CASE OF BODOR v. HUNGARY
Doc ref: 81099/12 • ECHR ID: 001-141946
Document date: March 25, 2014
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SECOND SECTION
CASE OF BODOR v. HUNGARY
( Application no. 81099/12 )
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
25 March 2014
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Bodor v. Hungary ,
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section) , sitting as a C ommittee composed of:
Helen Keller, President, András Sajó , Egidijus Kūris , judges , and Stanley Naismith , Section Registrar ,
Having deliberated in private on 4 March 2014 ,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1 . The case originated in an application (no. 81099/12) against the Republic of Hungary lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Slovak national, Mr Vitazoslav Bodor (“the applicant”), on 12 December 2012 .
2 . The applicant was represented by Ms J. Nahm, a lawyer practising in Gödöllő. The Hungarian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr Z. Tallódi , Agent, Ministry of Public Administration and Justice .
3 . On 7 March 2 013 the application was communicated to the Government .
4 . The Slovak Government did not wish to exercise their right to submit written observations (Article 36 § 1 of the Convention).
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
5 . The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Velké Dravce , Slovakia.
6 . T he applicant and his former spouse , also of Slovakian nationality , found employment in Hungary and settled there in 2004 . They married in Slovakia in 2005. Their child, a lso a Slovakian citizen, was born in Hatvan, Hungary , in 2007.
7 . As their marriage deteriorated, the wife lodged a divorce action and a custody claim with the Hungarian Hatvan District Court on 18 June 2008.
8 . The applicant filed an objection contesting the jurisdiction of the Hungarian courts. The District Court held a hearing and dismissed the case, accepting the applicant ’ s argument . Furthermore, the court noted that the applicant had filed a divorce action before the Slovakian Rimavská Sobota District Court.
9 . On appeal , the Hungarian Heves County Regional Court quashed the first-instance decision on 19 February 2009 , for further circumstances to be clarified, namely the exact date of filing the action before the Slovakian court . The Regional Court noted that the law applicable by the Hatvan District Court was the Slovakian one .
10 . In the resumed proceedings, the Hatvan District Court ascertained that the action before the Slovakian c ourt had been filed on 24 June 2008, that is, six days later than the one before the Hungarian court. During the procedure the court obtained the necessary translation of the Slovakian law.
T he District Court rejected the applicant ’ s jurisdictional objection on 10 March 2010 , holding that the Slovak ian case had been pre-empted by the Hungarian one . On his appeal, the second-instance court upheld the decision on 16 June 2010.
11 . Meanwhile, the applicant filed a complaint about the protraction of the proceedings. The objection was dismissed by the Heves County Regional Court on 18 May 2010. The court held that there was no unreasonable delay or omission to be observed during the proceedings.
12 . The first hearing on the merits was held by the Hatvan District Court on 5 October 2010 in the absence of the applicant. Althou gh two more hearings were held on 8 February and 28 April 2011 , the applicant , properly summoned, failed to appear.
13 . Meanwhile, the applicant had brought several actions against his former spouse before the Slovakian Rimavská Sobota District Court. The applicant ’ s contact with his child was also regulated with provisional measure by that c ourt on 22 December 2008.
14 . On 28 April 2011 the Hatvan District Court dissolved the applicant ’ s marriage and ordered him to pay child maintenance.
15 . The applicant appealed but the Hungarian Eger High Court upheld the first-instance decision on 15 February 2012. This decision was served on the applicant on 15 June 2012.
16 . The applicant lodged a petition for review. On 14 May 2013 the Kúria rejected the reque st since it was excluded by law in such cases .
THE LAW
17 . The applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
18 . The Government did not contest that argument.
19 . The period to be taken into consideration began on 18 June 2008 and ended on 15 June 2012, disregarding the entirely futile proceedings before the Kúria . It thus lasted four years for two levels of jurisdiction.
In view of such lengthy proceedings, this complaint must be declared admissible.
20 . The Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present application (see Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).
21 . Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or convincing argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present circumstances. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that the length of the proceedings was excessive , especially in view of the nature of the litigation, and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
22 . Relying on Article 41 of the Convention, the applicant claimed 10 , 0 00 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and altogether EUR 1,140 for the costs and expenses incurred. The latter amount corresponds to the legal work billable by his lawyer in respect of the domestic proceedings and the ones before the Court.
The Government contested the claim.
The Court considers that the applicant must have sustained some non- pecuniary damage and awards him, on the basis of equity, EUR 1, 600 under this head, also having regard to what was at stake in the litigation.
Moreover, r egard being had to the documents in its possession and to its case-law, the Court considers it reasonable to award the applicant, who was represented by a lawyer, the sum of EUR 1,000 covering costs for the proceedings before the Court.
The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
23 . The applicant further complained, under Articles 8 and 13, about the manner in which his case was handled and its outcome. However, the Court is satisfied that , even assuming compliance with Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, there is no appearance of a violation of the applicant ’ s rights under these provisions. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) and must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT , UNANIMOUSLY,
1. Declares the length complaint admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
2 . Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;
3. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 1 , 600 ( one thousand six hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 1,000 ( one thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant ’ s claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 25 March 2014 , pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Stanley Naismith Helen Keller Registrar President
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