FIRST SECTION

CASE OF BLONSKI AND OTHERS v. HUNGARY

(Applications nos. 12152/16 and 6 others – see appended list)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

13 October 2022

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Blonski and Others v. Hungary,

The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

Raffaele Sabato , President,

Péter Paczolay ,

Davor Derenčinović , judges,

and Liv Tigerstedt, Deputy Section Registrar ,

Having regard to:

the applications against Hungary lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by the applicants listed in the appended table (“the applicants”), on the various dates indicated therein;

the decision not to disclose the identity of certain applicants as specified in the appended table;

the decision to give notice of the complaints concerning Article 3 of the Convention to the Hungarian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Mr Z. Tallódi, Ministry of Justice, and to declare inadmissible the remainder of applications nos. 16796/16, 59530/18 and 59440/19;

the parties’ observations;

Having deliberated in private on 20 September 2022,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1. The cases concern the applicants’ sentences of life imprisonment with the possibility of release on parole once they have served a minimum term of between 30 and 40 years (see the appended table). The applicants complained that their sentences constituted inhuman and degrading punishment, in breach of Article 3 of the Convention.

2. The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table.

3. The relevant domestic law is set out in Bancsók and László Magyar (no. 2) v. Hungary (nos. 52374/15 and 53364/15, §§ 15-17, 28 October 2021).

THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT

4. Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment.

5. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

6. The automatic review of a sentence after a specified minimum term represents an important safeguard for the prisoner against the risk of detention in violation of Article 3. The relevant principles have been summarised in Hutchinson v. the United Kingdom ([GC], no. 57592/08, §§ 66-68, 17 January 2017), and Vinter and Others v. the United Kingdom ([GC], nos. 66069/09 and 2 others, § 44, ECHR 2013 (extracts)). In Bodein v. France (no. 40014/10, 13 November 2014) the Court examined whether the possibility of a review of life sentences after thirty years of imprisonment remained compatible with the criteria established in Vinter and Others . In finding that it did, the Court gave particular weight to the fact that the starting ‑ point for the calculation of the whole-life term included any deprivation of liberty, that is to say, even the period spent in pre ‑ trial detention. Since the applicant was able to apply for parole twenty-six years after the imposition of his life sentence, the Court concluded that the punishment in his case was to be considered reducible for the purposes of Article 3 (see Bodein , cited above, § 61).

7. Under the Hungarian Criminal Code, the minimum term to be served before an offender sentenced to life imprisonment can be released on parole must be set in the judgment convicting the offender and must range between the statutory minimum of twenty-five years and the maximum of forty years. Furthermore, the requirements which a person sentenced to a prison term must fulfil in order to be conditionally released are set out in section 188 of Act no. CCXL of 2013; satisfactory compliance with those requirements is subject to assessment by a court. National law and practice therefore afford the possibility of a dedicated judicial review of the life sentences imposed on the applicants.

8. However, in the present case, the applicants could be eligible for release only after having served thirty to forty years of their terms. It remains to be determined whether in their case the review mechanism satisfies the criteria set out in the Court’s case-law.

9. In that connection, the Court notes that the thirty to forty years the applicants must wait before they can first expect to be considered for release on parole is a significantly longer period than the maximum recommended time-frame for review of a life sentence, namely twenty-five years, as established on the basis of a clear support in comparative and international law (see Vinter and Others , cited above, § 120).

10. The Court further notes the Government’s position that the applicants Mr A.A. and Mr Tóth would in practice have to serve less than thirty years after the imposition of their life sentences in order to be considered for conditional release, since the period spent in pre-trial detention was included in the calculation. Indeed, Mr A.A. is eligible for release on parole twenty ‑ six years, and Mr Tóth twenty-nine years after the imposition of their life sentences.

11. However, the Court notes that this is so only because they have been kept in pre-trial detention before their conviction and sentencing and this pre ‑ trial detention period has been deducted from the thirty-year period. It does not change the fact that the term to be served before they are eligible to be considered for parole was set at thirty years, like it was for the applicant Mr Benjamin (see the appended table), and that this review would take place more than twenty-five years after the imposition of their life sentences. Thus, even having regard to the State’s margin of appreciated, in the instant case the Court cannot accept the Government’s position on this point.

12. In sum, the fact that the applicants in the present case can hope to have their progress towards release reviewed only after they have served thirty to forty years of their life sentences is sufficient for the Court to conclude that the applicants’ life sentences cannot be regarded as reducible for the purposes of Article 3 of the Convention. Such a long waiting period unduly delays the domestic authorities’ review of “whether any changes in the life prisoner are so significant, and such progress towards rehabilitation has been made in the course of the sentence, as to mean that continued detention can no longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds” ( Vinter and Others , cited above, § 119).

13. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.

14. In application no. 12152/16, the applicant also complained under Articles 4, 6, 13 and 17 of the Convention of the unfairness of the criminal proceedings, essentially challenging their outcome. Assessing the circumstances of the case as a whole, there is no indication that the proceedings were conducted unfairly. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

15. The applicants in applications nos. 12152/16, 59530/18, 56162/19, 58544/19 and 13524/20 claimed various amounts in damages and for costs and expenses.

16. The Government found these claims excessive.

17. The Court considers that its finding of a violation constitutes sufficient just satisfaction and accordingly makes no award under this head.

18. As to costs and expenses, the Court reiterates that an applicant is entitled to their reimbursement only in so far as it has been shown that they have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. That being so, the Court awards the sums indicated in the appended table for costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants.

19. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicants, within three months, the amounts indicated in the appended table, plus any tax that may be chargeable to them, in respect of costs and expenses, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

Done in English, and notified in writing on 13 October 2022, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Liv Tigerstedt Raffaele Sabato Deputy Registrar President

APPENDIX

No.

Application no.

Date of introduction

Case name

Applicant Year of birth Place of residence

Represented by

Date of final judgment and minimum term to be served before eligibility for release

Amount awarded for costs and expenses

(in euros)

1.

12152/16

29/02/2016

Blonski v. Hungary

Imre BLONSKI 1970 Tiszalök

Arthur KOVÁCS

07/04/2011

35 years

1,292

2.

16796/16

11/03/2016

R.H. v. Hungary

R.H. 1981 Sátoraljaújhely

Éva GÖCS

16/09/2010

35 years

-

3.

47754/17

29/06/2017

A.A. v. Hungary

A.A. 1980 Sátoraljaújhely

Edina Eszter JÓZSA

27/10/2009

30 years

-

4.

59530/18

07/12/2018

Benjamin

v. Hungary

Simon BENJAMIN 1972 Szeged

István SZIKINGER

15/01/2001

30 years

2,000

5.

56162/19

17/10/2019

Rendek v. Hungary

Imre László RENDEK 1976 Szeged

Dániel András KARSAI

05/06/2006

35 years

1,800

6.

58544/19

04/11/2019

Tóth v. Hungary

Attila TÓTH 1980 Szeged

Dániel András KARSAI

20/04/2004

30 years

1,800

7.

13524/20

03/03/2020

Páva v. Hungary

Sándor PÁVA 1972 Szeged

Dániel András KARSAI

15/06/2003

40 years

1,800