of Security on the same day, the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor noted that the offence of attempting to overthrow the government and the constitutional order by force was still ongoing and that there was a risk that members of the FETÖ/PDY terrorist organisation who were suspected of committing the offence in question might flee the country. He asked the Directorate General of Security to contact all the regional authorities with a view to taking into police custody all the judges and public prosecutors whose names were listed in the appendix to the instructions – including some of the applicants –, and to ensure that they were brought before a public prosecutor to be placed in pre-trial detention under Article 309 of the Criminal Code.
9. On 20 July 2016 the Government declared a state of emergency for a period of three months as from 21 July 2016; the state of emergency was subsequently extended for further periods of three months by the Council of Ministers.
10. On 21 July 2016 the Turkish authorities gave notice to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe of a derogation from the Convention under Article 15 (for the contents of the notice, see Alparslan Altan v. Turkey , no. 12778/17, § 66, 16 April 2019, or Baş , cited above, § 109 ).
11 . During the state of emergency, the Council of Ministers passed several legislative decrees under Article 121 of the Constitution (see BaÅŸ , cited above, § 52 ). One of them, Legislative Decree no. 667, published in the Official Gazette on 23 July 2016, provided in its Article 3 that the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors ( Hakimler ve Savcılar Yüksek Kurulu ‑ “the HSYK”) was authorised to dismiss any judges or prosecutors who were considered to belong or to be affiliated or linked to terrorist organisations or organisations, structures or groups found by the National Security Council to have engaged in activities harmful to national security.
12. On 18 July 2018 the state of emergency was lifted.
13. On 16 July 2016 the 3rd Chamber of the HSYK noted that, in accordance with the instructions of the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor, a criminal investigation had been initiated in respect of judges and prosecutors suspected of being members of FETÖ/PDY (see paragraph 7 above). It decided to submit a proposal to the chairman of the HSYK to approve the opening of an investigation, in accordance with section 82 of Law no. 2802 on judges and prosecutors (“Law no. 2802”) (see Baş , cited above, § 67, for the relevant section of Law no. 2802).
14. On the same day, the 2nd Chamber of the HSYK held an extraordinary meeting. It noted that the proposal by the 3rd Chamber for the opening of an investigation had been accepted by the chairman of the HSYK and that the presidency of the Inspection Board of the Ministry of Justice had appointed a chief inspector. On the basis of the report drawn up by the chief inspector, the 2nd Chamber of the HSYK suspended 2,735 judges and prosecutors – including some of the applicants – from their duties for a period of three months, pursuant to sections 77(1) and 81(1) of Law no. 2802, on the grounds that there was strong suspicion that they were members of the terrorist organisation that had instigated the attempted coup and that keeping them in their posts would hinder the progress of the investigation and undermine the authority and reputation of the judiciary. Its decision was based on information and documents in the investigation files that it had been sent prior to the coup attempt and on information obtained following research by the intelligence services. Further details regarding the HSYK’s decision may be found in the Baş case (ibid., §§ 17-20).
15. It appears from the information provided by the Government that by decisions taken on 19 and 22 July, 10 August and 13 October 2016, the HSYK decided to suspend more judges and prosecutors from their duties –including some of the applicants – on grounds similar to those in its earlier decision of 16 July 2016.
16. On 17 July 2016 the 1st Presidency Board of the Court of Cassation issued a decision (no. 244/a) revoking the existing authorities of the members of the Court of Cassation whose names had been indicated by the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office, including some of the applicants. A similar decision (no. 2016/27) was taken by the Presidency Board of the Supreme Administrative Court on the same date in respect of its members concerned, including, once again, some of the applicants.
17. On 24 August 2016, applying Article 3 of Legislative Decree no. 667 (noted in paragraph 11 above), the plenary HSYK dismissed 2,847 judges and prosecutors – including many of the applicants – considered to be members of or affiliated or linked to FETÖ/PDY (decision no. 2016/426). The HSYK found that the position of the judges and prosecutors concerned within structures that were incompatible with the principles of independence and impartiality and their activities within the organisation’s hierarchy, coupled with their underlying sense of allegiance, were likely to undermine the reputation and authority of the judiciary. It held that the fact that judges and prosecutors obeyed the instructions of a hierarchical structure outside the State apparatus presented a genuine obstacle to the right of citizens to a fair trial.
18. According to the information provided by the parties, a total of a further 1,393 judges and prosecutors were dismissed from the profession in the following months, including some of the applicants.
19. Acting on the instructions of the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office (see paragraph 8 above), regional and provincial prosecutors’ offices initiated criminal investigations in respect of individuals suspected of being involved in the coup attempt and/or alleged to have links to the FETÖ/PDY organisation, including the applicants.
20. Following their arrest and detention in police custody, the applicants were placed in pre-trial detention on various dates between 18 July 2016 and 19 October 2016, mainly on suspicion of membership of the FETÖ/PDY organisation, an offence punishable under Article 314 of the Criminal Code (see Baş , cited above, § 58). The pre-trial detention orders were issued by the magistrates’ courts located at the respective places of the applicants’ arrest.
21. When ordering the applicants’ pre-trial detention, the magistrates’ courts relied mainly on the fact that the applicants had been suspended from their duties as judges or prosecutors on the grounds of their membership of the organisation that had instigated the attempted coup and that the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office had requested the launching of a criminal investigation in their regard. The magistrates noted the existence of further incriminating evidence in respect of some of the applicants, such as witness statements or evidence suggesting their use of the ByLock messaging system. Regard being had to the state of the evidence, the nature of the alleged offence or offences – which were among the so-called ‘catalogue’ offences listed in Article 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) –, the potential sentences and the ongoing investigations into the coup attempt across the country, the magistrates’ courts held that pre-trial detention was a proportionate measure. In the majority of the decisions, it was noted specifically that the criminal investigation was governed by the ordinary rules, given that the offence of which the suspects were accused, namely membership of an armed terrorist organisation, was a ’continuing offence’ ( temadi olan suç ) and that there was a case of discovery in flagrante delicto governed by the relevant provisions of domestic law (see Baş , cited above, § 67, as regards the relevant section 94 of Law no. 2802, and paragraphs 30 and 31 below as regards Laws nos. 2797 or 2575, respectively).
22. On different dates the magistrates’ courts dismissed the applicants’ objections against the initial orders for their detention, mainly on the same grounds as those indicated in the initial detention orders.
23. The applicants’ continued pre-trial detention was reviewed automatically pursuant to Article 108 of the CCP, which provides for a review every thirty days (see BaÅŸ , cited above, § 62). Their requests for release were examined at the same time as the automatic periodic review of their detention, as provided under Article 3, paragraph 1 (ç), of Legislative Decree no. 668 (ibid., § 81). The reviews, which were carried out on the basis of the case files, were not conducted on an individual basis but concerned a large group of suspects. Both the decisions to prolong the pre ‑ trial detention and the dismissals of the applicants’ objections to their detention essentially involved a repetition of the reasons put forth at the time of the initial pre-trial detention.
24. According to the information provided by the parties, on various dates the applicants were charged with membership of a terrorist organisation under Article 314 § 2 of the Criminal Code. During the subsequent trial stage, the first-instance courts, ruling either at the scheduled hearings or at periodic reviews carried out between the hearings, ordered the applicants’ continued detention and dismissed their requests for release on grounds similar to those noted above.
25. According to the latest information in the case file, the first-instance courts have concluded their examinations regarding all applicants, except for a few. Most of the applicants were convicted of membership of a terrorist organisation, and some sixteen applicants were acquitted. For the most part, the appeal proceedings are still pending before the regional courts of appeal or the Court of Cassation, as relevant, except in the case of a few applicants whose convictions or acquittals have become final.
26. In the meantime, the applicants lodged one or more individual applications with the Constitutional Court in respect of, inter alia , the alleged violation of their right to liberty and security on various accounts, all of which were declared inadmissible.
27 . Amongst the complaints lodged by the applicants was the one concerning their detention in alleged breach of the procedural safeguards afforded to judges and prosecutors in domestic law and the lack of jurisdiction of the magistrates’ courts that had ordered their detention, which the Constitutional Court found to be inadmissible. It held essentially that in view of the nature of the alleged offence and the manner in which it had been committed, it had been appropriate to accept the jurisdiction of the magistrates who had ordered the applicants’ detention. In many of the decisions, it further stated expressly that there had been no error of assessment or any arbitrariness as regards the application of the provisions relating to discovery in flagrante delicto .
RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE
28. The relevant domestic law and practice, including the pertinent case ‑ law of the Court of Cassation and the Constitutional Court, have for the most part been set out in the cases of Alparslan Altan v. Turkey (cited above, §§ 46-48, 50-55 and 59-64 ) and BaÅŸ v. Turkey (cited above, §§ 52 ‑ 67, 70, 81-90, 98-99, 101-103). Further elements of relevant domestic law and practice are summarised below.
29 . The relevant parts of Article 141 § 1 of the CCP provide:
“Compensation for damage ... may be claimed from the State by anyone ...
(a) who has been arrested or taken into or kept in detention under conditions or in circumstances not complying with the law;
...
(d) who, even if he or she was detained lawfully during the investigation or trial, has not been brought before a judicial authority within a reasonable time and has not obtained a judgment on the merits within a reasonable time;
(e) who, after being arrested or detained in accordance with the law, was not subsequently committed for trial or was acquitted; ...”
30 . The relevant provision of the Court of Cassation Act (Law no. 2797) provides:
Preliminary examination, investigation and prosecution of offences
Personal and duty-related offences
Section 46
“The opening of an investigation against the First President, the first deputy presidents, the chamber presidents and the members of the Court of Cassation, as well as the Chief Public Prosecutor and the Deputy Chief Public Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation, in respect of offences related to their official duties or personal offences shall be subject to the decision of the First Presidency Board. However, in cases of discovery in flagrante delicto falling within the jurisdiction of the assize courts, the preliminary and initial investigation shall be conducted in accordance with the rules of ordinary law.”
31 . The relevant parts of the Supreme Administrative Court Act (Law no. 2575) provide:
Investigation
Section 76
“1. The initial investigation in respect of offences committed by the President, the Chief Public Prosecutor, the deputy presidents, the chamber presidents and the members of the Supreme Administrative Court in connection with or in the course of their official duties shall be conducted by a committee composed of a chamber president and two members selected by the President of the Supreme Administrative Court.
...”
The procedure for the prosecution of personal offences
Section 82
“1. The proceedings regarding the personal offences committed by the President, the Chief Public Prosecutor, the deputy presidents, the chamber presidents and the members of the Supreme Administrative Court shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions concerning the personal offences committed by the President, the Chief Public Prosecutor and the members of the Court of Cassation.
...”
32 . On 2 July 2019 the plenary criminal divisions of the Court of Cassation delivered a judgment (E. 2019/9.MD-312, K.2019/514) regarding a former member of the HSYK suspected of membership of FETÖ/PDY, where it addressed, inter alia , the question of the compatibility with domestic law of the conduct of the preliminary investigation in accordance with the rules of ordinary law. After summarising its case law relating to the elements of the offence of membership of an armed organisation, which it noted was a personal offence, and to the notion of “continuing offence” (see, in this regard, Baş , cited above, §§ 83-86 and 90), the Court of Cassation proceeded with the examination of the concept of “ in flagrante delicto ” and its application in the context of continuing offences. Referring to the prevalent view in Turkish legal doctrine, the Court of Cassation held that continuing offences could be committed in flagrante delicto , and that the situation of discovery in flagrante delicto would persist in respect of continuing offences as long as the offence continued to be committed. The Court of Cassation pronounced as follows:
“... As indicated as part of the general remarks regarding membership of an organisation, in order to establish the presence of membership, it is sufficient that the perpetrator continually submits (...) to the hierarchy of the organisation by his concrete actions ... Accordingly, membership (...) does not need to be demonstrated by other acts ... On the other hand, in the event that the competent authorities have obtained evidence that raises a suspicion that the perpetrator is a member of a criminal organisation, and that the continuity of the membership can be established on the basis of that evidence ..., it is not contrary to the law to ... accept that the perpetrator had been [caught] while committing the offence [in question], within the meaning of Article 2 (j), paragraph 1 of the CCP, and that, therefore, [he or she] may be subject to the terms of discovery in flagrante delicto . It is not necessary here that the perpetrator’s criminal act be observed by the general public; it is sufficient that the competent authorities know at the time of arrest that the acts demonstrating the continuity of the membership of the organisation persist and that the perpetrator had not left the organisation.”
33. The Court of Cassation held that contrary to the Court’s findings in the case of Alparslan Altan , its interpretation of the concept of “discovery in flagrante delicto ” in the context of the arrest of judges and prosecutors for alleged membership of FETÖ/PDY was not based on an unreasonable and arbitrary judicial interpretation. Its approach, which had also found acceptance by the Constitutional Court, was rather grounded in doctrine, on the theory of organised crime and, above all, on domestic legal provisions that had been enacted by the legislature in a consistent and harmonious manner, which the Strasbourg Court had not taken into account.
34. Referring to Article 161 § 8 of the CCP, the Court of Cassation further stated that in view of their nature and gravity, the investigation of certain offences, including that of membership of an armed organisation, would be conducted directly by the public prosecutors in accordance with the terms of the ordinary law, even if the offence was committed during, or in connection with, the performance of an official duty. Accordingly, where such grave offences were concerned, the requirements of Article 161 § 8 of the CCP would prevail and the special investigatory procedures envisaged in certain laws – such as Law no. 2797 in respect of the members of the Court of Cassation –, would not be applicable, regardless of whether there was a case of discovery in flagrante delicto or not. The Court of Cassation contended that in its Alparslan Altan judgment, the Court had failed to assess the issue of the lawfulness of the pre-trial detention from the standpoint of Article 161 § 8 of the CCP.
35 . The Court of Cassation concluded, in the light of the foregoing, that the conduct of the investigation against the defendant under the terms of the ordinary law had been in accordance with the relevant legal framework, that it had not resulted from an extensive or arbitrary interpretation of the law, and that it had thus been compatible with the requirements of the “quality of law”.
36 . In a decision delivered on 8 May 2019, the Constitutional Court examined a complaint relating to the alleged unlawfulness of the pre-trial detention on 21 July 2016 of Selim Öztürk, who served as an ordinary judge subject to Law no. 2802 at the material time. According to the excerpt provided in the Constitutional Court’s decision, Mr Öztürk’s pre-trial detention was ordered by the Ankara Magistrates’ Court on the basis of Articles 100 and 101 of the CCP, without any specific reference to section 94 of Law no. 2802 or to the existence of a situation of a discovery in flagrante delicto . When upholding the lawfulness of that detention order, the Constitutional Court nevertheless found that it was factually and legally tenable to hold that the judge in question had been caught in flagrante delicto , having regard to the Court of Cassation’s consistent case-law on the matter, according to which the existence of a situation of discovery in flagrante delicto was inferred at the moment of the arrest of judges and prosecutors suspected of the offence of membership of an armed terrorist organisation –, and to the fact that he had been detained amid efforts to quell the coup attempt for membership of the organisation behind that attempt.
37 . On 4 June 2020 the Plenary of the Constitutional Court delivered a decision of inadmissibility in the case of Yıldırım Turan , which concerned the pre-trial detention of an ordinary judge – subject to Law no. 2802 – in the aftermath of the coup attempt on suspicion of membership of FETÖ/PDY. Like the present applicants, the applicant in that case complained, inter alia , that his pre-trial detention had been ordered without respect for the special procedural guarantees granted to the members of the judiciary in his position under Law no. 2802.
38. The Constitutional Court stated at the outset that it had delivered many decisions where it had addressed this issue, both in respect of the members of the high courts (such as Alparslan Altan , no. 2016/15586, 11 January 2018, Salih Sönmez , no. 2016/25431, 28 November 2018, and Hannan Yılbaşı , no. 2016/37380, 17 July 2019 , concerning members of the Constitutional Court, the Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court, respectively) and ordinary judges (such as Adem Türkel , no. 2017/632, 23 January 2019). Relying on the relevant legal framework and the case-law of the Court of Cassation, it had found in all those decisions that the offence in question – that is, membership of an armed terrorist organisation – was a personal offence of a continuing nature. This effectively meant that the commission of the crime had been continuing at the time of arrest, and that, therefore, there had been a situation entailing discovery in flagrante delicto falling within the jurisdiction of the assize courts in all the cases concerned, which had rendered inapplicable the special procedural guarantees envisaged under different laws governing the members of the judiciary in question.
39 . In two further judgments delivered on 31 October 2019 (namely, A.B. , no. 2016/22702, and Mustafa Özterzi , no. 2016/14597 , concerning a member of the Court of Cassation and an ordinary judge, respectively), it had consolidated this case-law and had underlined the fact that the assessment regarding the existence of a situation of discovery in flagrante delicto in the prevailing circumstances could not be deemed unfounded, given that the persons arrested were considered to have an organisational relation with FETÖ/PDY, which was behind the coup attempt, and that the arrests had taken place at a time when the efforts to avert that attempt were still ongoing and the threat against national security and public order persisted. The Constitutional Court therefore reiterated that in accepting the existence of a case of discovery in flagrante delicto with respect to the members of the judiciary arrested after the attempted coup, its main reference point had been the coup attempt itself.
40. The Constitutional Court then went on to review the judgment in the Baş case (cited above), where the Court had found a violation of Article 5 § 1 on the basis of its earlier conclusions in Alparslan Altan (cited above) regarding the extensive interpretation of the concept of in flagrante delicto by the domestic courts. According to the Constitutional Court, the Court’s findings in that case involved an assessment not of the application of the Convention, but of the interpretation of the relevant Turkish law. While it acknowledged the binding nature of the Court’s judgments, the Constitutional Court stressed that it was up to the Turkish public authorities, and ultimately to the domestic courts, to interpret the provisions of domestic law relating to the pre-trial detention of members of the judiciary. It held that although the Court was entitled to consider whether the interpretation given by Turkish courts to domestic law violated the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention, it should not replace the domestic courts and interpret domestic law first-hand. It therefore deemed it useful to recapitulate the relevant domestic legal framework and practice governing the investigation and pre-trial detention of the members of the judiciary.
41. The Constitutional Court noted essentially that the existence of the element of discovery in flagrante delicto falling within the jurisdiction of the assize courts constituted an exception to the procedural safeguards afforded to all judges and prosecutors, regardless of the level or type of court in which they served. However, unlike the legal framework governing the members of high courts and the elected judicial members of the HSYK, where the distinction between personal and duty-related offences was immaterial for the application of the relevant procedural safeguards, the “personal offences” committed by ordinary judges and prosecutors within the meaning of section 93 of Law no. 2802 would fall outside the protection afforded to them under the same law by reason of their profession. Measures taken in respect of such offences would therefore be subject to the rules of ordinary law, whether there was a case of discovery in flagrante delicto or not.
42. Accordingly, when assessing the lawfulness of the pre-trial detention of an ordinary judge or prosecutor in the present context, it was of decisive importance to determine whether the offence attributed to him or her was a personal offence or an offence committed during or in connection with the performance of duties. Relying on a number of judgments delivered by the Court of Cassation in the aftermath of the attempted coup, as well as its own relevant case-law from the same period, it reiterated that the offence of membership of a terrorist organisation could not be committed by public officials as part of their duties and, for that reason, the initiation of a criminal investigation against Mr Yıldırım Turan, and his pre-trial detention, were not subject to authorisation by an administrative authority. There was, therefore, no legal obstacle to his arrest pursuant to the terms of the ordinary law.
43 . That being so, the Constitutional Court emphasised that the question as to whether there was a case of discovery in flagrante delicto within the meaning of section 94 of Law no. 2802 had no bearing on the lawfulness of Mr Yıldırım Turan’s arrest, but was only relevant for the determination of the judicial authority with jurisdiction ratione loci to carry out the investigation and order the pre-trial detention. It accordingly dismissed Mr Yıldırım Turan’s allegation that his deprivation of liberty had lacked a legal basis.
44 . The Government referred to Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 of the Committee of Ministers to member States, entitled “Judges: independence, efficiency and responsibilities” and adopted on 17 November 2010. The relevant parts of the Recommendation have been noted in the case of Alparslan Altan (cited above, § 65).
45 . They further brought to the Court’s attention Opinion no. 3 of the Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE) on the “Principles and Rules Governing Judges’ Professional Conduct, in Particular Ethics, Incompatible Behaviour and Impartiality”, dated 19 November 2002, which provided as follows in its relevant part:
“Article 75: As regards criminal liability, the CCJE considers that:
i) judges should be criminally liable in ordinary law for offences committed outside their judicial office;
...”
46. On 21 July 2016 the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the Council of Europe sent the Secretary General of the Council of Europe a notice of derogation (see, for the text of the notice of derogation, Alparslan Altan , cited above, § 66, or Baş , cited above, § 109).
47. The notice of derogation was withdrawn on 8 August 2018, following the end of the state of emergency.
THE LAW
48. Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment, pursuant to Rule 42 § 1 of the Rules of Court.
49. The Government emphasised at the outset that all of the applicants’ complaints should be examined with due regard to the derogation of which the Secretary General of the Council of Europe had been notified on 21 July 2016 under Article 15 of the Convention. Article 15 provides:
“1. In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under [the] Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law.
2. No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war, or from Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7 shall be made under this provision.
3. Any High Contracting Party availing itself of this right of derogation shall keep the Secretary General of the Council of Europe fully informed of the measures which it has taken and the reasons therefor. It shall also inform the Secretary General of the Council of Europe when such measures have ceased to operate and the provisions of the Convention are again being fully executed.”
50. The parties made submissions regarding the derogation under Article 15 of the Convention along the same lines as those noted in the cases of Alparslan Altan v. Turkey (cited above, §§ 68-70) and Baş v. Turkey ( Baş v. Turkey , cited above, §§ 112-114).
51. The Court notes that in Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey (no. 13237/17, § 93, 20 March 2018) it held, in the light of the Constitutional Court’s findings on this point and all the other material in its possession, that the attempted military coup had disclosed the existence of a “public emergency threatening the life of the nation” within the meaning of the Convention. With regard to the scope ratione temporis and ratione materiae of the derogation by Turkey – a question which the Court could raise of its own motion – the Court observes that the applicants were detained a short time after the coup attempt, the event that prompted the declaration of the state of emergency. It considers that this is undoubtedly a contextual factor that should be fully taken into account in interpreting and applying Article 5 of the Convention in the present case (see, mutatis mutandis , Hassan v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 29750/09, § 103, ECHR 2014, and Alparslan Altan , cited above, § 75 ).
52. As to whether the measures taken in the present case were strictly required by the exigencies of the situation and consistent with the other obligations under international law, the Court considers it necessary to examine the applicants’ complaints on the merits (see Baş , cited above, § 116).
53. The applicants complained mainly that they had been placed in pre-trial detention in breach of the domestic law governing the arrest and pre-trial detention of the members of the judiciary, and disputed that there had been a case of discovery in flagrante delicto for the purposes of section 94 of Law no. 2802 and section 46 of Law no. 2797. They further argued that the magistrates’ courts had lacked competence and territorial jurisdiction to decide on their detention.
54. The Court considers it appropriate to examine these complaints under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which provides as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: ...”
55. The Government urged the Court to declare this complaint inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies in respect of the applicants who had not made use of the relevant compensatory remedy under Article 141 § 1 (a) of the CCP, which provided for an award of compensation to anyone who had been unlawfully deprived of his liberty, as well as the applicants whose claims under that provision were still pending before the domestic courts. The Government further claimed that one of the applicants (application no. 55057/17) had been granted compensation pursuant to Article 141 § 1 (e) of the CCP following his acquittal and had therefore lost his victim status. In the Government’s view, any other applicants whose claims for compensation were pending before the competent courts could similarly obtain redress and lose their victim status, which the Court had to take into account in examining the admissibility of their complaints. The Government lastly asked the Court to declare the applications inadmissible for abuse of the right of application to the extent that the applicants had not informed the Court of the developments in their cases following the lodging of their applications.
56. The applicants contested the Government’s arguments.
(a) Non-exhaustion of domestic remedies
57. Referring to the general principles developed in its case-law regarding the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention (see, for instance, Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan [GC], no. 40167/06, §§ 115-116, ECHR 2015), the Court reiterates firstly that for a remedy in respect of the lawfulness of an ongoing deprivation of liberty to be effective, it must offer a prospect of release (see Mustafa Avcı v. Turkey , no. 39322/12, § 60, 23 May 2017). It notes in this respect that it has already found that the remedy provided for in Article 141 of the CCP is not capable of terminating the deprivation of liberty (see, for instance, Alparslan Altan , cited above, § 84 ). It therefore rejects the Government’s preliminary objection insofar as it concerns the applicants who are still deprived of their liberty for the purposes of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.
58. Secondly, with regard to the remaining applicants who are no longer in pre-trial detention, the Court recalls that where an applicant, who is no longer in detention, complains that he or she was detained in breach of domestic law, a compensation claim capable of leading to an acknowledgment of the alleged violation and an award of compensation is in principle an effective remedy which needs to be pursued if its effectiveness in practice has been convincingly established (see Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], no. 14305/17, § 208, 22 December 2020 ).
59 . The Government do not dispute the fact that the applicants have challenged the lawfulness of their pre-trial detention before various domestic instances, including the Constitutional Court, and that on none of those occasions was the unlawfulness of their pre-trial detention acknowledged (see paragraph 27 above). Moreover, the examples of case ‑ law provided by the Government regarding the domestic courts’ interpretation of the concept of “ in flagranto delicto ” in the present context demonstrate unequivocally that the applicants’ detention in accordance with the ordinary law provisions, as opposed to the special procedure pertaining to the detention of judges and prosecutors envisaged under the applicable laws, was considered to be compatible with the relevant domestic law by the highest courts of the land (see the case-law cited in paragraphs 32-43 below).
60. The Court considers, in the light of the foregoing, that a compensation claim under Article 141 § 1 (a) of the CCP would have had no prospects of success in respect of the applicants’ complaint under Article 5 § 1 regarding the unlawfulness of their pre-trial detention. Accordingly, the Court considers that the applicants were not required to make use of that compensatory remedy for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention (see, for a similar finding, Baş , cited above, § 121, and Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey , no. 23199/17, § 126, 10 November 2020 ). It therefore dismisses the Government’s objection in this regard.
(b) Victim status
61. As for the question whether the applicant in application no. 55057/17 may be considered to have lost his victim status on account of the compensation awarded to him under Article 141 § 1 (e) of the CCP, the Court refers to its consistent and well-established case-law to the effect that a favourable decision or measure is not, in principle, sufficient to deprive applicants of their status as a “victim” for the purposes of Article 34 of the Convention, unless the national authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, and then afforded redress for the breach of the Convention (see, among other authorities, Gäfgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978/05, § 115, ECHR 2010, and Alparslan Altan , cited above, § 85 ).
62 . The Court notes in this connection that the award in question was made in view of the said applicant’s acquittal and involved no acknowledgment of unlawfulness of his pre-trial detention. The wording of Article 141 § 1 (e) of the CCP is indeed very clear that compensation under that provision is awarded to those who have been acquitted after being arrested or detained “in accordance with the law”. For this reason, and bearing also in mind the assessment made in paragraph 59 above regarding the domestic courts’ consistent approach to the issue of “lawfulness” in the present context, the award made to the applicant may not be considered as constituting an acknowledgement of the alleged breach of the right to liberty and removing his victim status. For that reason, the Court rejects the Government’s objection in this regard, both in relation to application no. 55057/17 and to any other applicants who may have in the meantime received compensation on the same ground.
(c) Abuse of the right of application
63. The Court reiterates that under Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention, an application may be rejected for abuse if, among other reasons, it was knowingly based on untrue facts (see X and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 22457/16, § 145, 2 February 2021) . Incomplete and therefore misleading information may also amount to abuse of the right of application, especially if the information concerns the very core of the case and no sufficient explanation is given for the failure to disclose that information (see, for instance, Predescu v. Romania , no. 21447/03, § 25, 2 December 2008 ). The same applies where new, significant developments occur during the proceedings before the Court and where – despite being expressly required to do so by Rule 47 § 6 of the Rules of Court – the applicant fails to disclose that information to the Court, thereby preventing it from ruling on the case in full knowledge of the facts. However, even in such cases, the applicant’s intention to mislead the Court must always be established with sufficient certainty (see Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], no. 38433/09, § 97, ECHR 2012 ).
64. Having examined the case files and the parties’ submissions in the light of the foregoing principles, the Court does not find any indication to lead it to conclude that the applicants have withheld information in a deliberate attempt to mislead it, or have otherwise abused the right of petition in respect of their complaint in question. The Government’s objection in that connection should, therefore, be dismissed.
(d) Conclusion
65. The Court notes accordingly that the applicants’ complaint regarding the lawfulness of their pre-trial detention is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.
(a) The applicants
66. The applicants claimed that they had been placed in pre-trial detention in breach of the special rules of procedure prescribed in domestic law in relation to the arrest and pre-trial detention of the members of the judiciary.
67. The observations submitted by the applicants who were subject to Law no. 2802 at the time of their detention – that is, ordinary judges and public prosecutors – were largely along the same lines as those noted in the case of Baş (cited above, §§ 133-135).
68. As for the remaining applicants, who were members of the Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court at the material time, they mainly noted that under the relevant provisions governing their respective status – namely section 46 of Law no. 2797 and section 76 of Law no. 2575 – the opening of a criminal investigation in their regard was in principle subject to a decision of their relevant Presidency Boards. They accepted that in cases of discovery in flagrante delicto falling within the jurisdiction of the assize courts, the preliminary and initial investigations in their respect could be conducted under the rules of ordinary law, but contested the finding that their detention involved a situation of discovery in flagrante delicto . They therefore requested that the Court follow the approach it had taken in its judgment in Alparslan Altan (cited above). Some of the applicants stressed that while there was no doubt as to the “continuing” nature of the offence of membership of an armed organisation under Turkish law, the correlation made in the recent Court of Cassation judgments between such offences and the notion of “discovery in flagrante delicto ” was quite far-fetched and even unlawful.
69. Some applicants further added that the offence of which they had been accused could only have been committed in connection with the performance of their official duties, given that the offence was said to relate to judicial actions that they had allegedly carried out under the instructions of the terrorist organisation in question.
(b) The Government
70. The Government largely repeated the observations that they had lodged in the cases of Alparslan Altan and Baş (both cited above, §§ 92-98 and §§ 136-141 respectively), as relevant, and argued that, contrary to the Court’s findings in those cases, the pre-trial detention of the applicants had been in compliance with the applicable domestic legislation.
71 . The Government stated at the outset that investigations had been initiated and detention orders had been issued against the applicants pursuant to the general provisions of the CCP on the basis of the consideration that there had been a case of discovery in flagrante delicto . The Government explained in particular that although Laws nos. 2797 and 2575 provided for a special procedure for conducting criminal proceedings against members of the Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court, in cases of discovery in flagrante delicto falling within the assize courts’ jurisdiction, the investigations would be conducted in accordance with the rules of ordinary law and it would be possible to order preventive measures. Section 94 of Law no. 2802 pertaining to ordinary judges and prosecutors similarly provided for the application of the rules of ordinary law in the event of discovery in flagrante delicto falling within the assize courts’ jurisdiction.
72 . The Government noted that in the present cases, the investigation conducted against the applicants had concerned their suspected membership of an armed terrorist organisation under Article 314 § 2 of the Criminal Code, which fell within the jurisdiction of the assize courts. They further noted that, in view of the “continuing” nature of the offence of membership of an armed terrorist organisation, the magistrates’ courts had found that there had been a case of discovery in flagrante delicto at the time of the applicants’ arrest and had accordingly ordered their detention in accordance with the rules of ordinary law – i.e. Articles 100 et seq. of the CCP – as per the relevant provisions of Laws nos. 2797, 2575 and 2802. In the context of the individual applications brought before it, the Constitutional Court had moreover not accepted the applicants’ argument that the investigating authorities’ assessment – that there had been a case of discovery in flagrante delicto in respect of the offence of membership of a terrorist organisation imputed to them – had lacked a factual and legal basis and had thus been arbitrary. The Government therefore considered that the primary issue to be resolved before the Court was whether there was a situation of “ in flagrante delicto ” in respect of the offence imputed to the applicants.
73 . Noting that it was incumbent on the domestic judicial authorities to interpret legal concepts provided in domestic law and to determine their scope, the Government claimed that the decisions of the magistrates’ courts at issue had been in accordance with the settled case-law of the Court of Cassation. They referred in this connection to the well-established practice of that court, according to which the offence of membership of an armed terrorist organisation was a “continuing offence” falling within the jurisdiction of the assize courts. They also referred to the conclusion reached by the plenary criminal divisions of the Court of Cassation in a leading judgment of 10 October 2017 (E.2017/YYB-997, K.2017/404), where it was held that “there is a situation of discovery in flagrante delicto at the time of the arrest of judges suspected of the offence of membership of an armed organisation, and [consequently] the investigation must be carried out in accordance with the provisions of ordinary law” (see Alparslan Altan , cited above, § 63; for a similar finding, see also the judgment delivered by the plenary criminal divisions of the Court of Cassation on 26 September 2017 (E. 2017/16-956, K. 2017/370), noted in Baş , cited above, § 88). The Government emphasised in this regard that the Court of Cassation’s jurisprudence on the matter was by no means a product of the post-15 July 2016 period, as that court had interpreted the concepts of “continuing offence” and “ in flagrante delicto ” in a similar manner in cases that concerned the offence of membership of terrorist organisations other than FETÖ/PDY and that predated the cases at issue. The application of those concepts in the present context had not, therefore, involved a new judicial interpretation that could be regarded as arbitrary.
74 . The Government moreover stressed that in accepting the existence of “discovery in flagrante delicto ” in respect of the members of the judiciary placed in detention subsequent to the coup attempt of 15 July, the Constitutional Court had taken the coup attempt itself as its main reference point, rather than the continuing nature of the offence of membership of a terrorist organisation, having regard to the fact that the judges concerned were arrested at a time when the efforts to avert the coup attempt were still ongoing.
75. Referring to the relevant international material (see paragraphs 44-45 above), the Government further noted that judges and prosecutors were criminally liable for offences committed outside their judicial office in the same way as any other citizen. They submitted in this connection that the offence of which the applicants had been accused, namely membership of an armed terrorist organisation, was a personal offence, and not one that could be regarded as an offence committed in connection with or in the course of official duties. They relied in support of this argument on a judgment delivered on 28 September 2010 by the plenary criminal divisions of the Court of Cassation (E.2010/162 ‑ K.210/179), where the offence of membership of an armed terrorist organisation, of which the defendant had also been accused, had not been treated as an offence committed in connection with or in the course of official duties (see, for further information regarding that judgment, BaÅŸ , cited above, § 137).
76. The Government acknowledged that Laws nos. 2797 and 2575 pertaining to the members of the Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court, as well as Law no. 6216 governing the members of the Constitutional Court as outlined by the Court in Alparslan Altan (cited above, §§ 49 and 106-107), did not differentiate between offences committed in an official or personal capacity, and that the special procedures envisaged under the relevant laws would apply in both circumstances, unless there had been a case of discovery in flagrante delicto as indicated above. The situation was different, however, in respect of ordinary judges and prosecutors subject to the provisions of Law no. 2802, which provided that personal offences governed by section 93 would be treated in accordance with the requirements of the ordinary law. Relying on the positions taken by the Court of Cassation and the Constitutional Court in this regard (see, for instance, the references made in Baş , cited above, § 137, and Alparslan Altan , cited above, § 94, respectively, to the relevant courts’ case-law; see also the judgments noted in paragraphs 32-43 above), the Government therefore argued that even if the Court were to conclude that there had not been a case of discovery in flagrante delicto in respect of the ordinary judges and prosecutors in the present case, their detention would still be subject to the rules of ordinary law by reason of the “personal” nature of the offence imputed to them within the meaning of section 93 of Law no. 2802. The Government therefore argued that the Court’s reliance in Baş (cited above) on the conclusions that it had previously made in Alparslan Altan (cited above), in disregard of the clear distinction between the safeguards afforded to ordinary judges and prosecutors and the members of the Constitutional Court, had been erroneous.
77. They further emphasised in this regard that the decisions taken by the HSYK on 16 July 2016 and afterwards on the suspension of these judges and prosecutors from office did not as such amount to an authorisation for the opening of a criminal investigation due to a duty-related offence; those decisions rather pertained to the disciplinary investigations initiated by the HSYK following the criminal investigation launched ex proprio motu by the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office.
78 . The Government lastly contended that consideration should also be given to Article 161 § 8 of the CCP, which provided that investigations into certain offences – including the offence of membership of an armed terrorist organisation imputed to the applicants – would be conducted directly by the public prosecutor pursuant to general provisions, even if the offence had been committed in connection with or in the course of official duties. In other words, Article 161 § 8 would bar the application of the special procedural safeguards afforded to judges and prosecutors under various laws.
79. The Court refers at the outset to the relevant principles established in its case-law regarding the right to liberty and security under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention (see, for instance, Alparslan Altan , cited above, §§ 99-103, and Baş , cited above, § 143, and the cases cited therein).
80. It reiterates in particular that where the “lawfulness” of detention is at issue, including the question whether “a procedure prescribed by law” has been followed, the Convention refers essentially to national law and lays down the obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules thereof. This primarily requires any arrest or detention to have a legal basis in domestic law. Compliance with national law is not, however, sufficient: Article 5 § 1 requires in addition that any deprivation of liberty should be in keeping with the purpose of protecting the individual from arbitrariness. The Court must further ascertain in this connection whether domestic law itself is in conformity with the Convention, including the general principles expressed or implied therein, notably the principle of legal certainty ( see Mooren v. Germany [GC], no. 11364/03, § 72, 9 July 2009, with further references).
81. On this last point, the Court stresses that where deprivation of liberty is concerned, it is particularly important that the general principle of legal certainty be satisfied. It is therefore essential that the conditions for deprivation of liberty under domestic law be clearly defined and that the law itself be foreseeable in its application, so that it meets the standard of “lawfulness” set by the Convention, a standard which requires that all law be sufficiently precise to allow the person – if need be, with appropriate advice – to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail (see, for instance, Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 16483/12, § 92, 15 December 2016 , and the cases cited therein).
82. The Court notes, moreover, that it has on many occasions emphasised the special role in society of the judiciary, which, as the guarantor of justice, a fundamental value in a State governed by the rule of law, must enjoy public confidence if it is to be successful in carrying out its duties (see Baka v. Hungary [GC], no. 20261/12, § 164, 23 June 2016 , with further references). This consideration, set out in particular in cases concerning the right of judges to freedom of expression, is equally relevant in relation to the adoption of a measure affecting the right to liberty of a member of the judiciary. In particular, where domestic law has granted judicial protection to members of the judiciary in order to safeguard the independent exercise of their functions, it is essential that such arrangements should be properly complied with. Given the prominent place that the judiciary occupies among State organs in a democratic society and the growing importance attached to the separation of powers and to the necessity of safeguarding the independence of the judiciary (see Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal [GC], nos. 55391/13 and 2 others, § 196, 6 November 2018 ), the Court must be particularly attentive to the protection of members of the judiciary when reviewing the manner in which a detention order was implemented from the standpoint of the provisions of the Convention (see Alparslan Altan , cited above, § 102, and Baş , cited above, § 144).
83. Turning to the specific circumstances of the present case, the Court notes, and the parties do not dispute, that the applicants were all arrested and placed in pre-trial detention in accordance with the rules of the ordinary law, more specifically, on the basis of Articles 100 et seq. of the CCP. The parties diverge, however, on the question of whether the initial pre-trial detention of the applicants – as serving judges and prosecutors enjoying a special status at the time of the events – under the rules of the ordinary law may be said to have satisfied the “quality of the law” requirement. Having regard to the different legal regulations applicable to ordinary judges and prosecutors and members of high courts, respectively, the Court will address this question separately for each group.
(a) Ordinary judges and prosecutors subject to Law no. 2802
84. The Court notes, as indicated above, that despite the special procedural safeguards flowing from their status as judges or prosecutors at the material time, the applicants were placed in pre-trial detention in accordance with the ordinary law, for they were deemed to have been caught in flagrante delicto , as per section 94 of Law no. 2802. The Court further notes that the application of the notion of “ in flagrante delicto ” in the specific context of the pre-trial detention of an ordinary judge subject to Law no. 2802 has already led to a finding of violation of Article 5 § 1 in Baş , where the Court found that that notion had been interpreted by the national courts in an extensive manner that was not in conformity with the requirements of the Convention (cited above, §§ 145-162). Having reviewed the parties’ submissions, as well as the recent judgments of the Court of Cassation and the Constitutional Court on this matter (see paragraphs 32-43 above), the Court sees no reason to depart from its findings in the Baş case (cited above, §§ 145-162).
85 . The Court notes, as the Government have also pointed out, that in acknowledging the existence of “discovery in flagrante delicto ” in the present circumstances, the Constitutional Court has adopted a slightly different approach from that followed by the Court of Cassation (see Baş , cited above, §§ 150-156 for a detailed examination of the Court of Cassation’s approach). More specifically, the Constitutional Court has taken the coup attempt as its main reference point, rather than relying solely on the continuing nature of the offence of membership of a terrorist organisation, in view of the factual context in which the relevant members of the judiciary had been arrested (see paragraph 39 above; see also the Government’s argument noted in paragraph 74 above). According to the Constitutional Court, the applicants, and all members of the judiciary caught in the aftermath of the coup attempt, could be considered to have been caught in flagrante delicto solely on the basis of their alleged organisational ties with the terrorist organisation behind that attempt. While the Court is aware of the unique circumstances that surrounded the applicants’ arrest, it considers that the Constitutional Court’s conjectural approach appears likewise to stretch the concept of “ in flagrante delicto ” beyond the conventional definition provided in Article 2 of the CCP (see Baş , cited above, §§ 59 and 152), noting in particular the absence of an affirmation on the part of the Constitutional Court or the Government that the applicants were arrested and placed in pre-trial detention while in the process of, or immediately after, committing an act linked directly to the coup attempt (see, for a similar finding, ibid., §§ 149 and 152).
86. The Court further notes the Government’s argument that the pre-trial detention of the relevant applicants under ordinary rules did not necessarily hinge on their discovery in flagrante delicto , but that it was also justified under section 93 of Law no. 2802, as the offence of which they had been accused was a personal offence governed by that section and not a duty ‑ related one. As indicated in the BaÅŸ case (ibid., § 158), it is not for the Court to determine into which category of offences the applicants’ alleged conduct falls. The Court will therefore limit its examination to assessing whether the relevant law was applied in the present circumstances in a manner that complied with the requirements of legal certainty (ibid., § 158).
87. The Court observes in this connection that in the detention orders issued regarding the applicants, no position was taken on the “personal” or “duty-related” nature of the offence at issue and that reference was made, if any, only to section 94 of the Law, which applies to both types of offences. For the reasons enunciated in the Baş case (ibid.), the Court considers that the presence of a case of discovery in flagrante delicto appears to have been decisive for depriving the applicants of the safeguards afforded under the relevant law. The Court further notes that even in those applications where the detention orders did not make an express reference to section 94, it is clear from the relevant case-law of the Court of Cassation and the Constitutional Court that in the event of the arrest of a member of the judiciary for membership of an armed terrorist organisation, the conditions for “discovery in flagrante delicto falling within the jurisdiction of the assize courts” within the meaning of section 94 of Law no. 2802 would be considered to have materialised at the time of apprehension, in view of the continuing nature of the offence of membership of an armed terrorist organisation attributed to them (see, for instance, the leading Court of Cassation judgments referred to in Baş , cited above, §§ 88 and 150, and in paragraph 73 above; see also the Constitutional Court judgment noted in paragraph 36 above, where the existence of a situation “ in flagrante delicto ” was endorsed by that court even in the absence of an express reference to section 94 or a recognition of such situation in the detention order). The Government have moreover acknowledged in their observations that the applicants’ pre-trial detention had been conducted in accordance with the general provisions of the CCP on account of their apprehension in flagrante delicto (see paragraphs 71-72 above).
88. The Court is, therefore, not convinced that the finding as regards the existence of a case of “ in flagrante delicto ” within the meaning of section 94 of Law no. 2802 may foreseeably have been considered as relevant only for determining the jurisdiction ratione loci of the court ordering the detention, without any bearing on the lawfulness of that detention (see Baş , cited above, § 158).
89 . The Court also notes the argument made by the Court of Cassation (see paragraphs 32-35 above), and repeated in the Government’s observations (see paragraph 78 above), that the special procedure set out in Law no. 2802 would in any event not apply in the applicants’ cases, since the investigation against them would be conducted directly by the public prosecutors by virtue of Article 161 § 8 of the CCP, regardless of whether the offence had been committed in a personal or official capacity or whether they had been caught in flagrante delicto . The Court considers in this regard that the interplay between the relevant provisions of Law no. 2802 and Article 161 § 8, and the effect of the latter on preventive measures that can be taken against members of the judiciary, remains unclear in the present context, noting in particular that Article 161 § 8 appears to relate solely to the designation of the authority responsible for conducting a criminal investigation. The Court further observes from the material before it that this argument advanced under Article 161 § 8 was not taken up by the Constitutional Court (see paragraphs 37-43 above). In these circumstances, the Court may not take that provision into consideration for the purposes of determining the lawfulness of the applicants’ pre-trial detention under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.
90 . The Court reiterates, as also indicated by the Government in their observations, that it is primarily for the national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law. It also reiterates, however, that it falls ultimately to the Court to determine whether the way in which that law is interpreted and applied produces consequences that are consistent with the principles of the Convention (see, for instance , Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland [GC], no. 26374/18, § 250, 1 December 2020 , and the cases cited therein). As the Government rightly pointed out, the judicial protection provided under Law no. 2802 does not mean impunity. That said, having regard to the importance of the judiciary in a democratic State governed by the rule of law, and to the fact that protection of this kind is granted to judges and prosecutors not for their own personal benefit but in order to safeguard the independent exercise of their functions, the requirements of legal certainty become even more paramount where a member of the judiciary has been deprived of his or her liberty (see Baş , cited above, § 158).
91. Having regard to the foregoing, and to its considerations in the Baş case, the Court cannot conclude that the pre-trial detention of the applicants who were subject to Law no. 2802 took place in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. Moreover, for the reasons set out above, the Court considers that the measure at issue cannot be said to have been strictly required by the exigencies of the situation (ibid., §§ 159-162).
92. There has therefore been a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention on account of the unlawfulness of the pre-trial detention of the applicants who were ordinary judges or prosecutors subject to Law no. 2802 at the time of their detention.
(b) Members of the Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court subject to Law no. 2797 and Law no. 2575
93. The Court notes that according to Article 46 of Law no. 2797 governing the members of the Court of Cassation, which is also applicable to members of the Supreme Administrative Court, the initiation of an investigation against these high court judges is subject to the decision of their relevant Presidency Boards, unless in the case of discovery in flagrante delicto falling within the jurisdiction of the assize courts, which triggers the application of the rules of the ordinary law (see paragraphs 30 ‑ 31 above).
94. The Court observes that the legal framework noted above is similar to that applicable to members of the Constitutional Court as laid out in the case of Alparslan Altan (cited above, § 49). It further observes that, just as in that case, the present applicants’ pre-trial detention was carried out in accordance with the terms of the ordinary law by reason of the judicial authorities’ finding that they had been caught in flagrante delicto .
95. The Court notes that the extensive application of the notion of “ in flagrante delicto ” resulted in the finding of violation of Article 5 § 1 in the aforementioned case of Alparslan Altan (ibid., §§ 104-115). Having regard to the information and documents before it, and to the argument in paragraphs 85 and 89-90 above, as relevant, the Court sees no reason to depart from its findings in Alparslan Altan (cited above). It finds accordingly that the applicants who were members of the Court of Cassation or the Supreme Administrative Court at the time of their pre-trial detention were similarly not deprived of their liberty in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law, as required under Article 5 § 1. The decision to place these applicants in pre-trial detention may not, moreover, be said to have been strictly required by the exigencies of the situation (ibid., §§ 116-119).
96. There has therefore been a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention on account of the unlawfulness of the pre-trial detention of the applicants who were members of the Court of Cassation or the Supreme Administrative Court subject to Law no. 2797 or Law no. 2575 at the time of their detention.
97. Some of the applicants also complained under Article 5 § 1 (c) and 3 of the Convention that they had been placed in pre-trial detention in the absence of reasonable suspicion that they had committed the offence of which they had been accused, that the decisions for their detention had not been accompanied by relevant and sufficient reasons, and that the length of their pre-trial detention had been excessive. Some applicants further argued under Article 5 § 4 that the reviews conducted by the domestic courts into their detention had not complied with certain procedural safeguards, and/or under Article 5 § 5 that there had been no effective domestic remedies to allow them to obtain compensation for the alleged breaches of their rights under Article 5 [1] .
98. The Court has found above that the applicants’ detention was not prescribed by law, which runs counter to the fundamental principle of the rule of law and to the purpose of Article 5 to protect every individual from arbitrariness. Having regard to the significance and implications of this finding, which goes to the heart of the protection afforded under Article 5 and entails a violation of one of the core rights guaranteed by the Convention, and to the accumulation of thousands of similar applications on its docket concerning detentions in the aftermath of the attempted coup d’état in Turkey, which puts a considerable strain on its limited resources, the Court considers – as a matter of judicial policy – that it is justified in these compelling circumstances to dispense with the separate examination of the admissibility and merits of each remaining complaint raised by each individual applicant under Article 5. The Court also points out in this connection that an individualised examination of the remaining complaints brought by each applicant would significantly delay the processing of these cases, without a commensurate benefit to the applicants or contribution to the development of the case-law. It notes furthermore that it has already addressed the legal issues raised by these complaints for the most part (see, in particular, Selahattin Demirtaş (no 2) , Alparslan Altan and Baş , all cited above; Atilla Taş v. Turkey , no. 72/17, 19 January 2021) . It is precisely within this exceptional context that the Court, guided by the overriding interest to ensure the long-term effectiveness of the Convention system, which is under threat by the constantly growing inflow of applications (see, mutatis mutandis , Burmych and Others v. Ukraine (striking out) [GC], nos. 46852/13 et al, §§ 111, 119 et seq., 157 and 210, 12 October 2017 ), decides not to examine the applicants’ remaining complaints under Article 5.
99. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
100. The applicants requested compensation in varying amounts in respect of non ‑ pecuniary damage for the alleged violation of their rights under Article 5. Most of the applicants also claimed pecuniary damage, corresponding mainly to their loss of earnings resulting from their dismissal, as well as the legal costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and the Court.
101. The Government considered that the applicants’ claims were unsubstantiated and excessive.
102. The Court reiterates at the outset that Article 41 of the Convention empowers it to afford the injured party such satisfaction as appears to it to be appropriate (see Karácsony and Others v. Hungary [GC], nos. 42461/13 and 44357/13, § 179, 17 May 2016 ).
103. The Court also reiterates, however, that it is not its role under Article 41 to function akin to a domestic tort mechanism court in apportioning fault and compensatory damages between civil parties (see Al Jedda v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 27021/08, § 114, ECHR 2011 ). The Court is an international judicial authority contingent on the consent of the States signatory to the Convention, and its principal task is to secure respect for human rights, rather than compensate applicants’ losses minutely and exhaustively. Unlike in national jurisdictions, the emphasis of the Court’s activity is on passing public judgments that set human rights standards across Europe (see, mutatis mutandis , Goncharova and other “Privileged Pensioners” cases v. Russia , nos. 23113/08 and 68 others, § 22, 15 October 2009, and Nosov and Others v. Russia , nos. 9117/04 and 10441/04, § 68, 20 February 2014). Accordingly, the awarding of sums of money to applicants by way of just satisfaction is not one of the Court’s main duties but is incidental to its task under Article 19 of the Convention of ensuring the observance by States of their obligations under the Convention (see, for instance, Nagmetov v. Russia [GC], no. 35589/08, § 64, 30 March 2017 ).
104. The Court further notes that it enjoys a certain discretion in the exercise of the power conferred by Article 41, as is borne out by the adjective “just” and the phrase “if necessary” (see, for instance, Arvanitaki ‑ Roboti and Others v. Greece [GC], no. 27278/03, § 32, 15 February 2008 ). The exercise of such discretion encompasses such decisions as to refuse monetary compensation or to reduce the amount that it awards (see Arvanitaki ‑ Roboti and Others v. Greece [GC], no. 27278/03, § 32, 15 February 2008 ). The Court’s guiding principle in this respect is equity, which above all involves flexibility and an objective consideration of what is just, fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the case, including not only the position of the applicant but the overall context in which the breach occurred (see Varnava and Others v. Turkey [GC], nos. 16064/90 and 8 others, § 224, ECHR 2009, and Al-Jedda , cited above, § 114 ).
105. As regards the applicants’ request for pecuniary damage, which they claim to have sustained as a result of their loss of earnings following their dismissal, the Court observes that the present judgment concerns the applicants’ pre-trial detention and not their dismissal from the office of judge or prosecutor. Accordingly, it cannot discern a causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged, and it therefore rejects any claims under that head (see, for a similar finding, Alparslan Altan , cited above, § 154, and Baş , cited above, § 289).
106. As for the remainder of the applicants’ claims for non-pecuniary damage and costs and expenses, the Court finds it appropriate to rule in equity and make a global and uniform assessment in that respect, having regard to the general principles noted above, as well as to the materials in its possession, its case-law, the repetitive nature of the legal issues examined in the present case and the number of similar applications pending before it. Accordingly, it considers it reasonable to award each of the applicants a lump sum of 5,000 euros (EUR), covering non-pecuniary damage and costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount.
107. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
(a) that the respondent State is to pay each of the applicants, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 5,000 (five thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable on these amounts, which are to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
Done in English, and notified in writing on 23 November 2021, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Hasan Bakırcı Jon Fridrik Kjølbro Deputy Registrar President
In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the following separate opinions are annexed to this judgment:
(a) Concurring opinion of Judge Koskelo, joined by Judge Ranzoni;
(b) Partly concurring opinion of Judge Yüksel;
(c) Partly dissenting opinion of Judge KÅ«ris.
J.F.K. H.B.
CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE KOSKELO, JOINED BY JUDGE RANZONI
108. The present judgment is remarkable in an unusual and highly problematic sense. The Court concludes, in effect, that it is faced with a situation that renders it unable to fulfil its function, and this conclusion is reached, moreover, in the context of core aspects of core rights enshrined in Article 5 of the Convention. Having found a violation of Article 5 § 1 on the ground of the unlawfulness, in terms of domestic law, of the applicants’ initial pre-trial detention (points 3 and 4 of the operative provisions), the Court leaves the other complaints raised by the applicants under Article 5 unexamined (point 5).
109. I have voted in favour of this extraordinary outcome, reluctantly and with great misgivings. Why so?
110. It is well established that there are situations where complaints raised under different provisions of the Convention rely on a factual basis and on legal arguments which present similarities, to the extent that the Court may be justified in considering that, once a violation is found under one provision, it is not necessary to separately examine the issue from the standpoint of another provision also invoked by the applicant. The present joined cases, however, do not fall into that category of situations because, in this instance, the Court refrains from examining all other complaints raised under Article 5 apart from the issue of lawfulness. This exclusion covers, in particular, complaints pertaining to the requirement of reasonable suspicion, which under the Court’s well-established case-law is an essential and necessary condition for pre-trial detention to be in accordance with Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention, and thus at the very core of one of the core rights. The issues raised under those complaints and the complaints based on the lack of lawfulness are not “overlapping”. In fact they concern Convention safeguards which are distinct and fundamentally important.
111. Furthermore, based on the cases already examined by the Court, such as Alparslan Altan v. Turkey and BaÅŸ v. Turkey (both cited in the present judgment), as well as the related circumstances transpiring from them, it must be presumed that many of those other complaints might be well ‑ founded.
112. Nor can it be said, under such circumstances, that the present situation would fall within the criterion used by the Court in certain cases where it may find it appropriate to limit its examination to the “main legal questions” raised by the complaints before it (see, for instance, Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848/08, § 156, ECHR 2014).
113. It is also quite clear that the present situation is not comparable with so-called pilot judgment proceedings, where the Court may strike out applications in the same series for the purpose of “returning” the issues to be addressed at the domestic level. In the present situation, it is already evident that the applicants’ recourse to domestic remedies failed and that no further domestic action can be expected to address the alleged violations of Article 5.
114. From a strictly legal point of view, there is hardly any plausible justification for leaving all the other complaints, including those relating to the core issue of reasonable suspicion, unexamined.
115. Moreover, the complaints arise from the detention of judges and prosecutors in very large numbers, which makes the situation even more serious. At the same time, it is precisely the volume of the problem which lies at the heart of the Court’s dilemma (see paragraph 98 of the judgment).
116. The decision not to examine the applicants’ other complaints raised under Article 5 of the Convention thus has a critically novel quality. I have nonetheless arrived at the conclusion that the time has come to acknowledge the reality as it presents itself: if alleged violations occur on a large scale and the rights concerned are no longer protected through domestic remedies, even the international supervision entrusted to the Court reaches its practical limits. The fact that core rights are at stake renders the state of affairs particularly sad and serious but cannot in itself change it. In circumstances where it has become clear that the complaints cannot, and therefore will not, be processed within a reasonable time-frame, or without paralysing the Court’s activity more generally, it is better to make this impasse transparent rather than maintain illusions about the situation. Any further conclusions remain for other bodies to consider.
117. For the reasons set out above (and in paragraph 98 of the judgment itself), the wording used in the operative provision (point 5 – “no need to examine”) is not, in my view, appropriate in the present context. Despite this, however, I voted in favour of this provision as I agree with its outcome.
118. As a final point, I affirm my agreement with the finding of a violation on the grounds that the applicants’ pre-trial detention was not lawful within the meaning of Article 5 § 1, albeit with one additional remark. It concerns the Government’s argument that the lawfulness of the detention of those applicants who were ordinary judges or prosecutors did not, under the relevant domestic law, depend on the existence of discovery in flagrante delicto but on whether the offence in question was a “personal” offence or a “duty-related” one, i.e. an offence committed in connection with or in the course of official duties (see paragraphs 41 and 76 of the present judgment). The Government have submitted that under domestic law, the offence of membership in a terrorist organisation – of which the applicants were suspected – qualifies as a “personal offence”, rendering the specific procedural safeguards and rules governing ordinary judges and prosecutors inapplicable.
119. While acknowledging that it is primarily a prerogative of the domestic courts to interpret domestic law, the position relied on by the Government nonetheless raises a fundamental question in the present context. In their observations before the Court, the Government have consistently described the organisation in question (“FETÖ/PDY”) as one which had the aim of infiltrating various public institutions, including the judicial system, and of creating a “parallel State”, the latter expression being also used in the wording adopted by the Government to denote that organisation. More specifically, the Government have submitted that judges and prosecutors belonging to that organisation took instructions from its hierarchy when dealing with cases entrusted to them. It is difficult to understand how such submissions can be reconciled with the proposition that membership of this particular organisation nonetheless remains to be characterised as a “personal offence” which is not linked with the exercise of the suspects’ duties as judges or prosecutors. In the specific circumstances of these cases, such an interpretation of domestic law appears neither reasonable nor consistent with the Convention requirements of foreseeability and legal certainty.
PARTLY CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE YÃœKSEL
120. In the present case, I voted with the other members of the Chamber to find a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention as regards ordinary judges and prosecutors subject to Law no. 2802. Nevertheless, and with all due respect to my colleagues, I submit this concurring opinion to: (a) share the reasons for which I am unable to agree with the Chamber’s reasoning in reaching that conclusion; and (b) emphasise that the discord between the Court and the highest domestic courts on the question of the lawfulness of the detentions of ordinary judges and prosecutors subject to Law no. 2802 remains unresolved.
121. The Chamber’s reasoning in the present case follows the findings of the majority in Baş v. Turkey (no. 66448/17, 3 March 2020) in respect of the lawfulness of the pre-trial detention of an ordinary judge pursuant to Law no. 2802. In Baş the Court held by a majority that the Turkish national courts’ expansive interpretation of the scope of the concept of in flagrante delicto and their application of section 94 of Law no. 2802 was manifestly unreasonable and incompatible with Article 5 § 1. The Court held therefore that the applicant’s detention had been unlawful (see Baş , cited above, § 158).
122. In my partly dissenting opinion in Baş , I set out the reasons for my disagreement with the majority’s finding that the applicant’s detention was unlawful. The crux of my reasoning was that I did not share the majority’s view that the shortcomings in the applicant’s case amounted to such a “gross or obvious irregularity” (see Mooren v. Germany [GC], no. 11364/03, § 84, 9 July 2009) as to render the detention unlawful within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. With the utmost respect to my colleagues, I maintain that my view as set out in my partly dissenting opinion in Baş is the legally correct interpretation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention in the context of detentions pursuant to Law no. 2802.
123. In the present case, however, I made the decision to vote in favour of finding that the detention of the applicants subject to Law no. 2802 was unlawful and a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. While I maintain the validity of my view as expressed in my partly dissenting opinion in Baş , I cannot ignore the fact that the majority’s view in Baş is now final and is the settled law of the Court for the time being on the issues presented in the present application. As a judge of this Court who believes that applications before the Court should be dealt with in a manner that sustains judicial integrity and the coherence of its case-law, and without prejudice to my view as expressed in my partly dissenting opinion in Baş , I concur with the majority in the present case.
124. I would nevertheless like to stress that the divergence that has emerged between this Court and the highest courts of Turkey on the question whether the arrest and pre-trial detention of ordinary judges and prosecutors subject to Law no. 2802 have been effected in accordance with a “procedure prescribed by law”, within the meaning of Article 5 § 1, continues to persist (see, to this effect, the latest decision delivered by the Constitutional Court on 4 June 2020 in the case of Yıldırım Turan , referred to in paragraphs 37-43 of the present judgment). Bearing particularly in mind the high number of applications pending before the Court which raise the same legal issue, I consider that it falls to the Grand Chamber, as the highest judicial formation of the Court, to address this state of contradiction and to clarify and consolidate the Court’s position in this regard.
PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE KŪRIS
1. I voted against point 5 of the operative part of the judgment. At the same time, I agree with the outcome, because, hard as I try, I am unable to propose any pragmatic alternative to the majority’s audacious decision to terminate the examination of the numerous applicants’ complaints under Article 5 § 1 (c), 5 § 3, 5 § 4 and 5 § 5 of the Convention. My disagreement thus concerns not the very outcome but the wording of operative point 5: had it been worded without using the formula “no need to examine”, which it now contains, and had it thus corresponded to the reasoning intended to substantiate it (paragraph 98 of the judgment), I would have voted for it (and whatever misgivings, if any, I might have had, I would have expressed them in a much shorter concurring opinion). Regrettably, the formula “no need to examine” is certainly not adequate for the extraordinary situation in which the Court has found itself in the present case. That formula had to be avoided – and it could have been avoided at no cost. It is most unfortunate. It is faulty. It is misleading, because its employment in the operative part suggests that the respective complaints are not meritorious.
But they certainly are.
I
2. The Court does not owe any examination of the admissibility, let alone of the merits, in response to all the complaints that it receives. There is a vast array of legal grounds – and good reasons – for leaving certain complaints, even whole applications, unexamined.
3. To begin with, some non-examination is rather routine. Quite a lot of the complaints submitted to the Court do not meet the admissibility criteria defined in Article 35 and must be rejected on these formal grounds. Others are struck out of the Court’s list of cases, when the Court establishes that they meet the conditions set out in Article 37.
4. Apart from the above, in the Court’s practice there are also some not so routine, indeed quite exceptional, cases where the applications (or at least some complaints) are left unexamined.
5. A telling example would be the so-called pilot-judgment procedure. It is undertaken when the Court finds a systemic (or structural) problem raised by the applicant’s individual case and underlying the violation found in it. In view of the growing number of similar applications and of the potential finding of an analogous violation in the respective cases, the examination of those similar applications which have not yet been communicated to the respondent Government is adjourned until that State adopts the general measures aimed at resolving that systemic (structural) problem which gave rise to the violation found in the pilot judgment, and only those applications which have already been communicated continue to be examined under the normal procedure (see, for example, Broniowski v. Poland (merits), [GC], no. 31443/96, ECHR 2004-V; and, in the Turkish context, Ümmühan Kaplan v. Turkey , no. 24240/07, 20 March 2012). After the successful implementation of the general measures required by the pilot judgment, the adjourned applications are struck out of the Court’s list of cases, and the pilot-judgment procedure is closed. This procedure is therefore designed to assist the member States in resolving, at national level, the systemic (structural) problems found by the Court, securing to all actual and potential victims of the respective deficiencies the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention, offering to them more rapid redress and easing the burden on the Court, which would otherwise have to take to judgment large numbers of applications which are similar in substance, as a rule, at the expense of other meritorious cases. The pilot-judgment procedure was conceived as a response to the growth in the Court’s caseload, caused by a series of cases deriving from the same systemic (structural) dysfunction, and to ensure the long-term effectiveness of the Convention machinery.
6. Alas, it does happen that the State fails to execute the pilot judgment. This may generate large numbers of follow-up applications which raise issues that are identical in substance to those raised in the case in which the pilot judgment was adopted. Perhaps the most well-known example of a pilot judgment which the respondent State failed to execute would be the one adopted in the case of Yuriy Nikolayevich Ivanov v. Ukraine (no. 40450/04, 15 October 2009), which otherwise would have been an inconspicuous case. That failure led the Court to adopt what it called a “new approach” in dealing with the massive influx of as many as 12,143 Ivanov ‑ type follow-up applications, plus those of the five applicants specifically in the case of Burmych and Others v. Ukraine ((striking out) [GC], nos. 46852/13, 12 October 2017)). In Burmych and Others the Court proceeded in a thitherto unheard of and most extraordinary way. It concluded that the said Ivanov -type applications had to be dealt with in compliance with the respondent State’s obligation deriving from the pilot judgment adopted in Yuriy Nikolayevich Ivanov , struck them out of its list of cases, considering that the circumstances justified such a course, and transmitted them to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in order for them to be dealt with in the framework of the general measures of execution of the above-mentioned pilot judgment. At the same time the Court underlined that this strike-out decision was without prejudice to its power to restore to the list of its cases, pursuant to Article 37 § 2, the respective applications “or any other similar future applications, if the circumstances justify such a course”. The Court also envisaged that it might be appropriate to reassess the situation within two years from the delivery of the Burmych and Others judgment “with a view to considering whether in the meantime there have occurred circumstances such as to justify its exercising this power” (§ 223).
7. The Burmych and Others precedent was indeed instrumental for the purposes of substantially unclogging the Court’s docket. Whether it was in any way instrumental also to the applicants, who sought justice in Strasbourg, but were sent back to their domestic authorities against whose (in)action they had complained, and thus whether it fulfilled its purpose, is yet to be seen. It will have successfully served its purpose if those applicants, whose applications the Court resolved not to examine, have received any tangible satisfaction at the domestic level. It is reported that today, with four years having passed since the adoption of the judgment in Burmych and Others , there are more indications to the contrary. Be that as it may, the above-mentioned “reassessment of the situation” by the Court has not yet taken place.
But this is not my point here.
8. My point – pertinent to the present case – is that, as was rightly pointed out by the seven dissenters in Burmych and Others (Judges Yudkivska, Sajó, Bianku, Karakaş, De Gaetano, Laffranque and Motoc), that judgment was one of judicial policy . The approach of the dissenters (which, in my reading, underlies their whole joint dissenting opinion) is that, as a matter of principle, judicial policy considerations cannot be a substitute for legal reasoning and, consequently, a judgment based on judicial policy considerations alone is per se incompatible with the “legal interpretation of human rights” (see paragraph 1 of their opinion).
Ideally, yes. In real life, it depends. In an ideal world, judgments indeed should be substantiated solely or at least primarily by legal argument. But the world is not a perfect place. When one proclaims the august, majestic maxim that fiat iustitia, pereat mundus , one should also ask oneself: what would iustitia be in a mundus which periit ? What sense would iustitia make in such a mundus ? Would it make any practical sense at all? And would it be at all possible?
In Burmych and Others the Court considered that it was left with no choice other than to depart from the ideal(istic) standards of application-processing and to disengage itself from thousands of potentially meritorious applications, the examination of which would have paralysed its activities, while still providing some (even if not, as it seems to have turned out, efficient) redress procedure to the applicants at the domestic level. The Court reasoned that any alternative would have been worse. If Burmych and Others was not legally justifiable, then it was at least explicable and therefore defensible from the standpoint of the pressing need to secure the broader mission of the Court. That course was taken grudgingly, nolens volens , the Court being cognisant of the possibility of fallouts of all sorts.
9. It must be noted that the Burmych and Others judgment, just like the pilot judgments, does not contain the “no need to examine” (or its twin sister “not necessary to examine”) formula. Nowhere in the whole text. The Court did not see the complaints which it resolved not to examine as undeserving, i.e. not requiring examination. Not at all. Rather, it considered that those complaints merited examination, but could not be effectively examined by the Court in those circumstances. It struck the unexamined applications out of its list of cases pursuant to Article 37 § 1 (c) and transmitted them to the Committee of Ministers “in order for them to be dealt with in the framework of the general measures of execution of the [relevant, unimplemented] pilot judgment” (point 4 of the operative part). Instead of using the formula “no need to examine”, the Court ratiocinated as to “whether it [was] justified to continue to examine [those] applications” (§ 175), i.e. employed the exact wording of Article 37 § 1 (c). But even the word “justified”, perhaps because it has a connotation of justice, the latter not being merely a formal legal term, does not appear in the operative part of the Burmych and Others judgment.
10. What makes the Burmych and Others precedent so pertinent to the present case is that in that judgment the Court legitimised judicial policy as the principal or, rather, the sole ground for one of its judgments. And it not only decided to refrain from examining the respective complaints, but also openly and transparently conceptualised that decision. Whoever reproaches the Court for that unclogging of its docket, at least cannot reproach it for being evasive as to the reasons underlying that decision. From then on, the Court’s resolve to leave certain complaints unexamined in principle can be substantiated – if not duly legally reasoned, then at least factually explained – by referring to judicial policy considerations pertaining to very exceptional circumstances occurring in the realm of real life, not in that of pure law . Such a course is, to put it mildly, not a neat one from the purely legal(istic) perspective. But now it is part of the Court’s case-law. Needless to say that the circumstances in which the Court’s recourse to this method is defensible must be exceptional, indeed extraordinary.
II
11. The pilot judgments and the Burmych and Others precedent concern non-examination of certain complaints (applications) in very exceptional situations. However, the Court routinely, having examined one or several complaints, resolves not to examine certain “other” complaints raised in the same application.
12. In particular situations the “no need to examine” approach is legally tenable and is legitimately professed by the Court. This is so when the “other” complaints, although formulated as separate, are interrelated, as they overlap with the complaint(s) already examined in that case. They overlap, because they either share the same factual background or invoke such provisions of the Convention which are interrelated. The overlapping of one or another kind allows or even requires the Court to treat such complaints as raising the same legal issue and not requiring their re ‑ examination from yet another angle, once that issue has already been examined from one angle, factual or legal.
13. A “factual overlap” of the complaints may prompt the Court to resolve that it would be pragmatic, and in that sense justified, not to examine anew what is essentially the same complaint, and that non ‑ examination would not be to the detriment of the applicant or of the development of Convention law.
The Court uses various techniques to establish, and various phraseologies to designate, this “factual overlap”. Those techniques and phraseologies are so diverse that it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to arrange them in any typology. Here are a couple of very recent examples from their infinite variety. In Dareskizb Ltd. v. Armenia (no. 61737/08, § 93, 21 September 2021, not yet final), the Court decided that, having regard to its findings under Article 6 § 1 that the applicant company had been denied access to a court, it was “not necessary” to examine whether, in that case, there had been a violation of that Article also as regards the composition of that court. In C. v. Croatia (no. 80117/17, § 81, 8 October 2020), which concerned the right of a child to be heard in custody proceedings and the need to appoint a special guardian ad litem to protect the child’s interests, the Court held that the combination of flawed representation and the failure to duly present and hear the applicant’s views in the proceedings had irremediably undermined the decision-making process in the case and that obviated “the need ... to examine whether the applicant’s best interests were properly assessed by adopting the decision to grant custody to his father without any preparation or adaptation period or whether the enforcement of that decision had been compatible with Article 8”.
14. A typical example of a “legal overlap” is the interrelatedness of ostensibly separate complaints, by which the Court is requested to assess the same factual situation under two different provisions of the Convention, one of which subsumes (or absorbs) the other at least in part, e.g. under Article 6 § 1 and Article 13, respectively as lex specialis and lex generalis ; or Article 11, lex specialis , and Article 10, lex generalis . If a violation of the Convention based on its special provision is found, the re ‑ examination of the same matter under a general provision would normally be redundant.
15. In deciding whether to take that self-restricting course, the Court has a discretion that is not narrow. The case-law in which the second, third, etc., of the overlapping complaints are left unexamined is abundant.
In such cases the formula “no need to examine” (or “not necessary to examine”) means exactly what it says on the tin. It does not mislead or deceive, for it adequately represents the Court’s approach and reasons behind its resolve not to examine certain complaints.
16. In parallel, the formula “no need to examine” has been employed also in such instances where the examination of the applicants’ complaints clearly merited examination.
Roughly, all such cases in which the formula in question is employed fall into one of three categories.
17. The first category includes the politically sensitive cases, in which an applicant complains under Article 18. It happens that the Court, having found a violation of a Convention provision, nevertheless decides that it is “not necessary” to examine whether that violation resulted from a “hidden agenda”. If this question is answered in the affirmative (which is often too evident), this could trigger the formal finding of a violation of Article 18. This should be all the more so where the Court has found violations of not one but of several Convention provisions.
One example (indeed one out of many) of such regrettable over ‑ reluctance to examine the applicants’ well-founded complaints under Article 18 would be Kasparov and Others v. Russia (no. 2) (no. 51988/07, 13 December 2016), where the Court found violations of Articles 5 § 1, 6 § 1 and 11, which, in the Court’s own words, “had the effect of preventing and discouraging [the applicants] and others from ... actively engaging in opposition politics”. Then the Court pulled the brake. It concluded that “in view of this” it was “not necessary to examine whether ... there has been a violation of Article 18” (§ 55).
Such evasive judgments have been adopted in some politically sensitive cases against Russia and Turkey. Regarding Turkey (which is the respondent State in the present case), one could mention, for example, Şahin Alpay v. Turkey (no. 16538/17, 20 March 2018), Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey (no. 13237/17, 20 March 2018), or Atilla Taş v. Turkey (no. 72/17, 19 January 2021). I have made clear my disagreement with that approach in my partly dissenting opinions in Sabuncu v. Turkey (no. 23199/17, 10 November 2020) and Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey (no. 13252/17, 13 April 2021).
Yet, here this matter is touched upon for the sake of comprehensiveness only. The applicants in the present case did not complain under Article 18. This category of “undeserving” complaints therefore can be put aside.
18. The second category of the Court’s indisposition to the examination of duly substantiated complaints includes the cases which are, so to say, more mundane – in that sense that they are not related to alleged ulterior political motives prohibited by Article 18. These are not instances where the non-examination of the complaints is justified owing to their “factual” or “legal overlapping”. They are left without examination solely because the Court has so decided , without providing (at least not explicitly) any reasons for such a course and often without such legitimate reasons being in place at all. The Court justifies this by the fact that it has already examined some of the applicant’s complaints (and, as a rule, has found violations of some Convention provisions), so, bluntly put, it should be enough.
In such cases, the (in)famous Câmpeanu formula is employed. I refer to the case of Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu ([GC], no. 47848/08, 17 July 2014). That judgment gave the name to the formula in question, for it was that judgment in which this approach was consolidated. The formula goes that the Court, having examined certain “main” legal questions raised by the applicants, leaves the “remaining” complaints unexamined. It is as if a dentist says to his patient: “I fixed the big holes, so please do not overburden me also with small holes, for you will survive somehow”. The examination of the “main” legal questions ostensibly justifies the non-examination of the others, even if they are not interrelated with those actually examined.
Like the Burmych and Others solution, the Câmpeanu formula stems from a certain pragmatism in such situations, where the Court has to economise its human, time and other resources, and the respective judicial policy considerations. Even so, Burmych and Others was adopted in a situation which hardly anyone would deny was a truly exceptional one. In that judgment, the Court’s stance is explained in great detail. One would find not the slightest trace of such open and detailed explanation either in Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu or in other judgments where the Câmpeanu formula is employed, in fact copy-pasted. That formula has become self-justifying. The seven dissenters in Burmych and Others criticised that judgment as being adopted for the sake of “momentary judicial convenience” (§ 39 of the joint dissenting opinion). Although there is a grain of truth – and not a tiny one at that – in such a characterisation, I would be quite reluctant to follow, at least to the end, that criticism regarding Burmych and Others itself, because, contrary to the assertions of those colleagues, that decision in fact did have something to do with “judicial economy, judicial efficiency, or the Brighton philosophy”. But I think that this characterisation would indeed be congenial if applied to the Câmpeanu -type (non-)findings. There is nothing behind the Câmpeanu formula, except mere “momentary judicial convenience”. Perhaps too momentary.
Luckily, the Câmpeanu formula is not accepted as a normal, justifiable judicial practice by all judges of the Court. On this I refer to Judge Pastor Vilanova’s partly dissenting opinion in Popov and Others v. Russia (no. 44560/11, 27 November 2018), Judge Bošnjak’s partly dissenting opinion in Petukhov v. Ukraine (no. 2) (no. 41216/13, 12 March 2019), and my own partly dissenting opinion in the latter case. There is therefore some hope, however slim, that one day the Câmpeanu formula may be abandoned. But that may be only my wishful thinking.
19. The third category of cases in which the Court decides not to examine certain admissible “other” complaints includes judgments where the Court’s resolve not to examine them, because there is “no need” to do so, is not accompanied by any explicit, even if succinct, reasoning, which would at least somehow explain its self-restraint to the readership. Not even is the “main legal question” argument provided, as in Câmpeanu -type cases. This does not mean, in and of itself, that the non-examination would not be possible to justify. The problem is that readers are left to find out for themselves whether the Court’s determination not to examine those complaints is justified owing to their overlapping with the complaints already examined or is a result of the Court’s fiat .
Sometimes it is one, sometimes the other.
III
20. When thoroughly compared with previous solutions, the present case does not fall into any of the above-provided types of termination of the examination of admissible complaints.
I begin by comparing the present case with the cases in which pilot judgments have been adopted or which, like the very exceptional case of Burmych and Others , are related to an earlier pilot judgment. Then I will turn to the comparison of the present case with those in which the examination of “other” complaints was terminated on the basis that, in the Court’s own words, it was “not necessary”. I leave aside Article 18 cases, because, as already mentioned, the applicants in the present case did not complain under that Article. However, two other categories, the second and the third, merit at least a sentence or two. After that I will look into whether the present case bears any resemblance with those in which the examination of “other” complaints was terminated owing to the overlapping of the “undeserving” complaints with those already examined.
21. Firstly, the present judgment is not a pilot judgment. It does not mention any systemic (structural) problem, identified by the Court, in respect of which the respondent State must adopt any general measures rectifying the situation at the domestic level, and the examination of the relevant complaints has not been adjourned until the adoption of such measures; the Court has merely refused to examine them.
In addition, the complaints left unexamined in the present case are not those not yet communicated to the respondent Government. They were all duly communicated; therefore, even if this judgment had been a pilot judgment, the Court should have continued to examine them under the normal procedure. For the adjournment in the pilot-judgment procedure applies to complaints raised by “similar” applications, not those which have been submitted in precisely that case.
22. Nor does the present judgment bear any relation to a previous pilot judgment. The substantiation of the Court’s resolve to leave hundreds of well-reasoned applications unexamined, as provided in paragraph 98 of the judgment, refers to Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) ([GC], no. 14305/17, 22 December 2020), Alparslan Altan v. Turkey (no. 12778/17, 16 April 2019) and Baş v. Turkey (no. 66448/17, 3 March 2020 ) as the judgments in which legal issues raised by complaints left unexamined have been “addressed for the most part”. This is true. And yet, “for the most part” means “not all”. Moreover, “addressed” does not amount to the identification of a systemic (structural) problem. On top of that, those “legal issues” do not encompass the “factual issues” of the hundreds of applicants in the present case, which are at the root of their complaints. For those applicants did not apply to the Court for the reason that some “legal issues” could be “addressed” – they applied for the settlement of their “factual issues” with the domestic authorities.
23. Secondly, the present case is not a case of the Burmych and Others type. That case concerned a situation to which the Court’s approach was in many respects different from its approach to the situation examined – or, rather, not examined – in the present case. Burmych and Others clearly instructed the respondent State to implement the Court’s earlier pilot judgment, which the State had thus far failed to do. In the present case, there is nothing of that sort (and cannot be, because there is no related earlier pilot judgment). In Burmych and Others , the Court transmitted the non-examined applications – and thus the supervision over the State’s progress or lack thereof – to the Committee of Ministers. There is nothing of the kind in this case (and cannot be for the same reason). In Burmych and Others a possibility of reassessment of the situation is postulated. There is not a hint of anything like that in the present judgment.
Thus there is one essential difference between the present case and Burmych and Others . Burmych and Others may be figuratively compared to such necessary surgical amputation of a limb, where not only the person’s life is saved and, in addition, the hospital is sheltered from destruction, but also the ablated limb is replaced with a kind of prosthesis, however badly functioning, and the person is promised that one day the surgeon may revisit his condition. The present judgment rather looks like such an amputation where the loss of limb was not replaced by any surrogate, the surgeon sent the patient home for unattended treatment by someone who had allegedly inflicted the injuries on him, closed the hospital from within, and bade him farewell.
24. Furthermore, as mentioned above, Burmych and Others does not speak at all of complaints that do not require examination. The “no need to examine” formula is not used in that judgment – unlike in the present one.
25. Last but not least, in Burmych and Others the applications were struck out of the Court’s list of cases. In the present case they were not struck out – they were merely left unexamined. It is true that I do not find any realistic counter-arguments which would allow me to disagree with the majority that in the present case, like in Burmych and Others , there was a pressing need for the Court to depart from the ideal(istic) standards of application-processing so that the broader mission of the Court could be secured.
26. I therefore do not find the reference in paragraph 98 to Burmych and Others , very bare and thus unqualified as it is, to be particularly apt for the present situation. That judgment could certainly be referred to – but perhaps with more provisos, i.e. with considerations not only of the similarities between the situations (“constantly growing inflow of applications”), but of the difference in the Court’s approach to them. The reference as it stands now does not strengthen the reasoning – it weakens it. For none of the safeguards employed in that 2017 case have been imported into the present judgment. The “ mutatis mutandis ” caveat does not help. It only disguises the fact that the only resemblance of this judgment to Burmych and Others is that the Court has adopted it also under the duress of reality, in which it has been left with no other choice, if the long-term effectiveness of the Convention machinery is to be ensured.
27. On the other hand, when compared to Burmych and Others , the present judgment is more applicant-friendly in the sense that the applicants have won at least on one front: a violation of Article 5 § 1 has been found on account of the unlawfulness of their initial pre-trial detention. Not enough, but the five applicants in Burmych and Others did not receive even that.
28. I turn now to the cases in which the Court has substantiated the non-examination of “other” complaints by resorting to the formula “no need to examine” (or “not necessary to examine”).
29. Regarding the cases falling into the second above-mentioned category of employment of the formula “no need to examine”, the present case is fundamentally different, because the Câmpeanu formula is not used in this judgment. In fact, hardly anyone would say that in this judgment the “main” legal issues have been examined or that those not examined can be labelled as “secondary” in any sense.
30. As to the third above-mentioned category of cases, the difference between them and the present one is also essential, because in this judgment an explanation is provided as to why the “other” complaints are left unexamined. Whether or not that explanation will be accepted as satisfactory by the applicants and the broader readership is another matter.
31. It remains to be seen whether the unexamined complaints could be seen as overlapping with those actually examined.
But I am happy to be dispensed from the need to address this point, because this has been done by Judge Koskelo in her concurring opinion, joined by Judge Ranzoni. There it is convincingly shown that there is no overlapping of complaints. Indeed, the finding of a violation of Article 5 on account of a lack of basis in domestic law for the applicants’ detention does not, in and of itself, imply that there has also been a violation of Article 5 § 1 (c), or that there has been no such violation.
In order to answer that question the applicants’ situation would have to be examined from the angle of Article 5 § 1 (c).
IV
32. To sum up, there clearly is a need to examine the complaints left without examination in the present case – even though in its operative part the Court has stated that there is no such need.
This is why I see point 5 of the operative part as misleading.
33. What is more, the said need is a pressing one, particularly in view of the fact that, as can be seen from the concurring opinion of my distinguished colleague, one could presume that more than just a few of the complaints submitted in the present case under Article 5 § 1 (c) might be very well founded, in the light of such cases as Alparslan Altan v. Turkey and Baş v. Turkey (both cited above) and the circumstances transpiring from them. I would only add that, on the balance of probabilities, the presumption that there was no sufficient factual basis for the detention of at least some of the applicants is not at all futile, especially given the fact that the applicants so massively detained without a requisite legal basis were judges and prosecutors.
34. The decision not to examine the lion’s share of the complaints is an acknowledgment of the limits to the Court’s capacity in the face of the massive influx of applications. The reference to “judicial policy” (paragraph 98) means that the non-examination of complaints is determined not by any tenets of any Articles of the Convention, but by such reality, against which usual legal institutional and procedural mechanisms are helpless, unless the Court allows itself the dubious luxury of extending the examination of these complaints for at least a decade (but more likely for even longer) or (another most unattractive alternative) to postpone the examination of other meritorious complaints, at least those against the same State.
In that context it should be mentioned that today there are thousands of cases pending against Turkey which concern detentions and criminal convictions handed down in the aftermath of the 2016 attempted coup d’état in that State. Every week their number increases by scores. The Court is in fact inundated with cases related to those events. In addition to that tsunami, there is a yet larger pool of pending unrelated cases against Turkey.
35. In such circumstances, the decision not to examine the complaints that consume the most time, effort and other resources is the only pragmatic way out. From the purely legal(istic) perspective, it is not a satisfactory one, and not easily defensible. But it can be explained by reference to reality . That decision is not a judicial fiat . That explanation is provided here in paragraph 98. It is fairly stated at the end of that paragraph that the Court “ decides not to examine the applicants’ remaining complaints under Article 5” (emphasis added), and that that decision has been adopted within the “exceptional context” of the case. There is not the slightest hint about the “remaining” complaints not meriting examination (“no need to examine”) – only the grudging acknowledgment of the impracticality and inappropriateness of such examination in the face of the need to ensure the Court’s overall long-standing mission. This is an expediency justification – not a fully-fledged justification in the purely legal sense, perhaps not in the moral sense either, but still some justification of the untoward, intrusive choice, where all alternatives were worse. And, as has been shown, since Burmych and Others judicial policy considerations in principle may provide some substantiation, and in that sense some justification, for the Court’s decision to leave certain complaints unexamined in certain extraordinary circumstances. This judgment is the application of that methodological principle, inapplicable in normal circumstances, but already entrenched in the Court’s case-law.
36. Whatever the explanation in paragraph 98, the “no need to examine” formula employed in point 5 of the operative part virtually brings it to naught. The findings of the operative part should be read in conjunction with the reasoning leading to them. But this particular finding does not correspond, either in letter or in spirit, to the explanation provided in paragraph 98. This is why I did not vote for it, even though I agree with the outcome of the non-examination of the “remaining” complaints.
37. What happened is that the Chamber took the standard formula (as shown, already used too indiscriminately in a number of cases) and applied it in the most non-standard situation – one never encountered before.
For the situation faced by the Court in the present case is unprecedented . It therefore commands an unprecedented solution. Usual tools would not work. That has been explained in paragraph 98 – and abandoned in point 5 of the operative part. But when a judgment is adopted, it is not the paragraphs of the reasoning part that are voted on, but the points of the operative part.
I cannot cease to wonder why four years ago the Grand Chamber found an adequate way of referring to the exceptionality of the situation in the operative part of Burmych and Others , whilst the Chamber has not followed the Grand Chamber’s example when formulating point 5 of the operative part of the present judgment.
V
38. There is a risk that some may read this judgment, by which so many complaints of so many applicants have been denied examination, as a signal that a member State can escape responsibility for violating the Convention en masse , since the Court may be flooded with complaints against that State to such an extent that it becomes unable to cope with them and decides not to examine them.
To be frank: if a regime decides to go rogue, it should do it in a big way . And if responsibility can be escaped by “doing it big”, why not give it a try?
39. Recently the Court dealt with an attempt to drastically increase the number of applications to the Court, unambiguously aimed at causing it to become “congested, saturated and flooded” and at “paralysing its operations” ( Zambrano v. France (dec.), no. 41994/21, § 36, 21 September 2021). In that case it was noted that the right of application was being abused by applicants pursuing a strategy of flooding the Court with a tsunami of applications and thus with the aim of paralysing it.
40. But what if a similar strategy is pursued not by a group of applicants, whatever their motives may be, but by the Government of a member State, seeking to escape responsibility for violations of the Convention?
The question remains, and even becomes more pertinent: can the course adopted in this case be adopted again in an increasing number of cases? How many times can this be before such situations are no longer regarded as “exceptional”?
41. To conclude, the situation encountered by the Court in the present case is indeed unprecedented and exceptional by all standards applicable hitherto, or at best – or, rather, worst – is comparable only to Burmych and Others . But a similar exceptionality in principle can be “repeated”. Thus, as in addition to this exceptional situation there may be others , a remedy or safeguard, or counterbalance must be found – and applied. Needless to say, that remedy or safeguard, or counterbalance, cannot and must not be judicial.
To that effect, I can but agree with Judge Koskelo that “[a]ny further conclusions remain for other bodies to consider”.
VI
42. I follow Judge Koskelo’s remarks as to the dubious categorisation, in Turkish law, of the offences allegedly committed by the applicants in the present case as “personal offences”. The contradiction between the judges and prosecutors allegedly receiving instructions from the supposedly illegal organisation’s hierarchy, on the one hand, and their alleged membership in that organisation being categorised as a “personal offence”, on the other, is striking. Indeed, “such an interpretation of domestic law appears neither reasonable nor consistent with the Convention requirements of foreseeability and legal certainty”.
43. In this context, I must admit that I should have been more critical in Baş (cited above), where the Chamber, of which I was part, stated that “it [was] not for the Court to determine into which category of offences the applicant’s alleged conduct [fell]” (§ 158).
Perhaps it was. Or at least that statement had to be accompanied by an appropriate proviso.
44. Finally, I seize this opportunity to admit that today I would also differently assess some of the other complaints in Baş , namely those under Article 5 § 4, regarding the restriction of Mr Baş’s access to the investigation file and the alleged lack of independence and impartiality of the magistrates’ courts.
Of course, this confession is post factum , but still offers some relief.
APPENDIX
No.
Application no.
Case name
Lodged on
Applicant Year of Birth
Represented by
Applicant’s status at the time of pre-trial detention
1.
75805/16
Turan v. Turkey
24/11/2016
Ersin TURAN 1983
Bilal Eren MASKAN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
2.
75794/16
DemirtaÅŸ v. Turkey
30/11/2016
Hasan DEMÄ°RTAÅž 1989
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
3.
6556/17
Kaşıkçı v. Turkey
20/01/2017
Muhammet Ali KAŞIKÇI 1979
Gülşen ZENGİN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
4.
11888/17
Küçük v. Turkey
06/01/2017
Bekir KÜÇÜK 1974
Sariye YEŞİL TOZKOPARAN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
5.
12991/17
Erel v. Turkey
04/01/2017
Kemalettin EREL 1972
Karar Koray ATAK
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
6.
13875/17
Polater v. Turkey
09/01/2017
Yusuf Ziya POLATER 1983
Ä°smail GÃœLER
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
7.
14126/17
Çetin v. Turkey
06/01/2017
İlker ÇETİN 1970
Semih ERKEN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
8.
15011/17
Ulupınar v. Turkey
02/02/2017
Aziz ULUPINAR 1982
Rukiye COÅžGUN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
9.
15048/17
Karademir v. Turkey
19/01/2017
Mehmet KARADEMÄ°R 1971
Karar Koray ATAK
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
10.
15066/17
Kılınç v. Turkey
16/01/2017
Bahadır KILINÇ 1972
Hanife Ruveyda KILINÇ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
11.
15098/17
Altıntaş v. Turkey
02/02/2017
Yusuf ALTINTAÅž 1975
Rukiye COÅžGUN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
12.
15124/17
Ulupınar v. Turkey
19/01/2017
Atilla ULUPINAR 1968
Pınar BAŞBUĞA
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
13.
15290/17
Dalkılıç v. Turkey
17/01/2017
Erdem DALKILIÇ 1978
Elvan BAÄž CANBAZ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
14.
15494/17
Hamurcu v. Turkey
16/01/2017
Bayram HAMURCU 1989
Zehra KILIÇ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
15.
28551/17
CihangiroÄŸlu v. Turkey
29/03/2017
Bircan CÄ°HANGÄ°ROÄžLU 1973
Mehmet Fatih İÇER
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
16.
28570/17
Miralay v. Turkey
16/01/2017
Necati MÄ°RALAY 1980
Metin GÜÇLÜ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
17.
29073/17
Mercan v. Turkey
05/06/2018
Halil MERCAN 1985
Ä°hsan MAKAS
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
18.
31217/17
Efe v. Turkey
22/03/2017
Metin EFE 1976
Merve Elif GÃœRACAR
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
19.
33987/17
Kayı v. Turkey
17/01/2017
Halil Ä°brahim KAYI 1974
Rıza ALBAY
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
20.
34014/17
Kılıç v. Turkey
24/03/2017
Erdal KILIÇ 1974
Tufan YILMAZ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
21.
34028/17
Yılmaz v. Turkey
23/03/2017
Serdar YILMAZ 1983
Tufan YILMAZ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
22.
34357/17
Gündüz v. Turkey
18/04/2017
Kasım GÜNDÜZ 1990
Elif Nurbanu OR
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
23.
36845/17
Ağrı v. Turkey
10/01/2017
UÄŸur AÄžRI 1978
Yasemin BAL
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
24.
39593/17
Köksal v. Turkey
22/03/2017
Mustafa KÖKSAL 1978
Emre AKARYILDIZ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
25.
40053/17
Gölyeri v. Turkey
16/05/2017
Murat GÖLYERI 1980
Merve Elif GÃœRACAR
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
26.
40097/17
Çokmutlu v. Turkey
05/05/2017
Metin ÇOKMUTLU 1983
Arife ASLAN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
27.
40277/17
Evren v. Turkey
28/03/2017
Enver EVREN 1977
Fatih DÖNMEZ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
28.
40565/17
Özen v. Turkey
15/03/2017
Gökhan ÖZEN 1988
Mustafa TEMEL
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
29.
40937/17
Kaya v. Turkey
27/02/2017
Ömer KAYA 1980
Merve Elif GÃœRACAR
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
30.
41286/17
AydoÄŸmuÅŸ v. Turkey
31/03/2017
Tahir AYDOÄžMUÅž 1981
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
31.
41525/17
Özkan v. Turkey
13/04/2017
Mustafa ÖZKAN 1983
Osman BAÅžER
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
32.
41770/17
Örer v. Turkey
07/04/2017
Vedat ÖRER 1973
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
33.
41772/17
Tosun v. Turkey
29/12/2016
Tahsin TOSUN 1980
Ä°hsan MAKAS
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
34.
41886/17
Alkan v. Turkey
06/04/2017
Gökhan ALKAN 1989
Fatma Aybike ÇINARGİL ŞAN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
35.
42314/17
Tosun v. Turkey
18/04/2017
Kenan TOSUN 1987
Ä°hsan MAKAS
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
36.
43668/17
Teke v. Turkey
20/03/2017
Hasan Ali TEKE 1988
Sultan TEKE SOYDİNÇ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
37.
43681/17
Koçak v. Turkey
03/04/2017
ÇETİN KOÇAK 1980
Arzu BEYAZIT
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
38.
43710/17
Deliveli v. Turkey
31/03/2017
Hasan DELÄ°VELÄ° 1978
Emre AKARYILDIZ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
39.
43715/17
Aydın v. Turkey
04/04/2017
Zafer AYDIN 1980
Emre AKARYILDIZ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
40.
43733/17
Åžam v. Turkey
09/05/2017
Abdullah ÅžAM 1981
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
41.
43753/17
Eken v. Turkey
09/05/2017
Ä°smail EKEN 1976
Murat EKEN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
42.
44833/17
Yalvaç v. Turkey
02/05/2017
İbrahim YALVAÇ 1988
Arife ASLAN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
43.
44867/17
Güvenç v. Turkey
24/05/2017
İsmail GÜVENÇ 1985
Cahit ÇİFTÇİ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
44.
44881/17
Kızıl v. Turkey
22/05/2017
Bahtiyar KIZIL 1986
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
45.
44907/17
Yalım v. Turkey
03/05/2017
Cemalettin YALIM 1971
Hasan Celil GÜNENÇ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
46.
45079/17
Danış v. Turkey
11/04/2017
Muhammed Arif DANIÅž 1986
Cahit ÇİFTÇİ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
47.
45080/17
Akgül v. Turkey
04/05/2017
Mustafa AKGÃœL 1973
Kürşat Orhan ŞIMŞEK
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
48.
45129/17
Bahadır v. Turkey
23/06/2017
Mehmet BAHADIR 1976
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
49.
46907/17
KurÅŸun v. Turkey
20/02/2017
Ömer Faruk KURŞUN 1977
Mehmet ARI (not lawyer)
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
50.
46938/17
TufanoÄŸlu v. Turkey
23/03/2017
Ä°shak TUFANOÄžLU 1987
Regaip DEMÄ°R
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
51.
47039/17
Acar v. Turkey
22/03/2017
Gürcan ACAR 1966
Tufan YILMAZ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
52.
47043/17
Güven v. Turkey
24/03/2017
Saban GÃœVEN 1975
Tufan YILMAZ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
53.
47050/17
ToptaÅŸ v. Turkey
16/03/2017
Sungur Alp TOPTAÅž 1991
Sultan TEKE SOYDINÇ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
54.
48156/17
Demir v. Turkey
04/05/2017
Åženol DEMÄ°R 1979
Rukiye COÅžGUN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
55.
48162/17
Özgeci v. Turkey
08/05/2017
Erhan ÖZGECİ 1981
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
56.
48592/17
Kaya v. Turkey
04/05/2017
Osman KAYA 1983
Özcan DUYGULU
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
57.
48704/17
Atça v. Turkey
29/03/2017
Zekeriya ATÇA 1980
Ahmet KARAHAN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
58.
48724/17
Åženkal v. Turkey
28/03/2017
Yılmaz ŞENKAL 1969
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
59.
48755/17
Çetin v. Turkey
08/05/2017
Sadi ÇETİN 1984
Muhammed ÇETİN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
60.
48776/17
Genç v. Turkey
08/05/2017
Durmuş Ali GENÇ 1970
Rukiye COÅžGUN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
61.
48803/17
Türkmen v. Turkey
08/05/2017
Ali TÃœRKMEN 1982
Nilgün ARI
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
62.
49227/17
Berber v. Turkey
16/06/2017
Ä°dris BERBER 1977
Mehmet Fatih İÇER
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
63.
49233/17
Öğütalan v. Turkey
24/03/2017
Ersin ÖĞÜTALAN 1987
Sefanur BOZGÖZ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
64.
49455/17
Uluca v. Turkey
28/03/2017
Ä°hsan ULUCA 1966
UÄŸur ALTUN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
65.
49468/17
Aydemir v. Turkey
04/05/2017
Åžinasi Levent AYDEMÄ°R 1981
Necati TORUN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
66.
49509/17
Salman v. Turkey
09/05/2017
OÄŸuz SALMAN 1976
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
67.
49880/17
Atlı v. Turkey
31/03/2017
Ragıp ATLI 1974
Zülküf ARSLAN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
68.
49902/17
Kurt v. Turkey
22/03/2017
Levent KURT 1969
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
69.
52776/17
Ölmez v. Turkey
14/03/2018
Hayati ÖLMEZ 1980
Rukiye COÅžGUN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
70.
54540/17
Beydili v. Turkey
14/07/2017
Hasan BEYDÄ°LÄ° 1983
Ä°mdat BERKSOY
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
71.
54553/17
Aras v. Turkey
21/07/2017
Yunus ARAS 1988
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
72.
54899/17
Kökçam v. Turkey
20/02/2017
Mustafa KÖKÇAM 1961
Ahmet Faruk ACAR
Member of Supreme Administrative Court
73.
55003/17
Çağlar v. Turkey
26/05/2017
Sait ÇAĞLAR 1970
Fatma Zarife TUNÇ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
74.
55057/17
Var v. Turkey
19/04/2017
Selim VAR 1976
Tufan YILMAZ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
75.
58516/17
Giden v. Turkey
03/02/2017
Yıldıray GİDEN 1983
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
76.
59572/17
Özgelen v. Turkey
11/04/2017
Mustafa Safa ÖZGELEN 1964
Elif Nurbanu OR
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
77.
60292/17
DoÄŸan v. Turkey
03/02/2017
Mustafa DOÄžAN 1980
Mehmet ÇAVDAR
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
78.
60302/17
Karslı v. Turkey
08/02/2017
Hacı Serhat KARSLI 1983
Cahit ÇİFTÇİ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
79.
60326/17
Altun v. Turkey
10/01/2017
Hakan ALTUN 1976
Tufan YILMAZ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
80.
60387/17
Hotalak v. Turkey
24/06/2017
Yusuf HOTALAK 1985
Harun IÅžIK
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
81.
61123/17
Öztürk v. Turkey
14/08/2017
Burhanettin ÖZTÜRK 1975
Åžeyma GÃœNEÅž
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
82.
61232/17
Gürkan v. Turkey
19/06/2017
Åžeref GÃœRKAN 1972
Önder ÖZDERYOL
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
83.
61417/17
Topal v. Turkey
23/05/2017
Orhan Birkan TOPAL 1981
Esin TOPAL
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
84.
61467/17
Hazar v. Turkey
22/05/2017
Zafer HAZAR 1974
Merve Elif GÃœRACAR
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
85.
61547/17
Günay v. Turkey
20/06/2017
Hüseyin GÜNAY 1972
Fatma HACIPAÅžALIOÄžLU
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
86.
62174/17
CoÅŸgun v. Turkey
12/05/2017
Mehmet COÅžGUN 1980
Rukiye COÅžGUN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
87.
62633/17
Kundakçı v. Turkey
30/06/2017
Mesut KUNDAKÇI 1969
Hüseyin AYGÜN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
88.
62638/17
Karanfil v. Turkey
30/06/2017
Vecdi KARANFÄ°L 1969
Hüseyin AYGÜN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
89.
62656/17
Çengil v. Turkey
30/01/2017
Birol ÇENGİL 1966
Osman ÇENGİL
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
90.
62721/17
Åžahin v. Turkey
02/02/2017
Murat ÅžAHÄ°N 1988
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
91.
62723/17
Bozkurt v. Turkey
13/02/2017
Hüseyin BOZKURT 1977
Muhterem SAYAN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
92.
62741/17
Canavcı v. Turkey
26/01/2017
Mehmet Ali CANAVCI 1978
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
93.
62761/17
Polat v. Turkey
19/05/2017
Engin POLAT 1987
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
94.
62891/17
Ekinci v. Turkey
09/06/2017
Hüseyin EKİNCİ 1969
Elkan ALBAYRAK
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
95.
62896/17
Ekinci v. Turkey
09/05/2017
Fatih EKÄ°NCÄ° 1983
Beyza Esma TUNA
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
96.
62906/17
Erol v. Turkey
10/05/2017
Muhammed Akif EROL 1970
Hasan Hüseyin EROL
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
97.
63234/17
Uzunel v. Turkey
08/06/2017
Enes UZUNEL 1986
Cahit ÇİFTÇİ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
98.
63607/17
Günay v. Turkey
08/06/2017
Mehmet GÃœNAY 1978
Meryem GÃœNAY
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
99.
63610/17
Söyler v. Turkey
29/05/2017
Serdar SÖYLER 1984
Hüseyin YILDIZ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
100.
63611/17
Can v. Turkey
27/05/2017
Fatih CAN 1977
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
101.
63621/17
Boztepe v. Turkey
25/05/2017
Ramazan BOZTEPE 1972
Merve Elif GÃœRACAR
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
102.
63708/17
Yıldız v. Turkey
30/05/2017
Enes YILDIZ 1988
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
103.
63718/17
Genç v. Turkey
01/06/2017
Yunus GENÇ 1975
Beyza Esma TUNA
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
104.
63827/17
ÅžimÅŸek v. Turkey
02/06/2017
Kemal ŞİMŞEK 1980
Muzaffer Derya ÇALIŞKAN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
105.
64036/17
Buyuran v. Turkey
04/07/2017
Hasan Gazi BUYURAN 1969
Ä°hsan MAKAS
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
106.
64499/17
Yıldırım v. Turkey
13/07/2017
Resül YILDIRIM 1969
Enes Bahadır BAŞKÖY
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
107.
64545/17
AkbaÅŸ v. Turkey
18/04/2017
Talat AKBAÅž 1970
Hamit AKBAÅž
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
108.
66287/17
Erdurmaz v. Turkey
18/03/2017
Sertkan ERDURMAZ 1983
Tufan YILMAZ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
109.
66475/17
Kaya v. Turkey
26/05/2017
Tayfun KAYA 1973
Mehmet KAYA
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
110.
66705/17
Reçber v. Turkey
24/05/2017
Suat REÇBER 1978
Ä°hsan MAKAS
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
111.
66829/17
Ãœnal v. Turkey
07/08/2017
Ãœmit ÃœNAL 1981
Recep BAKIRCI
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
112.
67664/17
Yönder v. Turkey
20/07/2017
Mehmet Murat YÖNDER 1969
Yücel ALKAN
Member of Court of Cassation
113.
68209/17
Sel v. Turkey
17/01/2017
Mehmet SEL 1976
Önder ÖZDERYOL
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
114.
69379/17
Türkmen v. Turkey
08/08/2017
Necati TÃœRKMEN 1970
Merve Elif GÃœRACAR
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
115.
69443/17
Åžafak v. Turkey
25/08/2017
Ercan ÅžAFAK 1968
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
116.
69587/17
Birsen v. Turkey
07/07/2017
Ä°smail BÄ°RSEN 1984
Ä°shak IÅžIK
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
117.
70484/17
Gelgör v. Turkey
10/08/2017
Burhan GELGÖR 1970
Ahmet ÇORUM
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
118.
71053/17
Yazgan v. Turkey
08/08/2017
Mehmet YAZGAN 1988
Özge ALTINTOP
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
119.
71056/17
Girdi v. Turkey
28/08/2017
Seyfettin GÄ°RDÄ° 1988
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
120.
72345/17
Ekici v. Turkey
25/07/2017
Barbaros Hayrettin EKÄ°CÄ° 1989
Rukiye COÅžGUN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
121.
74901/17
Çalmuk v. Turkey
06/10/2017
Hüsnü ÇALMUK 1966
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
122.
76253/17
DemirbaÅŸ v. Turkey
14/10/2017
Samed DEMÄ°RBAÅž 1982
Ä°hsan MAKAS
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
123.
79800/17
Üzgör v. Turkey
01/11/2017
İsmail ÜZGÖR 1982
Hüseyin AYGÜN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
124.
82532/17
Kılınç v. Turkey
20/11/2017
Fatih KILINÇ 1977
Cem Kaya KARATÃœN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
125.
82536/17
Say v. Turkey
20/11/2017
Mehmet SAY 1974
Zeynep Sacide SERTER
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
126.
83719/17
Kırıcı v. Turkey
27/10/2017
Muhittin KIRICI 1974
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
127.
83801/17
Uzun v. Turkey
20/11/2018
Fahri UZUN 1972
Mustafa TUNA
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
128.
83969/17
Özçelik v. Turkey
20/11/2017
Mustafa ÖZÇELİK 1979
Gülçin MOLA
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
129.
84000/17
Aydemir v. Turkey
16/10/2017
Ä°sa AYDEMÄ°R 1981
Elif Nurbanu OR
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
130.
84242/17
BabayiÄŸit v. Turkey
29/11/2017
Yusuf BABAYİĞİT 1976
Cahit ÇİFTÇİ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
131.
84617/17
Babacan v. Turkey
13/11/2017
Hüseyin Güngör BABACAN 1966
Sümeyra Betül BABACAN ALKAN
Member of Court of Cassation
132.
84631/17
Atasoy v. Turkey
24/11/2017
Habib ATASOY 1969
Fatih DÖNMEZ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
133.
537/18
Åžener v. Turkey
24/11/2017
Halil ÅžENER 1976
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
134.
1217/18
Asan v. Turkey
06/12/2017
Ä°dris ASAN 1964
Hüseyin AYGÜN
Member of Court of Cassation
135.
1226/18
Budak v. Turkey
06/12/2017
Mesut BUDAK 1969
Hüseyin AYGÜN
Member of Court of Cassation
136.
1542/18
Akkol v. Turkey
05/12/2017
Ä°smail AKKOL 1965
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
137.
6110/18
Candan v. Turkey
26/01/2018
Hasan CANDAN 1985
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
138.
6413/18
Gürakar v. Turkey
10/01/2018
Muhammed Salih GÃœRAKAR 1984
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
139.
6485/18
Akgedik v. Turkey
03/01/2018
Hasan AKGEDÄ°K 1979
Burcu HAS
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
140.
6487/18
Önal v. Turkey
18/01/2018
Yunus ÖNAL 1975
Betül Büşra ÖNAL
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
141.
6538/18
TaÅŸer v. Turkey
16/01/2018
DurmuÅŸ TAÅžER 1970
Hanife Ruveyda KILINÇ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
142.
6812/18
Varol v. Turkey
19/01/2018
Ahmet Selçuk VAROL 1973
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
143.
6948/18
Aslan v. Turkey
23/01/2018
Veysel ASLAN 1968
Merve Elif GÃœRACAR
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
144.
8332/18
Erdagöz v. Turkey
02/02/2018
Özcan ERDAGÖZ 1981
Mehmet Fatih İÇER
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
145.
8416/18
BozkuÅŸ v. Turkey
25/01/2018
Bilal BOZKUÅž 1989
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
146.
8540/18
Demir v. Turkey
16/06/2017
Ahmet DEMÄ°R 1979
Utku CoÅŸkuner SAKARYA
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
147.
8543/18
Gümüş v. Turkey
16/06/2017
Mustafa Evren GÜMÜŞ 1981
Utku CoÅŸkuner SAKARYA
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
148.
8606/18
TurÄŸut v. Turkey
27/04/2017
Muhammed Davut TURÄžUT 1990
Xavier LABBEE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
149.
9818/18
Çolaker v. Turkey
26/01/2018
Mustafa ÇOLAKER 1974
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
150.
9824/18
Kahya v. Turkey
17/01/2018
Mustafa KAHYA 1972
Merve Elif GÃœRACAR
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
151.
9880/18
H.K. v. Turkey
29/01/2018
H.K. 1972
Duygu BUDAK
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
152.
9892/18
Güven v. Turkey
30/01/2018
Aziz GÃœVEN 1989
Nur EfÅŸan DEMÄ°REL
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
153.
10030/18
Köseoğlu v. Turkey
24/01/2018
Bilal KÖSEOĞLU 1966
Hüseyin AYGÜN
Member of Court of Cassation
154.
10290/18
Çetin v. Turkey
19/09/2017
Yunus ÇETİN 1966
Cengiz VAROL
Member of Supreme Administrative Court
155.
10291/18
KaradaÄŸ v. Turkey
29/11/2017
Bilal KARADAÄž 1967
Hüseyin AYGÜN
Member of Court of Cassation
156.
10471/18
Tunçer v. Turkey
01/02/2018
Ömer TUNÇER 1983
Osman Fatih AKGÃœL
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
157.
12041/18
Yula v. Turkey
28/02/2018
Ali YULA 1982
Emre AKARYILDIZ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
158.
12574/18
Akbal v. Turkey
22/02/2018
Mehmet AKBAL 1971
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
159.
12594/18
AkdoÄŸan v. Turkey
09/02/2018
Mehmet Emin AKDOÄžAN 1981
Arzu BEYAZIT
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
160.
12629/18
ÅžimÅŸek v. Turkey
05/03/2018
Adnan ŞİMŞEK 1984
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
161.
12630/18
Dursun v. Turkey
05/03/2018
Hasan DURSUN 1981
Önder ÖZDERYOL
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
162.
13823/18
Akan v. Turkey
16/03/2018
Selim AKAN 1988
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
163.
14627/18
Akkurt v. Turkey
09/03/2018
Ä°brahim AKKURT 1984
Hüseyin AYGÜN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
164.
14849/18
Boz v. Turkey
14/02/2018
Nazım BOZ 1985
Mehmet Fatih İÇER
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
165.
16029/18
NecipoÄŸlu v. Turkey
28/03/2018
Nazmi NECÄ°POÄžLU 1972
Levent ÇEŞME
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
166.
16296/18
Gülmez v. Turkey
23/03/2018
Hüseyin GÜLMEZ 1975
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
167.
16305/18
Aydın v. Turkey
22/03/2018
Muzaffer AYDIN 1971
Merve Elif GÃœRACAR
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
168.
16324/18
Temel v. Turkey
20/03/2018
Muhammed Zeki TEMEL 1978
Emre AKARYILDIZ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
169.
16368/18
Gül v. Turkey
23/03/2018
Tevfik GÃœL 1983
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
170.
16386/18
Polat v. Turkey
02/03/2018
Halil POLAT 1984
Mehmet Fatih İÇER
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
171.
17174/18
Elibol v. Turkey
15/03/2018
Mert ELÄ°BOL 1980
Muhammet GÃœNEY
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
172.
17237/18
MertoÄŸlu v. Turkey
16/03/2018
Hakan MERTOÄžLU 1990
Hamza BARUT
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
173.
17315/18
Çetin v. Turkey
10/03/2018
Muharrem ÇETİN 1971
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
174.
17391/18
Kırım v. Turkey
13/03/2018
Kerim KIRIM 1971
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
175.
17544/18
Sönmez v. Turkey
04/04/2018
Sebati SÖNMEZ 1979
Havva ÖZEL KAPLAN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
176.
17561/18
Toprak v. Turkey
01/03/2018
Muhammet TOPRAK 1984
Duygu BUDAK
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
177.
17576/18
Gül v. Turkey
23/02/2018
Olcay GÃœL 1977
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
178.
17637/18
Ä°kiz v. Turkey
02/04/2018
DurmuÅŸ Ali Ä°KÄ°Z 1979
Enes Malik KILIÇ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
179.
17754/18
Kulak v. Turkey
23/02/2018
Sercan CoÅŸkun KULAK 1983
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
180.
17828/18
Açıkgöz v. Turkey
04/04/2018
Bilal AÇIKGÖZ 1988
Mehmet Fatih İÇER
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
181.
17837/18
Uluçay v. Turkey
10/03/2018
Ömer ULUÇAY 1987
Mücahit AYDIN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
182.
17940/18
Yılmaz v. Turkey
05/01/2018
Yavuz YILMAZ 1971
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
183.
18063/18
Aker v. Turkey
06/04/2018
Ender Yakup AKER 1986
Mehmet Fatih İÇER
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
184.
18110/18
Gül v. Turkey
11/04/2018
Veysi GÃœL 1985
Hüseyin AYGÜN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
185.
18112/18
Bozlak v. Turkey
05/04/2018
Rafetcan BOZLAK 1990
Rukiye COÅžGUN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
186.
18200/18
Sarıgüzel v. Turkey
10/04/2018
Hacı SARIGÜZEL 1982
Mehmet GÃœL
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
187.
18214/18
Ãœnal v. Turkey
20/02/2018
Sedat ÃœNAL 1982
Cahit ÇİFTÇİ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
188.
18695/18
Berber v. Turkey
30/03/2018
Selim BERBER 1976
Ahmet Aykut YILDIZ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
189.
19228/18
Çeliktaş v. Turkey
05/03/2018
Şakir ÇELİKTAŞ 1986
Burcu HAS
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
190.
19230/18
Küçük v. Turkey
05/04/2018
Yalçın KÜÇÜK 1983
Mehtap SERT
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
191.
19445/18
Özen v. Turkey
12/04/2018
Edib Hüsnü ÖZEN 1981
Mehmet MIRZA
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
192.
20548/18
Güldallı v. Turkey
20/04/2018
Ömer GÜLDALLI 1985
Ahmet ÖZGÜL
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
193.
21020/18
Metin v. Turkey
30/04/2018
Özgür METİN 1982
Ä°hsan MAKAS
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
194.
21064/18
Zengin v. Turkey
20/04/2018
Nihan ZENGÄ°N 1990
Adem KAPLAN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
195.
21890/18
Erdem v. Turkey
02/05/2018
Yılmaz ERDEM 1975
Fatma (YILMAZ) KOCAEL
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
196.
22009/18
Ünlü v. Turkey
20/04/2018
Halil ÜNLÜ 1985
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
197.
22013/18
Çakırca v. Turkey
03/05/2018
Kenan ÇAKIRCA 1983
Meryem GÃœNAY
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
198.
22033/18
Yavuz v. Turkey
24/04/2018
Yener YAVUZ 1971
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
199.
22087/18
Özen v. Turkey
27/04/2018
Murat ÖZEN 1976
Hilal YILMAZ PUSAT
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
200.
22088/18
Kaymaz v. Turkey
03/05/2018
Yusuf Samet KAYMAZ 1988
Mehmet Ertürk ERDEVİR
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
201.
22200/18
Altun v. Turkey
07/05/2018
Osman ALTUN 1972
Hüseyin AYGÜN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
202.
22205/18
Güler v. Turkey
02/05/2018
Ercan GÃœLER 1978
Emre AKARYILDIZ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
203.
22238/18
Budak v. Turkey
30/04/2018
Serhan BUDAK 1984
Burcu HAS
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
204.
23665/18
Akbaba v. Turkey
07/05/2018
Åžerafettin AKBABA 1983
Atıl KARADUMAN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
205.
23858/18
Keskin v. Turkey
10/05/2018
Özcan KESKİN 1974
Ersayın IŞIK
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
206.
24205/18
Kantar v. Turkey
04/05/2018
Ä°smail KANTAR 1976
Cahit ÇİFTÇİ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
207.
24216/18
Erkaçal v. Turkey
30/04/2018
Taner ERKAÇAL 1978
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
208.
24222/18
Çakmakçı v. Turkey
02/05/2018
Murat Hikmet ÇAKMAKÇI 1970
Fatih DÖNMEZ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
209.
24224/18
Altun v. Turkey
07/05/2018
Ali Rıza ALTUN 1978
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
210.
24227/18
Maraşlı v. Turkey
22/05/2018
Yusuf Cuma MARAÅžLI 1980
Hüseyin AYGÜN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
211.
24446/18
R.H. v. Turkey
14/05/2018
R.H. 1983
Emine Feyza ASLAN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
212.
24636/18
Vural v. Turkey
17/05/2018
Muhammed Said VURAL 1991
Esad VURAL
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
213.
24702/18
Åžahin v. Turkey
09/05/2018
Adnan ÅžAHÄ°N 1975
Ä°hsan MAKAS
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
214.
24762/18
DemirtaÅŸ v. Turkey
17/05/2018
Ä°brahim DEMÄ°RTAÅž 1969
Ali YILMAZ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
215.
24876/18
Gökçek v. Turkey
16/02/2018
Erdoğan GÖKÇEK 1969
Hüseyin AYGÜN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
216.
25037/18
Karabacak v. Turkey
24/05/2018
Orhan KARABACAK 1978
Ä°hsan Can AKMARUL
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
217.
25186/18
Özgül v. Turkey
21/05/2018
Ünver ÖZGÜL 1972
Duygu SEZEN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
218.
25195/18
KiriÅŸ v. Turkey
14/02/2018
Ahmet KÄ°RÄ°Åž 1965
Åžeyma GÃœNEÅž
Member of Court of Cassation
219.
25218/18
Kara v. Turkey
07/05/2018
Nazım KARA 1966
Ahmet KARA
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
220.
25228/18
Benli v. Turkey
18/05/2018
Esat Faruk BENLÄ° 1970
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
221.
25336/18
Ayyayla v. Turkey
23/05/2018
Hüseyin AYYAYLA 1973
Can GÃœZEL
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
222.
25370/18
Durgun v. Turkey
25/05/2018
Metin DURGUN 1969
Ali DURGUN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
223.
25880/18
Dedetürk v. Turkey
30/05/2018
Serkan DEDETÃœRK 1977
Cahit ÇİFTÇİ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
224.
26281/18
Aksoy v. Turkey
24/05/2018
Ä°smail AKSOY 1970
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
225.
26414/18
ElieyioÄŸlu v. Turkey
30/05/2018
Aydın ELİEYİOĞLU 1980
Hüseyin AYGÜN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
226.
26419/18
Özata v. Turkey
30/05/2018
Bedri ÖZATA 1981
Hüseyin AYGÜN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
227.
26530/18
Kadıoğlu v. Turkey
24/05/2018
Yasin KADIOÄžLU 1978
Hatice YILMAZ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
228.
26814/18
Yılmaz v. Turkey
22/05/2018
Sinan YILMAZ 1975
Emre AKARYILDIZ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
229.
27022/18
Çelik v. Turkey
28/05/2018
Sabır ÇELİK 1974
Hüseyin AYGÜN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
230.
27057/18
Cihangir v. Turkey
30/05/2018
Nurullah CÄ°HANGÄ°R 1973
Merve Elif GÃœRACAR
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
231.
27073/18
Çimen v. Turkey
29/05/2018
Mustafa ÇİMEN 1981
Åžeyma LÄ°MON TALUY
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
232.
27092/18
Nas Çelik v. Turkey
28/05/2018
Seval NAS ÇELIK 1979
Hüseyin AYGÜN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
233.
27542/18
Yönder v. Turkey
05/06/2018
Muhammed YÖNDER 1983
Elif Nurbanu OR
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
234.
27574/18
Bilgen v. Turkey
01/06/2018
Rasim Ä°sa BÄ°LGEN 1968
Hakan ÖZER
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
235.
27581/18
Aygör v. Turkey
03/05/2018
Dursun AYGÖR 1965
Merve Elif GÃœRACAR
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
236.
27600/18
Yalçıntaş v. Turkey
11/04/2018
Habib Hüdai YALÇINTAŞ 1972
Rukiye COÅžGUN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
237.
27611/18
Saral v. Turkey
29/05/2018
Süleyman SARAL 1974
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
238.
27998/18
Güney v. Turkey
02/06/2018
Yusuf GÃœNEY 1979
Rukiye COÅžGUN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
239.
28050/18
Karaçavuş v. Turkey
15/05/2018
Ümit KARAÇAVUŞ 1981
Aykut ÖZDEMIR
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
240.
28150/18
Yalçın v. Turkey
08/06/2018
Onur YALÇIN 1988
Mehmet SÃœRMEN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
241.
28481/18
Gödel v. Turkey
07/06/2018
Orhan GÖDEL 1971
Haydar YALÇINOĞLU
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
242.
28530/18
Ä°lgen v. Turkey
04/06/2018
Faik Ä°LGEN 1986
Nesibe Merve ARSLAN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
243.
28538/18
Çelik v. Turkey
11/06/2018
Ahmet ÇELİK 1990
Rukiye COÅžGUN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
244.
28558/18
Arslan v. Turkey
06/06/2018
Fatih ARSLAN 1984
Kadir ÃœNAL
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
245.
28636/18
Köse v. Turkey
13/04/2018
Eşref KÖSE 1974
Rukiye COÅžGUN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
246.
28690/18
Uluçay v. Turkey
07/06/2018
Ali ULUÇAY 1979
Ä°hsan MAKAS
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
247.
28739/18
Kırbaş v. Turkey
11/06/2018
SavaÅŸ KIRBAÅž 1969
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
248.
28746/18
Özcan v. Turkey
11/06/2018
Uğur ÖZCAN 1968
AyÅŸe Nur AYFER
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
249.
29587/18
OkumuÅŸ v. Turkey
11/06/2018
Ali Mazhar OKUMUÅž 1976
Mehmet Fatih İÇER
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
250.
29762/18
Özdemir v. Turkey
12/06/2018
Kadir ÖZDEMİR 1974
Ahmet KARAHAN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
251.
29931/18
Özbek v. Turkey
08/06/2018
Okan ÖZBEK 1989
Elif Nurbanu OR
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
252.
30232/18
Kızıler v. Turkey
20/06/2018
Levent KIZILER 1986
Hüseyin AYGÜN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
253.
30234/18
Turgut v. Turkey
13/06/2018
Bayram TURGUT 1974
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
254.
30267/18
BasdaÅŸ v. Turkey
20/06/2018
Mustafa BASDAÅž 1973
Hüseyin AYGÜN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
255.
30287/18
Sonay v. Turkey
18/06/2018
Suat SONAY 1978
Fatma (YILMAZ) KOCAEL
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
256.
30481/18
Alıcı v. Turkey
14/06/2018
Hasan ALICI 1976
Bünyamin TAPAR
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
257.
30497/18
Güngörmüş v. Turkey
13/06/2018
Hasan GÜNGÖRMÜŞ 1981
Muhammet GÃœNEY
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
258.
30502/18
CoÅŸar v. Turkey
19/06/2018
Ãœmit COÅžAR 1988
Elif Nurbanu OR
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
259.
30517/18
Oktar v. Turkey
18/06/2018
Mehmet OKTAR 1985
Erdem OKTAR
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
260.
31880/18
Alper v. Turkey
25/06/2018
Cafer Tayyer ALPER
Hüseyin AYGÜN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
261.
31888/18
EroÄŸlu v. Turkey
25/06/2018
Hüseyin EROĞLU 1982
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
262.
31908/18
Gülver v. Turkey
19/06/2018
Hasan GÃœLVER 1970
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
263.
32352/18
Özden v. Turkey
11/06/2018
Salih ÖZDEN 1973
Rukiye COÅžGUN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
264.
32376/18
KaracaoÄŸlu v. Turkey
25/06/2018
Hasan KARACAOÄžLU 1990
Abdil TAÅž
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
265.
32412/18
Özdemir v. Turkey
27/06/2018
Mehmet Fatih ÖZDEMİR 1985
Mehmet Yasin BUHUR
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
266.
32418/18
Temel v. Turkey
28/06/2018
Yusuf TEMEL 1990
Mustafa TEMEL
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
267.
32431/18
Kahveci v. Turkey
25/06/2018
Yusuf KAHVECÄ° 1979
Köksal YAVUZ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
268.
32449/18
Nedim v. Turkey
22/06/2018
Mercan NEDÄ°M 1985
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
269.
32599/18
Karakaya v. Turkey
25/06/2018
Murat KARAKAYA 1984
Muhammet GÃœNEY
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
270.
32605/18
Arıkan v. Turkey
25/06/2018
Ahmet ARIKAN 1972
Berivan YAKIÅžIR
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
271.
32611/18
Kadıoğlu v. Turkey
25/06/2018
Ali KADIOÄžLU 1983
Muhammet GÃœNEY
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
272.
32906/18
Güverçin v. Turkey
25/06/2018
Sezgin GÜVERÇİN 1980
Karar Koray ATAK
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
273.
32945/18
Kır v. Turkey
13/06/2018
OÄŸuzhan KIR 1974
Mehmet Fatih İÇER
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
274.
32948/18
Altın v. Turkey
22/06/2018
Erkan ALTIN 1980
Mehmet Fatih İÇER
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
275.
32972/18
Hançerkıran v. Turkey
05/07/2018
Said Serhan HANÇERKIRAN 1977
Mustafa ASLAN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
276.
32999/18
Keçeci v. Turkey
02/07/2018
Tuğrul KEÇECİ 1988
Mustafa ÖZBEK
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
277.
33007/18
EÅŸim v. Turkey
27/06/2018
Recep EŞİM 1972
Hacer SEZER
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
278.
33112/18
Saz v. Turkey
27/06/2018
Murat SAZ 1974
Ali DURGUN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
279.
33417/18
Gül v. Turkey
04/07/2018
AyÅŸe NeÅŸe GÃœL 1968
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
280.
33474/18
DoÄŸan v. Turkey
02/07/2018
Cem DOÄžAN 1980
Naim DOÄžAN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
281.
33501/18
Orhan v. Turkey
05/07/2018
Bilal ORHAN 1985
Cahit ÇİFTÇİ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
282.
33714/18
Dural v. Turkey
20/04/2018
Kasım DURAL 1981
Remziye ARSLAN KAYA
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
283.
33806/18
Söyler v. Turkey
26/04/2018
Abdülkerim Ziya SÖYLER 1979
Metin YÃœCESAN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
284.
33941/18
Kandil v. Turkey
21/03/2018
Hamit Ali KANDÄ°L 1979
Adnan AYDIN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
285.
33967/18
Özdemir v. Turkey
21/06/2018
Dursun ÖZDEMİR 1979
Rukiye COÅžGUN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
286.
34161/18
Ä°lhan v. Turkey
11/05/2018
Mehmet Ä°LHAN 1981
Merve Elif GÃœRACAR
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
287.
34165/18
Yalçınkaya v. Turkey
03/05/2018
Ömer YALÇINKAYA 1977
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
288.
34198/18
Kelam v. Turkey
27/06/2018
Ali Arslan KELAM 1977
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
289.
34207/18
Albayrak v. Turkey
06/07/2018
Bülent ALBAYRAK 1970
Ä°hsan MAKAS
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
290.
34466/18
Yıldırım v. Turkey
29/06/2018
Bülent YILDIRIM 1978
Murat YILMAZ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
291.
34538/18
Gençoğlu v. Turkey
04/07/2018
Hacer GENÇOĞLU 1990
Sultan TEKE SOYDİNÇ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
292.
34683/18
Öztürkeri v. Turkey
10/07/2018
Bekir ÖZTÜRKERİ 1989
Murat YILMAZ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
293.
35036/18
Usta v. Turkey
13/07/2018
Onur USTA 1989
Hanifi BAYRI
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
294.
35163/18
Ak v. Turkey
14/07/2018
Hasan AK 1980
Emre AKARYILDIZ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
295.
35179/18
Sil v. Turkey
10/05/2018
Ahmet SÄ°L 1985
Mehmet ARI (not lawyer)
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
296.
35181/18
Karanfil v. Turkey
31/05/2018
Kemal KARANFÄ°L 1972
Cahit ÇİFTÇİ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
297.
35328/18
Çağlayan v. Turkey
18/04/2018
Serkan ÇAĞLAYAN 1973
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
298.
35435/18
Yıldız v. Turkey
05/07/2018
Utku YILDIZ 1990
Elif Nurbanu OR
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
299.
35487/18
Ayko v. Turkey
10/07/2018
Mehmet AYKO 1990
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
300.
35910/18
Yılmaz v. Turkey
10/07/2018
Abdurrahman YILMAZ 1968
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
301.
36216/18
Alaybay v. Turkey
20/07/2018
Hüseyin ALAYBAY 1973
Özhan KURT
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
302.
36388/18
Kurt v. Turkey
11/07/2018
Saltuk BuÄŸra KURT 1979
Hüseyin AYGÜN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
303.
36471/18
Akçalı v. Turkey
26/07/2018
Tamer AKÇALI 1972
Mehmet ARI (not lawyer)
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
304.
36545/18
Arslan v. Turkey
27/07/2018
Önder ARSLAN 1983
Yener ARSLAN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
305.
36591/18
Çam v. Turkey
17/07/2018
Ali Rıza ÇAM 1971
Levent KAHYA
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
306.
36656/18
ÅžiÅŸman v. Turkey
12/07/2018
Sefa ŞİŞMAN 1978
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
307.
36666/18
Baytekin v. Turkey
03/04/2018
Ä°brahim BAYTEKÄ°N 1973
Cahit ÇİFTÇİ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
308.
36930/18
Kaya v. Turkey
03/07/2018
Mine KAYA 1969
Grégory THUAN DIT DIEUDONNÉ
Member of Court of Cassation
309.
37070/18
Maden v. Turkey
27/07/2018
Ahmet MADEN 1969
Fatma HACIPAÅžALIOÄžLU
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
310.
37257/18
Dertli v. Turkey
16/07/2018
Abdullah DERTLÄ° 1984
Emre AKARYILDIZ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
311.
37346/18
Bulut v. Turkey
20/07/2018
Hikmet BULUT 1979
Emre AKARYILDIZ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
312.
38144/18
Yırtıcı v. Turkey
31/07/2018
Asabil YIRTICI 1981
Merve Elif GÃœRACAR
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
313.
38851/18
Mangal v. Turkey
07/08/2018
Serkan MANGAL 1981
Hüseyin AYGÜN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
314.
39058/18
Cil v. Turkey
10/08/2018
Kamil CÄ°L 1977
Hüseyin AYGÜN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
315.
39092/18
Arslan v. Turkey
04/07/2018
Fatih ARSLAN 1980
Merve Elif GÃœRACAR
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
316.
39476/18
Altın v. Turkey
06/08/2018
Ömer Faruk ALTIN 1986
Hanifi BAYRI
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
317.
39755/18
Çetinkaya v. Turkey
17/08/2018
Mehmet ÇETİNKAYA 1989
Hüseyin AYGÜN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
318.
40120/18
Göçen v. Turkey
10/08/2018
Bilal GÖÇEN 1984
Zeynep Sacide SERTER
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
319.
40643/18
BabaoÄŸlu v. Turkey
02/08/2018
Hüseyin BABAOĞLU 1981
Rabia Betül KAHRAMAN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
320.
41131/18
Dedebali v. Turkey
13/08/2018
Rıza DEDEBALI 1984
Merve Elif GÃœRACAR
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
321.
41242/18
Özer v. Turkey
13/08/2018
Eyüp ÖZER 1982
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
322.
41432/18
Hamurcu v. Turkey
10/08/2018
Betül HAMURCU 1989
Zehra KILIÇ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
323.
42179/18
Solak v. Turkey
16/08/2018
Selami SOLAK 1982
Muhammet GÃœNEY
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
324.
42378/18
Karamete v. Turkey
29/08/2018
Abdullah KARAMETE 1982
Emre AKARYILDIZ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
325.
42727/18
Hatal v. Turkey
19/07/2018
Ä°brahim HATAL 1970
İsmet ÇELİK
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
326.
43052/18
Gökoğlu v. Turkey
06/08/2018
Şükrü GÖKOĞLU 1971
Rukiye COÅžGUN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
327.
44227/18
Özyılmaz v. Turkey
28/08/2018
Muhteşem ÖZYILMAZ 1989
Mehmet ÖNCÜ (not lawyer)
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
328.
44388/18
Sabay v. Turkey
13/09/2018
Dursun SABAY 1977
Hüseyin AYGÜN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
329.
45116/18
Ä°pteÅŸ v. Turkey
17/08/2018
Gültekin İPTEŞ 1967
Rukiye COÅžGUN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
330.
45362/18
Çalıkan v. Turkey
25/09/2018
Abdullah Seçil ÇALIKAN 1985
Cahit ÇİFTÇİ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
331.
45455/18
EÄŸerci v. Turkey
07/09/2018
Ahmet EÄžERCÄ° 1969
Adem KAPLAN
Member of Supreme Administrative Court
332.
45460/18
Kul v. Turkey
07/09/2018
Süleyman KUL 1966
Mehmet ÖNCÜ (not lawyer)
Member of Court of Cassation
333.
45467/18
Uslu v. Turkey
07/09/2018
Mehmet USLU 1959
Adem KAPLAN
Member of Court of Cassation
334.
45480/18
TaÅŸdan v. Turkey
07/09/2018
Mehmet Nafi TAÅžDAN 1984
Hatice YILDIZ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
335.
46203/18
Baba v. Turkey
25/09/2018
Ali Rıza BABA 1975
Mehmet Fatih İÇER
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
336.
46229/18
Buğuçam v. Turkey
21/09/2018
Ziya Bekir BUĞUÇAM 1980
Utku CoÅŸkuner SAKARYA
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
337.
46260/18
Yalçın v. Turkey
21/09/2018
Zeki YALÇIN 1974
Canan DANIÅž
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
338.
46264/18
Gençoğlu v. Turkey
26/09/2018
Mehmet GENÇOĞLU 1989
Sultan TEKE SOYDİNÇ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
339.
46414/18
Demirezici v. Turkey
26/09/2018
Mehmet Ali DEMÄ°REZÄ°CÄ° 1966
Süeda Esma ŞEN KARA
Member of Court of Cassation
340.
47130/18
Korkmaz v. Turkey
20/09/2018
Mahmut KORKMAZ 1980
Ä°hsan MAKAS
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
341.
47418/18
Sırlı v. Turkey
28/08/2018
Mustafa SIRLI 1973
Süleyman SARIBAŞ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
342.
47439/18
Çelik v. Turkey
25/09/2018
Metin ÇELİK 1983
Ramazan ZEREY
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
343.
47657/18
Musa v. Turkey
25/09/2018
Alperen MUSA 1983
Muhammet GÃœNEY
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
344.
48133/18
Yıldırım v. Turkey
03/10/2018
Bünyamin YILDIRIM 1988
Metin SÖNMEZ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
345.
48158/18
Simavlı v. Turkey
27/09/2018
Mustafa SÄ°MAVLI 1965
Süleyman Serdar BALKANLI
Member of Court of Cassation
346.
48210/18
Ak v. Turkey
04/10/2018
Mustafa AK 1977
Burcu KÃœTAHYA
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
347.
48547/18
KocabeyoÄŸlu v. Turkey
08/10/2018
Hasan Nafi KOCABEYOÄžLU 1975
Mehmet ARI (not lawyer)
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
348.
49022/18
Alçık v. Turkey
05/10/2018
Ali ALÇIK 1964
Adem KAPLAN
Member of Court of Cassation
349.
49092/18
Tutar v. Turkey
28/09/2018
Galip Tuncay TUTAR 1964
Adem KAPLAN
Member of Supreme Administrative Court
350.
49260/18
Adalı v. Turkey
02/10/2018
Ercan ADALI 1973
Mehmet ÇAVDAR
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
351.
49461/18
Kaleli v. Turkey
10/10/2018
Temel KALELÄ° 1983
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
352.
49832/18
Ince v. Turkey
12/10/2018
Hüseyin İNCE 1972
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
353.
49843/18
Yardımcı v. Turkey
11/10/2018
Mehmet Murat YARDIMCI 1971
Mehmet ARI (not lawyer)
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
354.
49846/18
Aksoy v. Turkey
11/10/2018
Muharrem AKSOY 1976
Cabir Hulusi GÃœLDEN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
355.
50052/18
Koçtekin v. Turkey
15/10/2018
Okan KOÇTEKİN 1968
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
356.
50079/18
Aydın v. Turkey
12/10/2018
Turan AYDIN 1972
Zehra KILIÇ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
357.
50343/18
Dönmez v. Turkey
10/10/2018
Bekir DÖNMEZ 1977
Deniz UYSAL
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
358.
51094/18
Alim v. Turkey
25/10/2018
Ãœmit ALIM 1979
Hüseyin AYGÜN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
359.
51105/18
Kaya v. Turkey
25/10/2018
Levent KAYA 1980
Hüseyin AYGÜN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
360.
51377/18
BaÅŸlar v. Turkey
27/10/2018
Yusuf BAÅžLAR 1981
Zehra KILIÇ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
361.
51430/18
Evğün v. Turkey
22/10/2018
Mustafa EVĞÜN 1979
Emre AKARYILDIZ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
362.
51548/18
Fırat v. Turkey
18/10/2018
Bircan FIRAT 1974
Rukiye COÅžGUN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
363.
51920/18
Ä°ren v. Turkey
26/10/2018
Muzaffer Ä°REN 1974
Hüseyin UÇAN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
364.
52171/18
YiÄŸit v. Turkey
16/10/2018
Nazım YİĞİT 1972
Ali DURGUN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
365.
52298/18
KarakuÅŸ v. Turkey
09/10/2018
Nuri KARAKUÅž 1978
Zeynep ÅžEN KARAKUÅž
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
366.
52471/18
Cambolat v. Turkey
29/10/2018
Ahmet CAMBOLAT 1979
Mehmet Fatih İÇER
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
367.
52535/18
ErmiÅŸ v. Turkey
24/10/2018
Ercan ERMÄ°Åž 1986
Duygu BUDAK
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
368.
52615/18
Vatan v. Turkey
26/10/2018
Zeki VATAN 1974
Mehmet Fatih İÇER
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
369.
52817/18
Yıldız v. Turkey
22/10/2018
Halil Ä°brahim YILDIZ 1985
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
370.
53077/18
Alada v. Turkey
05/11/2018
Zakir ALADA 1985
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
371.
53381/18
UÄŸurlu v. Turkey
01/11/2018
Ä°brahim UÄžURLU 1982
Burcu HAS
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
372.
53564/18
Erdemir v. Turkey
23/10/2018
Ahmet ERDEMÄ°R 1982
Sefanur BOZGÖZ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
373.
53586/18
Ä°nceoÄŸlu v. Turkey
01/11/2018
Ä°smail Ä°NCEOÄžLU 1965
Ayşe Büşra İNCEOĞLU
Member of Court of Cassation
374.
53610/18
Çelik v. Turkey
08/11/2018
Abdullah ÇELİK 1981
Hüseyin AYGÜN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
375.
53682/18
Çeliktaş v. Turkey
12/11/2018
Sedat ÇELİKTAŞ 1977
Ahmet ÅžAHÄ°N
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
376.
53840/18
Özcan v. Turkey
06/11/2018
Lutfullah Sami ÖZCAN 1974
MenekÅŸe Merve TEKTEN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
377.
54260/18
Åžen v. Turkey
12/10/2018
Åžuayip ÅžEN 1966
Mehmet ÖNCÜ (not lawyer)
Member of Court of Cassation
378.
54263/18
Yılmaz v. Turkey
12/10/2018
Zekeriya YILMAZ 1965
Adem KAPLAN
Member of Court of Cassation
379.
54318/18
Cengiz v. Turkey
25/10/2018
Abdi CENGÄ°Z 1965
Zehra KILIÇ
Member of Court of Cassation
380.
54584/18
TaÅŸdelen v. Turkey
12/10/2018
ReÅŸat TAÅžDELEN 1963
Mehmet ÖNCÜ (not lawyer)
Member of Court of Cassation
381.
54844/18
Gürbüz v. Turkey
13/11/2018
Yasin GÃœRBÃœZ 1981
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
382.
54910/18
Sayıldı v. Turkey
16/11/2018
YeÅŸim SAYILDI 1972
Ahmet Serdar GÃœNEÅž
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
383.
54942/18
Yılmaz v. Turkey
31/10/2018
Erkan YILMAZ 1986
Sultan TEKE SOYDİNÇ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
384.
55500/18
Sayıldı v. Turkey
16/11/2018
Selçuk SAYILDI 1969
Ahmet Serdar GÃœNEÅž
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
385.
55596/18
Åž.D. v. Turkey
20/11/2018
Åž.D. 1977
Ä°brahim KOCAOÄžUL
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
386.
57177/18
Aydın v. Turkey
24/11/2018
Ä°lkay AYDIN 1982
Ä°smail GÃœLER
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
387.
57198/18
Mutlu v. Turkey
10/11/2018
Levent MUTLU 1977
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
388.
57202/18
Palancı v. Turkey
13/11/2018
Erhan PALANCI 1987
Esat Selim ESEN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
389.
57504/18
Sarı v. Turkey
26/11/2018
Bozan SARI 1984
Mehmet Fatih İÇER
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
390.
57591/18
Özdemir v. Turkey
26/11/2018
Muzaffer ÖZDEMİR 1968
Hüseyin AYGÜN
Member of Court of Cassation
391.
57936/18
Çolaklar v. Turkey
07/12/2018
İlyas ÇOLAKLAR 1985
Murat GÃœNDEM
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
392.
58507/18
Özese v. Turkey
26/11/2018
Hasan Hüseyin ÖZESE 1960
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
393.
58514/18
Tapar v. Turkey
26/11/2018
Hacı Yusuf TAPAR 1989
Bünyamin TAPAR
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
394.
58522/18
Arabacı v. Turkey
17/11/2018
Kerem ARABACI 1972
İsmet ÇELİK
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
395.
58651/18
Demir v. Turkey
15/11/2018
Murat DEMÄ°R 1968
Muhammet GÃœNEY
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
396.
58875/18
Gül v. Turkey
28/11/2018
Hasan Basri GÃœL 1979
Mehmet Fatih İÇER
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
397.
58925/18
Bahadır v. Turkey
28/11/2018
Oktay BAHADIR 1982
Emre AKARYILDIZ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
398.
59274/18
T.Ç. v. Turkey
03/12/2018
T.Ç. 1977
Abdullah BIRDIR
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
399.
59555/18
Yıldız v. Turkey
07/12/2018
Hasan YILDIZ 1981
Åžerafettin AKTAÅž
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
400.
59840/18
Sakman v. Turkey
04/12/2018
Ahmet SAKMAN 1981
Serdar ÇELEBİ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
401.
59990/18
Kaya v. Turkey
30/11/2018
Mehmet KAYA 1972
Fatih ÅžAHÄ°NLER
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
402.
233/19
Vural v. Turkey
11/12/2018
Hamdi VURAL 1978
Murat YILMAZ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
403.
752/19
Sarıkaya v. Turkey
29/12/2018
Cebrail SARIKAYA 1976
Cahit ÇİFTÇİ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
404.
1641/19
Göktopal v. Turkey
14/12/2018
Bülent GÖKTOPAL 1979
Muhammet ATALAY
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
405.
1668/19
Kırmaz v. Turkey
05/12/2018
Fikret KIRMAZ 1980
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
406.
1779/19
Yumma v. Turkey
02/01/2019
Süleyman YUMMA 1970
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
407.
1843/19
Altınışık v. Turkey
01/12/2018
Kadir ALTINIÅžIK 1968
Handan CAN
Member of Court of Cassation
408.
1844/19
Aydın v. Turkey
14/11/2018
Mahmut AYDIN 1967
Mehmet Fatih İÇER
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
409.
2111/19
ErdoÄŸan v. Turkey
06/12/2018
Zekeriya ERDOÄžAN 1966
Handan CAN
Member of Court of Cassation
410.
2413/19
Demir v. Turkey
27/11/2018
Gökhan DEMİR 1986
Ä°mdat BERKSOY
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
411.
3078/19
Demiryürek v. Turkey
17/12/2018
Ahmet DEMÄ°RYÃœREK 1970
Hüseyin AYGÜN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
412.
3114/19
Yılmaz v. Turkey
05/12/2018
Mustafa YILMAZ 1967
Hilal YILMAZ PUSAT
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
413.
3660/19
Cenik v. Turkey
21/12/2018
Fatih CENÄ°K 1979
Tufan YILMAZ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
414.
4149/19
TekelioÄŸlu v. Turkey
15/01/2019
Murat TEKELÄ°OÄžLU 1983
Hüseyin AYGÜN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
415.
4575/19
CuvoÄŸlu v. Turkey
04/01/2019
Mahmut CUVOÄžLU 1985
Tufan YILMAZ
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
416.
4995/19
Ertaşkın v. Turkey
10/01/2019
Sedat ERTAÅžKIN 1976
Zülküf ARSLAN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
417.
5153/19
Bilici v. Turkey
11/01/2019
Hasan BÄ°LÄ°CÄ° 1986
Regaip DEMÄ°R
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
418.
5313/19
MemiÅŸ v. Turkey
08/01/2019
Yahya MEMÄ°Åž 1965
Hüseyin AYGÜN
Member of Court of Cassation
419.
5316/19
Aydın v. Turkey
21/01/2019
Mustafa AYDIN 1968
Mehmet ARI (not lawyer)
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
420.
5331/19
Åžen v. Turkey
12/01/2019
ÇETİN ŞEN 1965
Süeda Esma ŞEN KARA
Member of Court of Cassation
421.
6114/19
Åžen v. Turkey
10/01/2019
Mümin ŞEN 1977
Zeynep ÅžEN KARAKUÅž
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
422.
7306/19
Alıcı v. Turkey
24/01/2019
Burhan ALICI 1971
Ä°rem TATLIDEDE
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
423.
7432/19
Üzüm v. Turkey
16/01/2019
Åžahin ÃœZÃœM 1977
Ömer Faruk ERGÜN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
424.
9927/19
Yıldırım v. Turkey
06/02/2019
Mecit YILDIRIM 1984
Hilal MET DUMAN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
425.
10967/19
DoÄŸan v. Turkey
15/02/2019
Osman Ä°lter DOÄžAN 1971
Hüseyin AYGÜN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
426.
11047/19
Pınar v. Turkey
06/02/2019
Atilla PINAR 1973
Zülküf ARSLAN
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
427.
13015/19
Toklu v. Turkey
25/02/2019
Aykut TOKLU 1979
Merve Elif GÃœRACAR
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
[1] For a full list of the complaints raised by the applicants, see the communication report of 17 May 2019 in the case of Altun v. Turkey (no. 60065/16) and 545 others.