FOURTH SECTION

DECISION

Application no . 52640/10 Mátyás PADLÁS against Hungary

The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 23 May 2017 as a Committee composed of:

Faris Vehabović, President, Carlo Ranzoni, Péter Paczolay, judges, and Andrea Tamietti, Deputy Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 2 September 2010,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

1. The applicant, Mr Mátyás Padlás, is a Hungarian national, who was born in 1957 and lives in Hódmezővásárhely. He was represented before the Court by Mr L. Horváth, a lawyer practising in Hódmezővásárhely.

2. The Hungarian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr Z. Tallódi, Agent, Ministry of Justice.

The circumstances of the case

3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

4. On 20 November 2007 the applicant filed an action with the Szeged Labour Court for unlawful dismissal.

5. On 6 May 2008 this court found for the applicant. On appeal, the Csongrád County Court upheld this decision on 23 September 2008, increasing the award. These courts took evidence at oral hearings.

6. On 25 November 2008 the respondent filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court, requesting an oral hearing.

7. By its order dated 29 April 2009 the Supreme Court informed the applicant, who was represented by a lawyer, that the respondent had filed a petition for review against the second-instance decision of the Csongrád County Court. The order contained the erroneous information that the respondent had not requested an oral hearing. It also stated that the Supreme Court itself did not consider necessary to hold one. The court nevertheless informed the applicant that he could request a hearing within eight days.

8. On 14 May 2009 the applicant ’ s lawyer filed comments on the petition for review. As to the holding of a hearing by the Supreme Court, his submissions contained the following passage:

“First of all, I submit with due respect that I am not asking for the holding of a hearing, since I am of the firm opinion that – on the basis of the available documents, evidence and pleadings of the parties – the honourable Supreme Court is in a position to decide on the respondent ’ s petition for review, which is in my opinion ill-founded.”

9. On 18 November 2009 the Supreme Court gave judgment without holding a hearing. It quashed the second-instance decision, reversed the first-instance decision and dismissed the applicant ’ s action. This decision was served on the applicant ’ s lawyer on 8 March 2010.

10. The Supreme Court accepted the respondent ’ s argument that the lower courts ’ decisions had faults of logic, contained wrong assessment of the evidence and their reasoning was inadequate. Relying in particular on oral testimonies of two witnesses, who had been questioned by the lower courts at hearings, in the presence of the applicant and his lawyer, the Supreme Court was satisfied that the applicant ’ s dismissal was lawful.

11. Section 274(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure provided, as in force at the relevant time, that the Supreme Court should decide on the petition for review without holding an oral hearing, unless any of the parties requested a hearing or the Supreme Court considered a hearing necessary.

COMPLAINT

12. The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the absence of an oral hearing before the Supreme Court amounted to a breach of his right to a fair hearing.

THE LAW

13. The applicant complained about the Supreme Court ’ s decision not to hold an oral hearing. He relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention which provides as relevant:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...”

14. The Government argued that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies in that he could have brought an official liability action – a well-established remedy in similar cases – against the Supreme Court for its failure to have properly informed him of the fact that the respondent had actually asked for an oral hearing. Indeed, the Supreme Court had breached, if inconsequentially, the relevant procedural rules in that it had held no hearing despite the respondent ’ s request. However, the applicant himself had expressly stated that he had wished no hearing. The Supreme Court, for its part, had taken no new evidence and based its decision on witness testimonies obtained at hearings the applicant had attended. All in all, the fairness of the procedure in its entirety had not suffered.

15. The applicant argued that the Supreme Court had represented the last available judicial instance in his case and an official liability action could not have possibly remedied the wrong sustained. When he received the erroneous information about the respondent ’ s renouncing a hearing, together with the statement that the Supreme Court itself did not consider necessary to hold one, he had deduced that the Supreme Court intended to reject the petition for review of the respondent, for the latter ’ s failure to pay the fees due. Section 274 of the Code of Civil Procedure required the Supreme Court mandatorily to hold a hearing if any of the parties had so requested. At any rate, the Supreme Court ’ s own position to dispense with a hearing led him to expect that the lower courts ’ decisions were likely to be upheld. The unfairness of the procedure culminated in the reversal of the lower courts ’ decisions which had been in the applicant ’ s favour.

16. The Court considers that it is not warranted to decide on the Government ’ s objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, since the application is in any case inadmissible for the following reasons.

17. The Court notes that the applicant expressly waived his right to have an oral hearing before the Supreme Court (see paragraph 8 above) and recalls that n either the letter nor the spirit of Article 6 of the Convention prevents a person from waiving of his own free will, either expressly or tacitly, the entitlement to the guarantees of a fair trial (see Hermi v. Italy [GC], no. 18114/02, § 73, ECHR 2006-XII, and Kwiatkowska v. Italy (dec.), no. 52868/99, 30 November 2000 ) . In these circumstances, the Court is not convinced that the applicant can validly complain about the absence of such a hearing simply because his speculations about the significance of the Supreme Court ’ s own intention not to hold spontaneously an oral hearing proved wrong. In this connection, the Court cannot attribute any decisive importance to the fact that the information given to the applicant about the other party ’ s interest in an oral hearing was wrong. In application of section 274 of the Code of Civil Procedure, had the applicant requested an oral hearing, the Supreme Court would have been required to hold one, irrespective of the other party ’ s position (see paragraph 11 above).

18. It follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) and must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 15 June 2017 .

Andrea Tamietti Faris Vehabović              Deputy Registrar President