SECOND SECTION

DECISION

Application no . 33320/15 Vladimir TERLEVIĆ against Croatia

The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 22 November 2016 as a Committee composed of:

Paul Lemmens, President, Ksenija Turković , Jon Fridrik Kjølbro , judges, and Hasan Bakırcı , Deputy Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 2 July 2015,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

1. The applicant, Mr Vladimir Terlević , is a Croatian national who was born in 1957 and lives in Poreč . He was represented before the Court by Mr I. Milanović , a lawyer practising in Umag .

2. The Croatian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms Å . Sta ž nik .

The circumstances of the case

3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

4. In civil proceedings in the Pore č Municipal Court and Pazin County Court, instituted by M.P. and S. Å . against the applicant, the latter was represented by a lawyer and presented arguments and evidence. The Pore č Municipal Court ordered the applicant to pay M.P. and S. Å . 499,517 Croatian kunas (HRK – approximately 66,450 euros (EUR)) plus interest accrued on that sum. On 7 December 2011 the Pula County Court upheld that judgment, and it thus became final. The applicant then lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court which has not yet been decided.

5. Since the applicant failed to comply with the order, M.P. and S. Å . instituted enforcement proceedings against him on 11 December 2013 in the Pore č Municipal Court, seeking the sale of a seven- storey building he owned, including the flat he occupied with his family.

6. On 20 December 2013 the Pore č Municipal Court issued an enforcement order. The applicant requested that enforcement order in respect of the flat be suspended since its sale would cause him and his family “irreparable damage” because they had nowhere else to live. On 17 January 2014 the Pore č Municipal Court dismissed that request on the grounds that the applicant has not shown “why the damage caused to the debtor by the enforcement could not be repaired”. On 27 August 2014 the Pula County Court upheld that decision. The relevant part of its judgment reads:

“... by claiming that [the enforcement] concerned the house where he lived with his family (the property consists of three flats) the debtor has not shown that irreparable damage was likely. Enforcement was ordered, inter alia , on ... the house where the debtor lives. Since such a house may serve as an object of enforcement, and a debtor may avoid it being sold by paying his outstanding debts, the first-instance court applied the substantive law correctly ... ”.

7. On 23 December 2013 the Poreč Municipal Court registered the enforcement order on the applicant ’ s property in the land register.

8. On 10 October 2014 the proceedings were consolidated with another set of enforcement proceedings in which an order had been issued against the applicant at the request of the Poreč Municipality in respect of a claim of HRK 58,034.76 (approximately EUR 7,700).

9. On 31 October 2014 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint, which was declared inadmissible by the Constitutional Court for lack of competence on 8 December 2014. It found that the decision dismissing the applicant ’ s request to have enforcement order in respect of his flat suspended did not concern a determination of his rights and obligations or a criminal charge against him.

10. On 16 September 2015 the proceedings were consolidated with the enforcement of a debt owed by the applicant to the Zagreb bank in the amount of EUR 19,000.

11. Public auctions for the sale of the applicant ’ s property were held on 24 September and 18 November 2015, but there were no interested buyers. On 18 December 2015 the Pore č Municipal Court terminated the proceedings.

COMPLAINT

12. The applicant complained that the sale in enforcement proceedings of the flat he occupies with his family would have violated his right to respect for his home.

THE LAW

13. The applicant complained that the enforcement order for his eviction had been issued in violation of his right to respect for his home. He relied on Article 8 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads:

“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his ... home ...

2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

1. Submissions of the parties

14. The Government argued that the applicant had lost his victim status because the enforcement proceedings at issue had been terminated. They also argued that he had not complied with the six-month time-limit which, in their view, was to be counted from the date the enforcement order had been issued. They also submitted that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies, because he had not lodged an appeal against the enforcement order or objected to its registration in the land register. Furthermore, he had not lodged a constitutional complaint . In such a complaint he could have argued that the order was contrary to the Constitution, which guaranteed the “inviolability of one ’ s home”.

15. The Government also argued that the grounds for interference with the applicant ’ s right to respect for his home were set out in the Enforcement Act. The interference had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the interests of others, namely his creditors. They maintained that he had not offered any other means of satisfying his outstanding debts.

16. The applicant replied that he had complied with the six-month time-limit and exhausted the available domestic remedies. He also argued that the enforcement order for his eviction amounted to an unacceptable interference with the right to respect for his home. He made no comments as to the fact that the enforcement proceedings had been terminated.

2. The Court ’ s assessment

17. The Court does not have to address all the issues raised by the parties because the application is in any event inadmissible for the following reasons.

18. The Court notes at the outset that the complaints raised in the present application originated in civil proceedings in which the applicant was legally represented and was able to present his evidence and arguments (see, a contrario , Zehentner v. Austria , no. 20082/02, § 61, 16 July 2009).

19. The Court has held that an interference with an applicant ’ s right to respect for his or her home exists even where he or she has not yet been evicted, but an eviction order has been issued and may be enforced at any time. It has also held that the obligation on an applicant to vacate a property in which he or she lives amounts to an interference with the right to respect for his or her home (see Ćosić v. Croatia , no. 28261/06, § 18, 15 January 2009).

20. In the present case, an enforcement order was issued for the sale of a building in which the applicant ’ s home was situated. However, the enforcement proceedings were terminated on 18 December 2015 and there is no indication that a new enforcement order was issued at any point thereafter, let alone any order for the sale of the applicant ’ s flat or his eviction from it.

21. In these circumstances the Court finds that the application in the present case is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 15 December 2016 .

Hasan Bakırcı Paul Lemmens              Deputy Registrar President