FIRST SECTION

DECISION

Application no . 35636/04 Milivoj MICEVSKI against the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 26 August 2014 as a Committee composed of:

Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque , President, Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska , Ksenija Turković , judges, and Søren C. Prebensen , Acting Deputy Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 16 September 2004,

Having regard to the Government ’ s observations and the applicant ’ s reply ,

Having deliberated, decides as follows :

THE FACTS

The applicant, Mr Milivoj Micevski, is a Macedonian national who was born in 1955 and lives in Skopje. The Macedonian Government (“the Government”) were initially represente d by their former Agent, Mrs R. Lazareska Gerovska, and subseque ntly by their present Agent, Mr K. Bogdanov.

A. The circumstances of the case

1. Enforcement proceedings

On 29 November 2001 the applicant requested e nforcement of a final judgment rendered in his favour. On 11 April 2002 the Skopje Court of First Instance (“the first-instance court”) partly granted the applicant ’ s enforcement request . After certain delays, on 6 April 2011 the first-instance court suspended ( одлага ) the enforcement until 12 January 2012. That decision was taken on the basis of the debtor ’ s request of 12 January 2011 for one-year postponement of the enforcement to which the applicant had consented in writing. The applicant was further advised to notify the court about the bailiff who would continue the enforcement, as required under the Enforcement Act. No information was provided whether the applicant complied with this latter instruction and whether the enforcement continued .

2 . Compensation proceedings regarding the non-enforcement of the applicant ’ s claim (“the compensation proceedings”)

On 1 September 2003 the applicant lodged a civil action against the State claiming damages for the lengthy non- enforcement. With decisions of 20 March 2006, 4 October 2006 and 23 April 2008 respectively, rendered at three instances, the domestic courts dismissed the applicant ’ s claim finding that no responsibility could be attributed to the State for the delays occurred in the enforcement proceedings.

3 . Length proceedings before the Supreme Court

On 2 March 2009 the applicant lodged a length remedy before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court ’ s first-instance panel with a decision of 6 July 2009 found that the applicant ’ s right to a trial within reasonable time had been violated and set a six-month time-limit for the first-instance court to proceed further with the case ( да даде тек на постапката ) . The applicant ’ s claim for pecuniary damages was dismissed since there was no causal link between the violation found and the damages sought. Non ‑ pecuniary damages were not awarded since the applicant had not specified any. The applicant did not appeal against this decision, which became final on 7 October 2009.

On 9 April 2010 the applicant lodged new length remedy before the Supreme Court. On 18 May 2010 the first-instance panel dismissed the length remedy. On 14 June 2010, upon the applicant ’ s appeal, the second ‑ instance panel remitted the case for fresh consideration. On 12 October 2010 the Supreme Court ’ s first-instance panel found t hat the enforcement proceedings lasted over eight years and nine months and that no delays could be attributed to the applicant. Consequently, it concluded that the applicant ’ s right to a hearing within a reasonable time was violated. It also set a six-month time-limit to the first-instance court to decide on the applicant ’ s enforcement request . It awarded the applicant the equivalent of 650 euros (EUR) as just satisfaction for the violation found. It appears that the applicant did not appeal against this decision. The awarded sum was paid to him on 7 February 2011.

B. Relevant domestic law

The provisions relevant to the present case were described in Adži Spirkoska and others v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (dec.), no. 38914/05 , 3 November 2011 .

COMPLAINTS

The applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention that the enforcement proceedings had lasted too long. He also complained that the different sets of proceedings that he had initiated had been unfair .

THE LAW

The applicant complained that the enforcement proceedings had not been in compliance with the “ reasonable time ” requirement and that the compensation and length proceedings had been unfair, in breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which, insofar as relevant, reads as follows:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing within a reasonable time by an independent tribunal established by law”.

The complaint under Article 6 about the length of the enforcement proceedings was communicated to the Government.

A. As to the enforcement proceedings

1. The parties ’ submissions

The Government , in view of the outcome of the first length remedy, invited the Court to strike the application out of the list of cases.

The applicant contested the Government ’ s arguments. In his submissions of 1 July 2011 , he informed the Court of the Supreme Court ’ s decision of 12 October 2010 .

2. The Court ’ s assessment

The Court considers that the Government ’ s arguments should be examined as a contestation of the applicant ’ s status of a victim. The Court notes that the length remedy, when us ed in 2009 and 20 10, was not yet considered to be effective (see Adži Spirkoska and others , cited above). Nevertheless, the Court reaffirms that as regards length cases in which the remedy was exhausted by the applicant, any redress provided by the Supreme Court shall be assessed through the prism of whether the applicants can still be considered to be victims within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention (see Adži Spirkoska and others, cited above ).

The Court notes that the Supreme Court, in its decision of 12 October 2010, acknowledged the violation of the reasonable-time requirement, awarded the applicant 650 EUR and set a time-limit for the first-instance court to decide on the applicant ’ s enforcement request. The Court finds that the amount paid to the applicant was not manifestly unreasonable and that he did not appeal against the decision of the Supreme Court ’ s first-instance panel. The Court further notes that the enforcement de facto ended on 12 January 2011, only few months after the Supreme Court ’ s decision. No information was submitted to the contrary. In such circumstances, the Court considers that the Supreme Court ’ s decision of 12 October 2010 may be regarded to have removed the applicant ’ s victim status in respect of the length of the enforcement proceedings that was under the Supreme Court ’ s consideration. As for the subsequent period of few months which followed after the Supreme Court ’ s decision, the Court notes it was too short and as such, could not raise an issue under the Convention.

It follows that the applicant ’ s complaint in respect of the length of the enforcement proceedings is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

B. As to the compensation and length proceedings

The applicant complained that the compensation and length -remedy proceedings had been unfair and consequently, in breach of Article 6 of the Convention.

The Court finds that these complaints are of a fourth-instance nature as they relate to the outcome of th os e proceedings. Having regard to all the evidence in its possession, and in so far as it has jurisdiction to examine the allegations, the Court has not found any appearance of a breach of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention or its Protocols.

It follows that these complaints are manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court unanimously

Declares the application inadmissible.

Søren C. Prebensen Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque Acting Deputy Registrar President