FIFTH SECTION

DECISION

Application no . 14349/13 Antonio C. LOPES against Ireland

The European Court of Human Rights ( Fifth Section ), sitting on 30 September 2014 as a Committee composed of:

Ganna Yudkivska , Presiden t,

Ann Power-Forde,

André Potocki , judges

and Stephen Phillips , Deputy Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 25 January 2013 ,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.

The applicant, Mr Antonio C. Lopes , is a Cap Verdean national, who was born in 1951 and is resident in Co. Waterford, Ireland . He formerly worked as a maritime navigator. He has lived in Ireland since 1985. In 1988, he was injured in a road traffic accident there. In the ensuing litigation, the applicant wished for the case to be heard not by the Circuit Court, whose jurisdiction at the time was limited to £15,000, but by the High Court, which has unlimited jurisdiction. Although he instructed his solicitor to transfer the case, this was not done, and on 14 May 1991 h e was award ed damages of £12,000 by the Circuit Court .

The applicant, then acting as a lay litigant, instituted proceedings in negligence against his solicitor. The action was dismissed by the High Court in 1995. In July 1997, the Supreme Court allowed the applicant ’ s appeal and remitted the case to the High Court for the assessment of damages. In July 1998, the High Court awarded the applicant the equivalent of EUR 66,185.69, minus the sum originally awarded. The applicant appealed this decision to the Supreme Court, which delivered judgment in July 1999. The Supreme Court increased the amount of damages to the equivalent of EUR 196,809.40, minus the award made in 1991. In all of the proceedings before the High Court and the Supreme Court the applicant acted as a lay litigant.

Some eight years later, on 26 March 2007, the applicant instituted new proceedings, this time against the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform. He contended that, in the earlier proceedings, he had been the victim of discrimination, corruption and bias on the part of the judges who had dealt with his case. In his view, he should have received a much higher sum. The applicant, as before, was unrepresented. He invoked the Constitution, EU law and the Convention, and contended that the Minister should be held vicariously liable. In a judgment of 11 June 2008, the High Court observed that the issue of vicarious liability did not arise. In striking the case out the judge, Hanna J., remarked:

“ In my view, having considered this matter carefully, it seems to me that the plaintiff ’ s proceedings in this case are wholly unsustainable in law or in fact. They are the fruits of a grievance founded on what I regret to say is the fanciful and unsustainable notion that racial bias drove the Supreme Court to treble the damages awarded to him in the High Court. ... Irish constitutional law is amply equipped to protect the applicant against any unfair discrimination, however motivated, but the reality of the matter is that there is not a shred of evidence whatsoever of any such racial discrimination against him and to that extent I am wholly satisfied that his allegations to this effect in his proceedings are scandalous and unsustainable ... ”

The applicant appealed by Notice of Appeal dated 10 July 2008. When, some time later, he sought information on the progress of his case, he was informed by the Supreme Court ’ s office that cases were being dealt with on the basis of priority. T he Supreme Court rejected his appeal on 27 March 2014. In a 22-page judgment, the court acknowledged that the claim raised some important legal issues but that before such issues could be considered it was necessary that there be a credible case on the facts as to the alleged bias, discrimination, or corruption. Distinguishing between the two bases upon which claims may be struck out, the Supreme Court considered that the applicant ’ s case was more appropriately considered under the inherent jurisdiction of the court to prevent abuse of process rather than under the Rules of the Superior Courts. It found that if it can be established that there exists no credible basis for suggesting that the facts are as asserted and that thus the proceedings are bound to fail on the merits, then the inherent jurisdiction of the court to prevent abuse can be invoked. The Supreme Court carefully examined the applicant ’ s allegations that the High Court had “ ignored ” an earlier ruling of the Supreme Court and that there had been “ collusion ” between the High Court and a medical witness. It concluded that there was no factual basis for the former suggestion which was based on the applicant ’ s misreading and misunderstanding of what the Supreme Court had said. It found that the allegation of conspiracy was ‘ so unstateable as to amount to an abuse of process ’ . The Supreme Court (Clarke, J.) concluded its analysis in the following terms:

“ Having carefully analysed each of the matters which were set out in his written submissions, in the documents which he filed in support of same and in his oral submissions, it seems to me that there is just no basis for suggesting that there is any evidence, or any prospect of there being evidence, to support his factual accusations. On that basis, I am satisfied that the underlying factual assertion which lies at the back of all of the submissions made is bound to fail. If that factual assertion fails, then the legal issues, however interesting and important, just do not arise. ”

COMPLAINTS

The applicant complain ed under Article 6 and 13 of the Convention about the delay in the hearing of his appeal by the Supreme Court, and the lack of an ef fective remedy in that respect. He further criticized the reasoning of the High Court judgment of 11 June 2008, and complained that it prevented the execution of the Supreme Court judgment of July 1997.

THE LAW

A. Duration of proceedings and effective remedy

The applicant contended that there had been a breach of his right to have his case determined within a reasonable time, and of his right to a remedy in respect of that right.

Article 6 of the Convention provides, in so far as relevant:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...”

Article 13 provides:

“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”

The Court must first determine the duration of the proceedings in this case. W hilst the applicant appears to suggest that the proceedings issued in 2007 were a continuation of the previous litigation, the Court considers that, clearly, each set of proceedings involved different causes of action and were directed against different defendants. The first action ended in 1991 and the second in 1999. Consequently, the Court considers that it is only the third set of proceedings that falls to be examined. These proceedings began on 26 March 2007 and ended on 27 March 2014, that is, seven years over two levels of jurisdiction. The High Court dealt with the case within 15 months. However, a period of over five years had lapsed between the lodgment of the applicant ’ s Notice of Appeal and the date of delivery of the Supreme Court ’ s judgment. This, on its face, is lengthy.

As laid down in the Court ’ s case-law, the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).

Concerning the first criterion, the Court considers that the proceedings involved a certain degree of legal complexity , as demonstrated by the Supreme Court ’ s analysis of the bases for striking out a case for abuse of process.

As to the conduct of the applicant and of the relevant authorities, it does not appear to the Court that the applicant, even though he acted without the benefit of legal representation, was responsible for the delay. As the applicant indicated, he did receive an explanation for the delay. However, Article 6 § 1 imposes on the Contracting States the duty to organise their judicial systems in such a way that their courts can meet each of its requirements, including the obligation to hear cases within a reasonable time (see, among many other authorities, Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], no. 36813/97, § 183 , ECHR 2006 ‑ V ). The Court has already had occasion to refer to the growing problems caused by the workload of the Supreme Court in recent years (see McFarlane v. Ireland [GC] , no. 31333/06, 10 September 2010 ).

With regard to the third criterion, what was a stake for the applicant, the Court is mindful of the domestic courts ’ findings that the applicant ’ s entire claim was simply groundless , there being no factual basis upon which his claims could stand. Therefore, notwithstanding the applicant ’ s subjective belief that his case disclosed serious matters , and his frustration while waiting for his case to be decided, it is clear that, objectively, and as a matter of law, there was nothing, in reality, at stake for him since his claims lacked any factual basis and were, in fact, held to be an abuse of process.

The Court observes that applicants who pursue unmeritorious or trivial claims may add to the general congestion of domestic courts and may contribute to delays in proceedings suffered by such applicants and others . It has rejected applications of this sort as an abuse of the right of individual petition (see Dudek (VIII) v . Germany , ( dec. ), nos. 12977/09, 15856/09, 15890/09, 15892/09 and 16119/09, 23 November 2010 ).

This leads the Court to conclude that the complaint about excessive delay is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

It also finds that the substantive claim is not arguable within the meaning of the Court ’ s case-law (see Boyle and Rice v. the United Kingdom , 27 April 1988, § 52, Series A no. 131) . The complaint under Article 13 is therefore also manifestly ill-founded, and must also be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

B. The applicant ’ s other complaints

The applicant criticised the High Court ’ s comments on judicial immunity and on the applicable time-limits to his claim. He repeated before this Court his claims before the domestic courts. The Court finds, in the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, that the applicant ’ s remaining complaints do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the application too is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court unanimously

Declares the application inadmissible.

Stephen Phillips Ganna Yudkivska              Deputy Registrar President