FOURTH SECTION

DECISION

Application no . 440/10 Lee BAYLISS against the United Kingdom

The European Court of Human Rights ( Fourth Section ), sitting on 10 June 2014 as a Committee composed of:

Ledi Bianku, President, Paul Mahoney, Krzysztof Wojtyczek, judges,

and Fatoş Aracı , Deputy Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 16 December 2009 ,

Having regard to the declaration submitted by the respondent Government on 2 April 2014 requesting the Court to strike the application out of the list of cases and the applicant ’ s reply to that declaration,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

1. The applicant, Mr Lee Bayliss , is a British national, who was born in 1977 and lives in Oxford. He was represented before the Court by Carringtons Solicitors, a firm of solicitors based in Nottingham .

2. The United Kingdom Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms M. Addis , of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office .

3. The applicant complained under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention about the delay in his Parole Board review from March 2010 until September 2010.

4. The complaint was communicated to the Government.

THE LAW

5. The applicant complained about the delay in his Parole Board hearing from March 2010 to September 2010 . He relied on Article 5 § 4 of the Convention.

6. After the failure of attempts to reach a friendly settlement, by a letter of 2 April 2014 the Government informed the Court that they proposed to make a unilateral declaration with a view to resolving the issue raised by the application. They further requested the Court to strike out the application in accordance with Article 37 of the Convention.

7. The declaration provided as follows:

“ In the particular circumstances of the present case the Government wish to express by way of a unilateral declaration their acknowledgment that in light of the judgments of the Court in Betteridge v the United Kingdom , no. 1497/10, 29 January 2013 and the UK Supreme Court ( R (Faulkner Sturnham) v Secretary of State for Justice [2013] UKSC 23 and R (Osborn) v Secretary of State for Justice [2013] UKSC 61) there has been a breach of the ‘ speediness ’ requirement of Article 5(4) of the Convention.

The Government do so in the following circumstances:

1) The Court has asked the Government whether the delay between March 2010 and September 2010 in holding the Applicant ’ s Parole Board review complied with the ‘ speediness ’ requirement of Article 5(4) of the Convention.

2) The Government accept that the ‘ speediness ’ requirement of Article 5(4) of the Convention was not met during that period of time.

3) As a result of recent decisions mentioned above in paragraph 1, the Parole Board is currently undertaking substantial changes to the mechanism that it uses to manage and convene hearings.

Accordingly, in light of the above and the particular circumstances of this case, the Government offer to pay the Applicant the sum of €400 to cover all pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage as well as costs and expenses, to be paid in pounds sterling into a bank account nominated by the Applicant within 3 months from the date of the striking out decision of the Court pursuant to Article 37 of the Convention. The payment will constitute the final settlement of the Applicant ’ s case as to Article 5(4) of the Convention.

The figure of €400 is calculated consistently with the approach adopted by both the Court and the domestic courts of the United Kingdom as to the amount of money that should be paid as just satisfaction for a period of delay in a Parole Board review of 6 months. ”

8. By a letter of 22 April 2014 , the applicant indicated that he was not satisfied with the terms of the unilateral declaration on the ground s that the financial award proposed was too low; that he continued to be a victim because the Legal Aid Agency would recoup the award made in these proceedings to cover legal aid awarded to him in the domestic proceedings; and that the problem of delays in Parole Board hearings was an ongoing one.

“for any other reason established by the Court, it is no longer justified to continue the examination of the application . ”

10. In certain circumstances, the Court may strike out an application under Article 37 § 1 (c) on the basis of a unilateral declaration by a respondent Government even if the applicant wishes the examination of the case to be continued. To this end, the Court will examine carefully the declaration in the light of the principles emerging from its case-law, in particular the Tahsin Acar judgment ( Tahsin Acar v. Turkey , [GC], no. 26307/95, §§ 75-77, ECHR 2003-VI).

11. The Court has established in a number of cases, including those brought against the United Kingdom , its practice concerning complaints about the violation of Article 5 § 4 on account of delays in Parole Board hearings (see, most recently , Betteridge v . the United Kingdom , no. 1497/10, 29 January 2013 ) .

12. Having regard to the nature of the admissions contained in the Government ’ s declaration, as well as the amount of compensation proposed – which is consistent with the amount awarded in Betteridge – the Court considers that it is no longer justified to continue the examination of the application (Article 37 § 1 (c)). As regards the applicant ’ s concern that the compensation offered by the Government in their unilateral declaration will , if paid, be recovered from him by the Legal Aid Agency, the Court is not persuaded on the basis of the information befo re it that such concern is well ‑ founded.

13. Moreover, in light of the above considerations, and in particular given the clear and extensive case-law on the topic, the Court is satisfied that respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto does not require it to continue the examination of the application (Article 37 § 1 in fine ). In particular, it is important to note that the delay at issue in the present case is a historical one and that steps have subsequently been taken by the Government to address the problem of delay (see Betteridge , cited above, § 40). It may fall to the Court at some future point, in the context of a new application lodged under Article 34 of the Convention, to assess the compatibility of any continuing delays in holding Parole Board hearings with the requirements of the Convention.

14. The Court considers that this amount of four hundred euros (EUR 400) should be c onverted into pounds sterling at the rate applicable at the date of payment, and paid within three months from the date of notification of the Court ’ s decision issued in accordance with Article 37 § 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In the event of failure to settle within this period, simple interest shall be payable on the amount in question at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank plus three percentage points.

15. Finally, the Court emphasises that, should the Government fail to comply with the terms of their unilateral declaration or should the Legal Aid Agency seek to recover, against the award made in the present decision, sums paid by way of legal aid in the domestic proceedings, the application could be restored to the list in accordance with Article 37 § 2 of the Convention ( Josipović v. Serbia (dec.), no. 18369/07, 4 March 2008).

16. In view of the above, it is appropriate to strike the case out of the list .

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Takes note of the terms of the respondent Government ’ s declaration under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention and of the modalities for ensuring compliance with the undertakings referred to therein;

Decides to strike the application out of its list of cases in accordance with Article 37 § 1 (c) of the Convention.

FatoÅŸ Aracı Ledi Bianku              Deputy Registrar President