SECOND SECTION

DECISION

Application no . 22413/08 István NAGY against Hungary

The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 11 December 2012 as a Committee composed of:

Peer Lorenzen , President, András Sajó , Nebojša Vučinić , judges, and Françoise Elens-Passos , Deputy Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 23 April 2008,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant, Mr István Nagy, is a Hungarian national, who was born in 1942 and lives in Budapest . He was represented before the Court by Mr A. Mező, a lawyer practising in Budapest . The Hungarian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr. Z. Tallódi, Agent, Ministry of Public Administration and Justice.

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

On 30 August 2001 two private individuals brought an action against the applicant before the Buda Central District Court, requesting the court to settle a dispute over the use of a commonly owned real estate.

Hearings were held on ten occasions, following which the court gave judgment on 13 May 2005. This judgment was upheld on appeal by the Budapest Regional Court on 2 November 2006.

The applicant lodged a petition for review with the Supreme Court, which upheld the Regional Court ’ s judgment on 20 June 2007. According to the prevailing rules on the service of court documents, they should be served on the legal representative in case the parties have authorised one. However, in the present case the judgment was erroneously served on the applicant, rather than his representative, on 16 July 2007. On 14 November 2007 the applicant requested the court that a copy of the judgment be served on his lawyer. The decision was served on the latter on 18 December 2007.

COMPLAINTS

The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the length and unfairness of the proceedings.

THE LAW

The applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. He also submitted that the proceedings had been unfair.

The Government submitted that the beginning of the running of the six-month time-limit for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention was the service of the judgment on the applicant on 16 July 2007. Therefore, the application had been introduced out of time. They also disputed the merits of the applicant ’ s complaints. The applicant contested these views.

The Court points out that the six-month rule is aimed at, inter alia , providing the prospective applicant with sufficient time to consider whether to lodge an application and, if so, to decide on the specific complaints and arguments to be raised ( O ’ Loughlin and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 23274/04, 25 August 2005), and facilitating the establishment of facts in a case, the passage of time rendering problematic any fair examination of the issues raised ( Nee v. Ireland (dec.), no. 52787/99, 30 January 2003).

Turning to the present case, the Court considers that, from the service on 16 July 2007 of the judgment on the applicant, he was actually aware of its contents and was in a position to proceed to lodging a case with the Court in due time. However, he did not do so and only introduced his application on 23 April 2008, more than six months after the judgment was served on him. In the Court ’ s view, there is nothing in the case-file exculpating the applicant of this delay.

It is true that, under domestic law, the written text of the final judgment should have been served upon the legal representative of the applicant. However, following receipt of the decision by the applicant, a further four months had passed before he requested that it be sent to his counsel. In the Court ’ s view, it could have been expected from a litigant with reasonable diligence to submit such a request earlier (see Darnay v. Hungary (dec.), no. 36524/97, 16 April 1998 ).

It follows that the application must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court unanimously

Declares the application inadmissible.

             Françoise Elens-Passos Peer Lorenzen Deputy Registrar President